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The primary objective of the thesis is to examine high executive pay trends in the Anglo-
American corporate system, in terms of its fairness and justice. Given that there is no objective 
standard for fair pay for executives, analysing the fairness of current pay trends would involve 
an examination on two levels: first, by looking at the pay setting process and possible 
irregularities within the latter which could compromise the integrity of the process as well as 
the outcome. Secondly, by putting high executive pay in a wider social context, an analysis 
against a background of wider income distribution. With respect to the latter, the thesis shows 
a causal relationship between high executive compensation and income inequality; the 
increase at the top end of the income distribution scale, could be attributable to the stagnation 
at the lower rungs. Considering the irregularities in the pay determination process and its role 
in income inequality, the thesis concludes that Anglo-American executive pay, at these levels, 
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1. An Introduction 
Adam Smith, in recognising income inequality as an inevitable outcome of a thriving 
capitalism, noted that it was perhaps needful in stimulating productivity and 
maintaining the so-called “distinction of ranks”. Proponents of the current executive 
pay culture might seize on this statement, while ignoring its wider context, as 
justification for the status quo. It would perhaps be fair to say that even Smith may 
have struggled to conjure a justification for not only the size of current pay levels, but 
the pace at which it has grown1. 
The acceleration of CEO pay levels precipitated a simultaneous increase in the CEO-
worker pay gap. In 1980, the average U.S CEO earned a salary which was 42 times the 
wage of the average worker, at $624,9962. The gap increased to 312:1 according to 
2017 figures, with average CEO pay standing at $18.9m3. A similar growth trend is 
evident for UK CEOs, who in the 1980s were paid on average between 13 to 44 times 
                                                            
1 By around mid-day on the 4th of January 2017-a day popularly known as ‘Fat Cat Wednesday’-the average 
FTSE 100 CEO had earned just over £28,000, the average annual salary for full time work in the UK1. Going by 
2015 figures, by the year’s end, same CEO would have earned on average, just under £4m, a figure that 
translates into an hourly wage of just over a £1, 000. An astonishing figure by any standard, which becomes 
even more befuddling when placed in the context of a society were a great portion of the citizenry earn below 
£10 an hour. Even worse, is the fact that UK CEOs are not the highest paid. Their American peers have 
themselves benefited from astronomical pay packets for decades, levels that make the UK levels pale in 
comparison. See, Katie Allen ‘UK bosses make more in two and a half days than workers earn all year’. The 
Guardian, 04 January 2017. On pay levels amongst American CEOs; Average pay for the top 200 CEOs within 
the S&P index with revenues of $1bn, was $19.3m. See, David Gelles ‘Top C.E.O. Pay Fell — Yes, Fell — in 
2015’. The New York Times, May 27, 2016. 
2 John Byrne ‘Executive Pay: The Party Ain't Over Yet’ Businessweek, April 25, 1993. Available at 
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1993-04-25/executive-pay-the-party-aint-over-yet). 
3 Lawrence Mishel and Jessica Scheider ‘CEO Compensation Surged in 2017’. Economic Policy Institute 





the average wage4. However, 2017 figures show that disparity to have grown 
substantially to 129:15. Although, UK CEOs traditionally lag their American peers with 
regards to quantum of pay, they are however relatively well paid, with 2017 figures 
showing average FTSE 100 CEO pay to be about £5.65m6.   
 These facts suggest that executive pay has witnessed an inflation-adjusted growth 
rate of 949 per cent between 1978-2015. A rate which out-paced that of the stock 
market and ordinary wages, which grew by 73 and 10.3 per cent respectively, in the 
same time period7. This very statistic raises potent questions about the justifiability of 
high pay. That executive pay has out-performed firm growth, nullifies the argument 
that executive pay is indexed to firm performance. Also, that executive pay has far 
outpaced ordinary wages, indicates that CEOs have increasingly captured larger 
portions of the wealth gains from increased productivity.  
 
1.2 Why High Executive Pay is a Problem 
An Oxfam news briefing in 2016 noted that the richest 1 per cent of the UK population 
- just over 600,000 individuals -own more than 20 times the total wealth of the bottom 
                                                            
4 High Pay Centre Report ‘FTSE 100 bosses now paid an average 130 times as much as their employees’. 
Available at (http://highpaycentre.org/blog/ftse-100-bosses-now-paid-an-average-143-times-as-much-as-
their-employees). 
5 CIPD Research Report ‘Executive pay Review of FTSE 100 executive pay packages’ August 2017. Available at < 
http://highpaycentre.org/files/7571_CEO_pay_in_the_FTSE100_report_%28FINAL%29.pdf>. 
6 Average CEO pay within the FTSE 100 index was £5.65m, a figure which includes the compensation paid out 
to the CEOs of Persimmon Plc and Melrose Plc, which stood at £47.1m and £42.3m respectively. Excluding 
these figures brought the average to £4.85, which still represents a 6 per cent rise in pay from 2016 levels. 
Otherwise, including the two pay packages, would suggest an increase of 23 per cent. This increase is evident 
in the median as well, which rose by 11 per cent to £3.93m. High Pay Centre Report ‘Executive Pay: Review of 
the FTSE 100 executive pay’. Available at <http://highpaycentre.org/files/CEO_pay_report.pdf> (accessed 
19/08/2018). 
7 Lawrence Mishel and Jessica Scheider ‘Stock market headwinds meant less generous year for some CEOs’ 





20 per cent-which represents about 13 million people8. Furthermore, it is estimated 
that the top decile of the wealth distribution scale collectively owns just over half-
about 54 per cent-of the nation’s wealth9. It is important to note that a lot of the 
wealth gains at the top are driven by executive pay, and this is evident in the U.S as 
well10.  
High executive pay is problematic, in the sense that it contributes to extreme wealth 
disparities, which threatens the socio-economic well-being of the relevant society. 
Figures show, that the UK and U.S consistently rank highest amongst the most unequal 
societies in the developed world11, this situation is made worse by the absence of 
tangible measures to address the situation. While it could be argued that this growth 
in inequality of income and well-being has led to fissures in Anglo-American societies. 
This is evident in the wave of economic populism and social upheaval, which has 
steadily grown both in form and impact, since the financial crisis. Manifesting in norm-
shattering political events like the exit of Great Britain from the European Union. 
‘Brexit’ was attributed in part to the pervasive disillusionment with wealth 
concentration at the top and the capture of the political process by a moneyed few, 
with specially corralled interests.  
As part of a plan to tackle income inequality, the British government recognised the 
extent to which high executive pay had contributed to the dilemma and discussed a 
                                                            




10 Mishel and Scheider (n3) 2. 





string of regulatory changes intended to address the issue. However, despite some 
initially stern recommendations, the actual proposals lacked the earlier vibrancy.  
Firstly, in the Green paper released in November 2016, plans to put total pay to an 
annual binding shareholder vote, were shelved. The latter it was suggested, could 
potentially be limited to “variable pay elements” and be made applicable to 
companies that had encountered “significant minority opposition” or who had lost 
previous advisory votes12. Also, prior plans to have workers on boards in a supervisory 
capacity as is the case in Germany and parts of the continent, where excluded. It is 
believed that the chancellor had considered some of the concerns raised about the 
practicality of the intended reforms, by members of the business community13.  
That Anglo-American executive pay has enjoyed an almost unfettered rise since the 
1980s, could be attributed to the non-interventionist policy stance of previous 
governments. Furthermore, when steps have been taken to arrest its growth, they 
have often lacked the bite needed to be impactful. Prior attempts had been designed 
to recommend, rather than compel as is the case with the various incarnations of the 
Corporate Governance Code. As such, firms falling within the purview of the Code 
could choose to avoid compliance, provided they had reasons for so doing. Recent 
research shows that only 72 per cent of FTSE 100 companies comply with the code’s 
provisions, while only 62 per cent of the FTSE 350 do so14. This suggests that optional 
compliance is perhaps not the most effective means to address corporate governance 
                                                            
12 Green paper: Corporate Governance Reform. Department of Business Innovation and Skills, November 2016. 
13 Jim Pickard and Sarah Gordon ‘May waters down plans for binding votes on executive pay’ Financial Times, 
November 29, 2016. 
14 Sarah Gordon ‘Third of UK businesses do not meet corporate governance requirements’. Financial Times, 





matters in general and the high pay issue in particular. The following section would 
outline some of the issues with High executive pay.  
 
 
1.2.1  High Executive Pay is the Outcome of Flawed Processes 
High executive pay is problematic, not only when considered for its size, but due also 
to issues with the process of pay setting. As Nozick stated, outcomes derived through 
“justice preserving means”15 are in fact just, the inverse of this would be that 
outcomes via processes lacking the justice requirement, would therefore be unjust.  
The popular justification for current pay levels is, that pay is just reward for 
performance. Challenging this view is the alternative argument that high executive 
pay is the outcome of managerial influence. Theories of “board capture” posited by 
Bebchuk and Fried, reject the mainstream justification for executive pay determined 
by performance, positing instead that managerial power and the latter’s ability to 
extract rents were the key determinants of pay quantum16. They argue that managers 
were enabled and indulged by complicit boards, either too distracted by self-interest 
or too apathetic to adequately marshal executive behaviour on behalf of investors. As 
such exorbitant pay packages are not the reward for good performance, but rather 
rewards unmatched by appreciable growth or given despite unmitigated failure. These 
                                                            
15 Which according to Nozick, are distributions which originate from a just situation and whose “repeated 
transitions”, either through acquisition or transfer, adhere to the demands of justice. Robert Nozick ‘Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books) 152. 
16 L. Bebchuk, J.M Fried and D. Walker, ‘Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation’. The University of Chicago Law Review, [2002] Vol. 69, 751-846. See also, Lucien Bebchuk and 






arguments are evidenced by a plethora of instances where out-sized payments were 
made in the face of poor firm performance. With the bonuses paid to executives in 
the wake of a tax-payer funded bail out, representing some of the most egregious 
examples17.  
Admittedly, not every exorbitant pay package is the product of a compromised pay 
setting process, in fact, an argument could be made that these may be in the minority. 
However, it is impossible to discountenance the impact even a handful of flawed pay 
packages could have. The utilisation of peer averages in the setting of executive pay, 
exacerbates the impact one flawed package could have. This latter fact, further 
highlights the difficulty of arguing for the performance-relatedness of executive pay. 
 
1.2.2 The Rise in Executive Pay Appears Interminable 
Executive pay grew by 950 per cent between 1979-2015, despite efforts to arrest its 
growth. Apart from legislative attempts which have had very limited success, the 
question of high executive pay has intermittently been placed before the courts. The 
Anglo-American courts have historically been reluctant to interfere in corporate 
governance matters. This attitude of non-interference is recognised and codified in 
some jurisdictions as the Business Judgement Rule. The Rule requires the judiciary 
when faced with questions that concern the exercise of valid business judgement, to 
defer to the director’s expertise.  
                                                            






Furthermore, company law doctrine dictates that the proper claimant in cases 
regarding wrongs done to the company, must be the company itself. This principle 
applies without exception to compensation cases, where claimants argue that 
disputed pay decisions constitute a waste of corporate assets. The problem is 
highlighted by the inability of the company to bring action by itself, due to its artificial 
status. Such claims are exclusively within the director’s remit, to institute on the 
company’s behalf or by a third party with leave granted by the company, through its 
directors18. Due to the high potential for conflict, the U.S courts devised the Demand 
Requirement, as an exception the rule. The latter allows third party claimants to be 
granted leave challenge pay decisions, provided they can evidence a prior demand 
had been made to the board of directors to remedy the situation or the futility of 
making such a demand19. Proving the futility of making a demand, does on its own 
present an onerous challenge, requiring the claimant to satisfy further obligations. It 
is perhaps no surprise that the clear majority of corporate waste cases fail at the 
preliminary hurdle20. 
With regards to executive pay cases, the current attitude of the U.S courts, represents 
a recognisable diversion from previous positions, as demonstrated in the decision in 
Rogers v Hill21. Here the court validated a corporate bye-law establishing a pay policy 
which allowed the CEO and other top executives, claim a percentage of the excess 
profits as a bonus. However, the court held that a $1m pay-out to the CEO, was 
                                                            
18 S.7.42 Modern Business Corporation Act. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martins, “Litigation Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility” 
Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol.79, 569 at 580. 





excessive and could not be justified given the prevailing economic circumstances22. It 
is remarkable that the court found the pay policy which produced the disputed 
compensation to be legitimate, but still decided against its justice because of its size 
and disparity from the norm. Holding that even a majority could not "justify payments 
of sums as salaries so large as in substance and effect to amount to spoilation or waste 
of corporate property”23. 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court in Brehm v Eisner24, rejected the plaintiffs 
argument that an agreement entered by the board with a CEO, which guaranteed a 
gratuitous exit package-allowing him earn more if his contract was terminated-was a 
waste of corporate assets. The court decision was taken 70 years after Roger and was 
based on claimant’s failure to provide particularized facts proving the board’s failure 
to meet the standard required for the compensation decision to be regarded as a valid 
business decision. The court decide thus, even though the CEO was awarded an exit 
payment of $38m, following a dismissal for poor performance.  
It has been suggested that reluctance of the courts to engage in compensation 
matters, arises from a need to discourage class actions suits being brought against 
corporations25. Regardless of the reasons, the court is required to meet its primary 
responsibility to address injustices and inequities at play in society, for which high or 
excessive executive pay often appears to fall within those categories. 
                                                            
22 Carl T. Bogus ‘Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy’ Buffalo Law 
Review, [1993] Vol.41 No.1, at 48. 
23 Rogers v Hill (n20) 591. 
24 746 A.2d 244. 





Legislative attempts to curb the growth in CEO pay have also proven largely ineffective 
and in some cases inadvertently aided its growth. The U.S legislature had sought to 
curb the growth of executive pay, by limiting its tax deductibility26. However, that the 
provision only applied to fixed salaries and not variable pay, allowed companies to 
circumvent its provisions by an emphasis on performance-related pay, which led to an 
explosion in pay levels27.  
Similarly, the Greenbury report required companies to disclose their compensation 
policy and to include total pay for executives, the performance criteria for realization 
of said pay, as well as comparator groups28. It is argued that increased disclosure 
enables companies ratchet up pay, referencing the salaries of CEOs of peer companies 
as justification29. Despite a caveat within the provisions of the code which required 
companies to “take account of relative performance” in making comparisons.  
It would be fair to say that legislative and regulatory attempts at addressing the issues 
with high pay, have yet to have the desired impact, as evidenced by the continuous 




                                                            
26 Robert Reich ‘There’s One Big Unfinished Promise by Bill Clinton that Hillary Should Put to Bed’ available at 
(http://robertreich.org/post/150082237740). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Greenbury Report was commissioned by the Confederation of British Industry and was released in 1995 
29 Alexander Mas ‘Does Disclosure affect CEO Pay Setting? Evidence from the Passage of the 1934 Securities 





1.3 High Executive Pay, Represents One of the Greatest 
Challenges of the 21st Century, Because of the Social 
Justice Implications 
Thomas Piketty in his book, Capital in the 21st Century, noted that the growth in 
income inequality coincided with the rise of the “super manager”30. As the 
fetishization of managerial talent increased, so did the rewards for possessing such 
talent and as managerial compensation grew, average wages stagnated. It is 
noteworthy that pay grew not only because CEOs could command higher wages-as a 
premium for their skill-but also the growth in CEO pay was partly driven by wage 
stagnation at the lower levels31. 
Executive pay began to accelerate in the 1980s in response to a multiplicity of factors.  
First, was the wholesale adoption of a neoliberal economic perspective, which began 
to gain traction in the 1970s. These ideas began to permeate economic policies on 
both sides of the Atlantic in the 1980s, and were promptly adopted by the business 
community32.  The engendering of the neoliberal market mentality in policy making, 
manifested itself in a widespread trimming of the state and its role in the ordering of 
the market and its activities. In Britain, the regression of the statist apparatus gave 
greater margins to the market and private interests, who began to fulfil obligations 
                                                            
30 The idea that managerial talent and skill was invaluable to firm success and required compensation 
commensurate with that of other highly skilled individuals. Thomas Piketty ‘Capital in the 21st Century’ (HUP, 
2014), 273. 
31 Josh Bivens and Lawrence Mishal ‘Understanding the Historic Divergence Between Productivity and Typical 
Workers Pay’ EPI Briefing Paper. Available at (https://www.smcm.edu/democracy/wp-
content/uploads/sites/29/2015/07/wage-stagnation-and-productivity.pdf). 
32 Steve Pearlstein ‘When Shareholder Capitalism Came to Town’ The American Prospect, April 19, 2014. 





previously met by the government. The privatization of erstwhile state-mandated 
services, created an opportunity for those with the means to step into these 
previously state-occupied roles, with significant financial benefits. Thus, creating a 
new class of shareholders and highly remunerated executives, whose remuneration 
was no longer constrained by government banding, but determined by market forces. 
Furthermore, efforts were made to slacken the controls over the private sector by 
revising previously enacted legislation, with the aim of freeing the market from the 
weight of bureaucratic red tape. In the U.S, the Reagan administration implemented 
policies that restricted the ability of the regulatory authorities to oversee share buy-
backs by corporations amongst others33. Also, the government passed legislation 
lifting capital controls which encouraged growth in market activity. The lifting of the 
controls on share buy-backs allowed CEOs to manipulate the share prices by investing 
large sums of corporate funds to repurchase company stock. The widespread use of 
equity as part of CEO compensation packages, made these buy-back schemes of 
immense financial benefit to executives34. 
To further the neoliberal agenda, attention turned to limiting employee rights and 
power, notably by stifling the unions. In Britain, the Conservatives led by Margaret 
Thatcher, passed the various Employee Acts35. The earlier version in 1980 had limited 
the power of the unions to lawfully picket and required a ballot for the operation of a 
closed shop provision. The 1982 version went further, by outlawing employee 
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dismissal for non-union membership and increased significantly the compensation 
that could be claimed in that event36. More significantly the Act lifted some of the 
immunities against civil action previously enjoyed by trade unions, making them more 
vulnerable to civil damages37. These acts were intended to soften the unions and 
employee resistance with the full effects brought to bear with the failure of the 1984 
miners’ strike. This precipitated a decline in union membership, which fell from 13.5m 
in 1980 to 9.9m ten years later38.  
It was important to disable the unions, given the impact that unionized jobs have on 
corporate performance39. They also have a sobering effect on earnings disparities 
within various industries40. The legacy of a successful war on the unions is evident 
today and manifest in phenomena such as: wage stagnation-wages have failed to keep 
pace with inflation. The latter has left ordinary workers worse off in real wage terms 
today, than in the 1970s. Furthermore, the decline in unionization has encouraged the 
widespread utilization of employee contracts, designed to strip employees of their 
statutory rights and the attendant costs41. The war on the unions led to union decline 
and excoriation of workers’ rights, to the benefit of shareholders and executives42. 
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39 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, the espousal of a neoliberal approach to governance, with its market 
emphasis and deregulatory tilt, precipitated the financialisation of the market 
economy. Focusing on the share price as the measuring unit of the company’s 
performance trajectory and shareholder value, it became necessary to maximise the 
share price, sometimes at any cost. What followed, was a deviation from the previous 
regime of empire building and corporate expansion, to a focus on efficiency and cost 
limitation43. Corporations began to downsize operations, situating jobs within low 
wage countries, while failing to retrain workers skilled within the particular field. 
Leaving blue-collar labour with the binary options of either being out of work or 
accepting unskilled and often poorly paid labour. With this having the twofold effect 
of placing a huge squeeze on wage growth for ordinary workers, while simultaneously 
stimulating firm profitability and executive compensation. 
 
 
1.4. What are the Questions to be Answered By this Thesis? 
As stated, the objective of the thesis is to examine the justice of high executive pay. 
The thesis defines executive pay as high, due to the disparity from the norm, when 
considered in relative terms. That executive pay could be deemed to be relatively high, 
does not connote its injustice. For the purpose of this thesis at least, the justice of high 
executive pay could be determined by evaluating its antecedents and externalities. 
The thesis adopts the approach that a justice evaluation of high executive pay must 
                                                            





do so by putting the latter in a wider social context. Failure to do the latter, would 
subject evaluations of high pay to the personal bias of the evaluator and lead to a 
biased outcome. 
Given the premise that high executive pay is not indicative of a failure to meet 
normative standards of justice, how then do we come to determine its justice?  
The answer to the above question must consider the process by which pay is 
determined, as well as its impact, within the immediate environment. Hence, the 
integrity of the pay setting process becomes of utmost importance in determining the 
justice of the outcome. Furthermore, the outcome would be examined in relation to 
its externalities. 
 Concerning the above objective, two key research questions must be answered; 
(1) Do possible compromises in the pay setting process render high executive pay 
unjust? 
The first question addresses one of the key justifications cited in defence of high 
executive pay i.e. that executive pay is the outcome of an agreement between an 
independent disinterested board, acting in the company’s interests and an executive 
looking to maximise her earnings. This conventional narrative possesses two aspects; 
first, that the independent board negotiates from a position of strength with the CEO, 
in determining fixed pay, while variable pay is made dependent on targets that ensure 
value maximization. Secondly, that variable pay is a reward for meeting these 
performance targets. This justification is premised on the somewhat questionable 
notion, the corporate governance safeguards intended to eliminate-or at least limit-





This thesis challenges the narrative by examining the pay setting process against the 
justice standards inherent within Nozick’s entitlement theory. That Nozick posits that 
anything that emanates from just processes is just, suggests that whatever arises 
through fraud, deception or undue influence, would fail to meet the standard. The 
latter is noteworthy when considering arguments which suggest significant 
managerial influence over the pay setting process. Therefore, by examining empirical 
and anecdotal evidence, this thesis would challenge conventional justification for high 
executive pay, using Nozick’s justice theory as a reference point.  
Although evidentially trivial correlation between pay and performance44, lends validity 
to the managerial interference theory, it would perhaps be hasty to suggest this to be 
the case in all instances. As the evidence suggests,  the governance reality shows 
managers wield greater influence over pay decisions than conventional theorists 
would want to admit. This first question is underpinned theoretically by Nozick’s 
justice theory, which only grants validity to outcomes which emanate from just 
processes. 
 
(2) Is high executive pay rendered unjust, via its sheer size, and disparate impact 
on income distribution? 
Through this second question, the thesis analyses the wider ramifications of high 
executive pay, by highlighting some of its externalities, including its disparate impact 
on income distribution cum income inequality. This question forms the second half of 
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this two-part analysis. High executive pay could only be determined to be just if it 
could evidentially be justified by its means, but also if the externalities it produces do 
not negatively impact the well-being of those it touches. Whereby the first question 
rests on Nozick’s theory of justice, the second question would be tested against the 
Rawlsian difference principle, which requires inequalities to be to the benefit of all. 
Hence, if high pay could be said to be the outcome of just processes, do the 
inequalities it produces work to the benefit of the least within the company on the 
one hand, and society at large?  
To answer this question, the thesis would examine pervasive operational strategies 
aimed at boosting productivity and profitability. The shift to shareholder value 
maximization necessitated a trimming down of company operations, making the firm 
leaner and nimbler with increased output. As such, the thesis argues that the shift to 
automation and increasing mechanization of production and service provision, is an 
attempt to further this end. With the consequence being, an increase in executive pay, 
with a corresponding decline in the fortunes of the firm’s ordinary employees.  
Whilst the first and second waves of industrialization in the 19th and 20th centuries 
caused skilled workers to earn higher wages-hence industrialization in this sense was 
dependent on manpower in the productive process-the third wave has sought largely 
to bypass this erstwhile pivotal aspect of the entire process45. The pivot to automation 
and other advanced technologies, coupled with a failure to retrain workers to adapt 
to these new technologies, has left labour deskilled and with a diminished relevance.  
                                                            





Furthermore, there has been a systematic outsourcing of the aspects of production 
and service provision, untouched by automation, to low wage countries46. This allows 
goods and service production to be maximized at a fraction of the cost. It is important 
to note, that a combination of all these factors, have had a wage-suppressive effect 
on those remaining in the workforce. Left without options and with little or no union 
support, labour was forced to work on vastly diminished terms. Simultaneously, given 
that pay is often linked to performance, the productivity boom has meant higher 
wages for CEOs. 
In the current regime, we have a situation where the wealth gains from increasing 
productivity are not being distributed effectively enough for the benefits to be felt 
widely. Increased corporate wealth has not translated to higher wages, in fact workers 
arguably earn less than in the post-war years, as wages fail to keep pace with firm 
productivity47. Therefore, if the factors that drive CEO pay to very high levels, do not 
appear to be in the interest of anyone but managers, executive pay would appear to 
fall short of the requirement of the Rawlsian principle.  
                                                            
46 William Lazonick ‘How Stock Buybacks Make Americans Vulnerable to Globalization’ Air Industry Research 
Network, Working Paper #16-0301, at 5. 
47 David Cooper and Lawrence Mishel ‘The erosion of collective bargaining has widened the gap between 






1.5. Research Methodology 
In answering the above research questions, the method adopted would be largely 
doctrinal. By utilising legal rules and doctrine, the thesis would examine the issues 
raised by the enumerated questions, in the light of the broad underlying theme of 
distributive justice and equity. The thesis takes on a comparative approach in engaging 
the subject, by juxtaposing the two dominant common law jurisdictions; the UK and 
U.S.A. This comparative approach, in  analysing the executive compensation culture in 
the UK and U.S.A, is important for a few reasons: 
Firstly, very little separates these two jurisdictions from a jurisprudential stand-point, 
share substantive and procedural similarities of their respective bodies of law. 
Furthermore, the two are largely homogenous, in so far as they share socio-cultural 
and economic similarities. For example, both operate vibrant market economies and 
have a similar cultural tolerance for income inequality amongst other things. This 
stated similarities, may partially explain why they have the highest CEO pay levels 
globally and rank poorly-as well as closely-in the global income inequality index.  
Although the UK lags the U.S in overall compensation levels, it adopts a similar 
compensatory template to their American counter-parts. An example would be the 
use of equity-based incentives, which were more widely used in the U.S, before the 
widespread adoption in the UK. It is no coincidence therefore that pay has grown in 
the UK and ranks second only to the U.S in international standings. 
Lastly, despite the jurisprudential similarities, there is however a general lack of UK 
case law regarding compensation in public companies. The majority of the current 





Which perhaps is useful when examining the pay against stated legal doctrine, but less 
so when placing pay in a wider context as is the approach of the thesis. In contrast, 
American corporate law jurisprudence is inundated by a healthy body of shareholder 
derivative case law. Where existing pay levels have been tested against legal dogma, 
even if only at a preliminary stage.  This difference could perhaps be a reflection of 
the disparity in litigation funding across these two jurisdictions. 
The thesis adopts a “law in context” approach in a bid to fully analyse the justice of 
high executive pay. This approach extends the debate beyond questions of quantum 
and considers its impact on wider society. By adopting the underlying themes of 
distributive justice and equity, through the contrasting theories of Rawls and Nozick, 
the thesis hopes to provide a platform for an evaluation of high pay in a real-world 
context. The enumerated objective, necessitates the implementation of a socio-legal 
approach. 
The thesis as reflected by its subject-matter and methodology, aims to examine 
executive pay in accordance with the broader themes of justice and with less regard 
to its compatibility with UK/U.S company law. This is an approach free of the 
restrictiveness which a strict rudimentary application of the legal doctrine might yield. 
The thesis seeks to engage the process of executive compensation setting, the 
outcome of the process and its impact in a wider social context. To this end, it is 






1.6. Original Contribution to the Subject-matter 
The issues surrounding executive pay have been widely researched. There is quite a 
solid body of work on the two key subjects addressed within this thesis; the pay setting 
process and the disparate impact of high executive pay. Generally, the focus in most 
of literature examining the justice of high CEO pay is largely on issues regarding 
quantum i.e. the size of the CEO pay packages, including the determinants of high pay. 
Thus, there exists a wealth of literature on the pay-setting process, and the failures 
therein. With a broad focus on managerial power or board capture, emphasising the 
likelihood of managerial influence over the pay setting process.  
However, there is not as much of the existing literature which considers the justice 
and fairness of executive pay, much less from a socio-legal standpoint. With regards 
to the latter approach to discussing high executive pay, the existing literature consists 
largely of work by Charlotte Villiers48 and Jared Harris49. These authors addressed 
arguments surrounding executive pay, from the vantage point of justice and social 
justice by utilising Nozick’s and Rawls’ principles of justice.  
Villiers stated the importance of establishing a careful definition of justice within the 
context of pay50. In discussing the justice of high executive pay, her work focused both 
on the pay setting process as well as the antecedents of high pay. 
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Villiers analyses the justice of executive pay setting utilising the theories of Rawls and 
Nozick. Using the standards espoused by these theories as a touchstone for 
establishing the justice of high pay. While highlighting the dissimilarities of these 
theories in terms of their overall approach to distributive justice, she does 
acknowledge however the procedural bent of Nozick and Rawls’ theses51. With Nozick, 
she highlights the voluntarism that underpins his transactive-based assertions. 
Wherein the giver of a thing must choose to and be willing, to part with the thing, to 
benefit another. The absence of the latter, would indicate that the outcome of said 
transaction would fail to meet the standard of justice52. In terms of Rawls, she 
mentions that while the Rawlsian theory was concerned partly with the process of 
distribution, he however countenanced the function of the outcome as well53. Much 
in contrast to Nozick who cared less for the impact of the outcome, when the justice 
of the process could be established. 
With regards to role of the law in constructing a just system of compensation 
determination, Villiers mentions that Nozick’s thesis, could be used as a “basis for the 
regulation” of executive pay. While the Rawlsian difference principle, could be used 
to construct a system of laws which would ensure that inequalities function to benefit 
all within society. She posits that Rawls’ idea of justice requires the regulation of 
executive pay to extend beyond the company laws, but also to the relevant 
distributive framework54. 
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Villiers also addressed the antecedents of high pay while utilising the difference 
principle55. In so doing, she critiqued the current regime of executive pay citing its 
distributional consequences, with a focus on its contribution to inequality. She argues 
that the Rawlsian difference principle encourages equality of opportunity and was 
based “on the ground of equal respect for persons”56. Something she believes the 
inequality of income-which partly results from high executive pay-threatens. 
In a similar vein, Harris discussed the problematic nature of current compensatory 
practices within corporations from an equity standpoint in addition to the negative 
consequences of incentive pay for company executives57. Harris highlights the fact 
that common objections to executive pay are usually based on its gross and 
comparative magnitude. Which generally centre on the size of executive pay and how 
it compares with average income. Harris however, criticised this approach for its 
sensationalist nature. He argues that the use of pay ratios could be misleading and 
incredibly difficult and complex to determine58. He states, that because executive pay 
is deemed to be unfair, does not necessarily imply that it is in fact. That a true 
determination of the justice of executive pay should consider the pay setting process 
and that of CEO selection, in line with Rawls’ difference principle59. 
He mentions the possible circumstances which could sully and ultimately compromise 
the pay-setting process, including CEO celebrity and influence over pay decisions. 
Other factors he mentioned are cognitive dissonance resulting from shared 
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backgrounds and prior relationships and the “norms of reciprocity” which could result. 
He argues that these may cause the pay setting process to fall short of Rawls’ 
expectations60. 
Similar to Villiers, Harris applies Nozick’s process-oriented thesis to the pay setting 
process. Arguing that the process may fail to meet the libertarian standard for justice 
if “all the libertarian tenets of individual responsibility, market transfer and consumer 
liberty” are not present within the transaction. Concerning the way high executive pay 
impacts the wider community, Harris states utilising Nozick’s theory, that; “Because 
Nozick argues that a thief is not entitled to his ill-gotten gains, it follows that executives 
who use an insider's advantage to enrich themselves at the expense of other 
stakeholders also do not attain just entitlement”61. Suggesting, that the determination 
of the fairness of executive pay, must extend beyond an examination of the pay setting 
process. 
He concludes, that unlike the objections to CEO pay based only upon its gross or 
comparative magnitude, an analysis of executive pay based on its justice and fairness 
“potentially has strong validity”62. 
Taking what has been said with regards to the justice of current executive pay levels, 
using Nozick’s and Rawls’ justice theories, this thesis attempts to advance the subject 
matter. First, by combining an examination of the pay setting process, with an analysis 
of the wider impact of executive pay.  
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The existing literature on the subject-matter, as represented by the work done in the 
area by Villiers and Harris, focused largely on an application of the justice theories to 
the pay-setting process. While Villiers went beyond the pay-setting process and put 
forward a contextual analysis, her arguments veered largely toward the egalitarian 
objections to high pay. This thesis also considers the egalitarian objections to high pay, 
but goes beyond questions of equality and considers the externalities of high pay, in 
determining its fairness. Such that, if the requirements of justice-as represented by 
Nozick’s entitlement theory-are met within the pay setting process pay cannot be 
deemed to be fair solely on these grounds. As such, the thesis considers the corporate 
actions which precede the meeting of the firm’s objective. Like practices discussed in 
Chapter Four, which increase productivity and supress costs, including wages for the 
ordinary workers. Thereby increasing value in the short-term, but at the expense of 
the long-term health of the firm and the community it inhabits. The approach adopted 
by the thesis, is predicated on the notion that executive pay cannot be just, if its 
externalities negatively impact the wellbeing of those touched by the corporation. 
Therefore, the approach adopted to examine the justice of high executive pay, would 
be carried out thus: 
First, by a quantum-based analysis of high executive pay, which includes the pay 
setting process and the pay for performance argument for high executive pay. This 
first test is underpinned by Nozick’s requirement that outcomes must be determined 
by justice preserving means, to be just.  
Regardless of the outcome of the first test-even if pay-setting process is shown to be 





requirement. As one of the major drivers of income inequality, pay must be measured 
against the Rawlsian difference principle-that validates inequalities only when they 
work to benefit the least in society. As such, the second test considers the externalities 
of high pay on all constituencies impacted by corporate activity, besides investors.  
CEO pay at its current level could only be determined to be just if it is determined by 
“justice preserving means” on the one hand AND meets the fairness standard, that is, 
must work to the benefit of all within society. Failure to meet both requirements, 
leaves executive pay short of the justice requirement. 
 
 
1.7. A Brief Outline of the Thesis by Subject-matter 
 The rest of the thesis goes as follows; 
Chapter Two attempts to lay a foundation for some of the arguments within the thesis, 
by examining the notion of executive pay as an issue of public policy. The latter would 
be determined by whether a society perceives the firm as a wholly public or private 
institution. Contemplation of the firm as wholly private, excludes all firm activity from 
the falling within the purview of public policy, the reverse would be the case, if the 
firm was considered to be a public institution. The Chapter argues for the latter, given 
the inextricability of corporate activity from wider society. It would therefore be 
implausible to consider the firm as wholly private, when so much of corporate activate 





would therefore bring the firm within the purview of public policy. Opening the doors 
for the legislative approach to reforms, intended to enhance its fairness. 
The thesis goes on in Chapter Three to answer the first research question by analysing 
the pay-setting process, using Nozick’s process-oriented justice perspective. It began 
by highlighting the arguments both for and against the current pay levels. It mentions 
the conventional view of an arm’s length bargaining process as well the managerial 
influence/captive board theory put forward by Bebchuk and Fried. The Chapter 
highlights some of the failings within the Anglo-American corporate governance 
structure, which potentially compromise board independence and facilitate 
managerial influence over the pay-setting process. Comparing the pay-setting process 
to Nozick’s postulation of a legitimate process in income determination and 
distribution. The Chapter argues that the inherent failures could potentially 
compromise the integrity of the latter and the fairness of the outcome. As part of this 
wider analysis, the Chapter examines the widespread use of comparator averages in 
pay setting. Arguing that this furthers arguments against the fairness of executive pay, 
making it unlikely to meet the justice requirements of Nozick’s thesis. 
In the Fourth Chapter the thesis attempts to answer the second research question; 
determining the justice of high executive pay by analysing its impact on wider society. 
In doing so, the thesis references differing theories of justice: Nozick’s libertarian 
theory and Rawls’s difference principle. With regards to executive pay, Nozick’s 
process-oriented argument would render high executive pay just, provided the pay 
setting process was uncompromised. Rawls’s alternative viewpoint that-income 





Nozick and to debunk notions of justice regarding high executive pay. Here the thesis 
considers some of the externalities of CEO greed and excess. Here particular focus 
would be given to growing automation and pervasive adoption of modern 
technologies in production and service provision. The Chapter would consider how 
these have facilitated the globalisation of firm operations. Highlighting the impact of 
offshoring and production relocation-a fact which has had a suppressive effect on 
wages at the bottom, while simultaneously causing CEO pay to increase, in response 
to productivity gains.  
The thesis proceeds in the latter stages of the Chapter to examine the debate 
regarding the convergence of corporate governance systems globally. The move 
towards the Anglo-American system of governance and its impact on executive 
compensation levels globally. It could be argued that the expansion of equity markets, 
and the dispersion of share-ownership, as well as a reduction in the number of family-
held firms globally, could be regarded as evidence of convergence. This argument is 
further strengthened by evidence of Anglo-American compensatory practices in 
jurisdictions not naturally inclined to such methods. This section sought to further the 
argument that the current pay levels-particularly outside the U.S- are more responsive 
to external factors and thus, has little to do with value creation. 
In Chapter Five, the thesis considers potential reforms to the current executive pay 
culture. Considering a role for the judiciary in arresting the growth of executive pay, 
as well as the legal constraints which make such an intervention unlikely. Here, the 
history of executive compensation litigation in both jurisdictions is discussed. The 





decision in Rogers v Hill, to the more liberal positions taken in more recent cases. The 
Chapter would discuss the attitude of non-interference adopted by the courts in 
general and would extensively consider the codified Business Judgment Rule.  
The latter portion of the Chapter would explore possible reforms to enhance the 
fairness of executive pay. First, by exploring the effectiveness of the recent legislative 
enactments, like the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010, both aimed at improving the transparency of executive compensation 
setting. The thesis goes on to argue that, although progress had been made since the 
passing of the aforementioned, more radical measures had to be pursued for 
meaningful progress to be made. To this end, the thesis discussed tightening some of 
the existing provisions within the ERRA, as well as the implementation of more 
stringent measures like maximum upper limits on executive pay. 
The final Chapter concludes the thesis and identifies possible measures that could be 
taken at state and institutional levels to curb high executive pay. With regards to the 
former, the possibility of state-mandated caps-as are in place in some jurisdictions-is 
discussed as well as institution level changes geared towards making pay fairer. It is 
concluded that state-mandated pay caps are a highly unlikely proposition particularly 
in the face of precedent from other jurisdictions where similar measures have been 
taken with less than desirable outcomes. The Chapter concludes with a call for a more 
balanced view with regards to what the corporate objective should be, as an antidote 








The Corporate Objective: Shareholder Primacy, Executive Pay 
and Public Policy 
 
2.1. Introduction 
For the most part since the last century, academics and business scholars have 
debated on what function the corporate form should have. Should it be geared 
towards profit-maximization or should the corporation being a social entity, like all 
other social entities, be established and operated for the common good?1. Limited 
liability confirmed the status of the modern corporation as the primary vehicle for 
business operations. Not simply because it created an avenue for investors to create 
wealth, but also and perhaps more importantly, it created an artificial entity, with a 
veil that protected its members from the negative consequences of business failure. 
Though adaptation to this business form was slow, it would eventually become the 
prime vehicle for investment in business and innovation in the twentieth century2. As 
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such, the attention shifted from the morality and ethics of the business form to its 
objective and functionality. To whom did this business entity owe its allegiance?3 
Limited liability began the process of separating ownership from control. The 
corporation being a legal person, having rights and obligations, did not have to be 
managed by its owners.  As investments increased, the resultant diffusion of 
ownership brought with it the need for the corporate manager4, at the same time, the 
corporate dichotomy of capital and labour was birthed.  
Adam Smith stated in the, ‘The Wealth of Nations5’ that only labour and entrepreneurs 
were to be regarded as the primary recipients of the proceeds of a company’s assets, 
not investors. Smith’s view on the objective of the company is said to have been borne 
out of his disdain for investor capitalism, which was the order of his day6. However, 
the view point was to change over the next few decades and investor interests were 
continuously and progressively prioritised. This followed the expansion of the limited 
liability corporation as it became a mainstay in the Anglo-American business polity.  
However, the Anglo-American approach to corporate governance, with its focus on 
shareholder primacy differed from the approach adopted in most of Europe and Asia. 
With the latter opting to view the company more as a social entity having 
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responsibilities in service of public interests7. It has been argued that a society’s 
approach to corporate governance is substantially influenced by its political and socio-
cultural institutions8. Given that Anglo-American societies have historically leaned 
towards a laissez faire attitude, with a non-communitarian preference for free 
markets and limited state interference, it should come as little surprise that it 
approaches corporate governance in such a manner. As such, shareholder primacy has 
gained traction in recent decades, riding the wave of neo-conservatism that took hold 
in the 1980s on both sides of the Atlantic9.  
As such the staunchest proponents of this governance approach would scoff at the 
concept of the altruistic business entity. Nor would they countenance the notion of a 
corporation having its scope of interests broadened to include and prioritise those of 
its wider community. On this note, the neoliberal economist, Milton Friedman 
famously stated that the company has but one social responsibility: to maximize the 
wealth of its members10.  A view to which other commentators including Adolf Berle 
appeared to be similarly inclined11.  
Much like Friedman, Berle believed in the efficiency of shareholder primacy, but 
differed in the way he rationalised his support for this governance approach. His 
opinions were borne out of a genuine belief that managing for shareholders was the 
                                                            
7 Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakmann, “The End of History of Corporate Law”. Georgetown Law Journal 
[200-2001] Vol.89, 439-468, 446. 
8 Mark J. Roe, Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, [December 2003] 
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 53. p.539-606. 
9 Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis: The Globalization of the Corporate Governance (Ashgate 2009). 
10 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, New York Times Magazine, 13 
September 1970. 
11 Adolf A. Berle ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ Harvard Law Review [1930-31] Vol.44, 1049. Also, Adolf 





most effective way to combat managerial indiscipline and excess12. Thus, it was for 
the benefit of all that the company be run in the benefit of some. But many have 
questioned the basis for shareholder ascendency as the prime focus of the corporate 
objective. With their ownership rights, no longer a solid base to lay their claim, it 
becomes necessary to understand the justification for shareholder primacy. 
The question of shareholder primacy becomes even more significant with regards to 
the debate surrounding executive pay, where greater shareholder engagement has 
been identified as the antidote to rising pay levels.  The counter-intuitiveness of the 
latter proposition becomes apparent, were one to consider the argument that the 
high executive pay culture is largely a by-product of a shareholder-centred approach 
to corporate governance13. The focus on the share price as the prime measurement 
of corporate growth and value creation, coupled with the need to ensure managers 
prioritised the latter, inadvertently stimulated the growth of wages at the top. The 
growth in productivity excused the inequities it created, even as it upset the overall 
balance of income distribution. For these inequalities were justified as expedient given 
the benefit a thriving corporation could have on the aggregate social wealth14. 
The question of shareholder exclusivity is central to the executive pay debate. Because 
it concerns solutions to the problem and the question as to whether high executive 
                                                            
12 Berle, "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note," 1367. 
13 B. McSweeney ‘The Pursuit of Maximum Shareholder Value: Vampire or Viagra?’ Accounting Forum, Vol.31, 
Issue 4, 325-331. David Collinson et al ‘Shareholder Primacy in UK Corporate Law: An Exploration of the 
Rationale and Evidence’. Available at (http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-
technical/business-law/rr-125-001.pdf) and Steve Pearlstein ‘When Shareholder Capitalism Came to Town’ The 
American Prospect, April 19, 2014. Available at (http://prospect.org/article/when-shareholder-capitalism-
came-town). 
14 William Lazonick ‘How Stock Buy-backs make Americans Vulnerable to Globalization’. AIR Working Paper 







pay is a private matter to be resolved within the corporation? Or is it to be regarded 
as public matter requiring a statist solution? In other words, is high executive pay a 
public policy or a shareholder issue?  
The distributive justice implications of high executive pay strengthen the argument 
that executive pay could be subjected to the whims of public policy. Some of the 
arguments against the justice of very high pay, centre on its social justice implications, 
particularly the effects on income distribution. We could make an argument for its 
consideration as a public policy issue, if the focus is placed not simply on pay quantum, 
or consideration given also to its externalities. However, the latter issue cannot be 
isolated from the broader debate concerning the place of the corporation with regards 
to public policy. 
For the view of the firm as a wholly private institution requires that firm -based issues 
be best settled within the endogenously. However, this Chapter explores the 
contrasting view that the externalities of corporate activity require the firm to be 
subject to public policy. As such, the firm cannot be regarded as a wholly private 
institution as so much of corporate activity directly impacts its immediate 
environment. This argument is bolstered by the fact that, almost every aspect of the 
corporation is subject to some form of governmental regulation. Could a similar 
argument therefore be made with regards to executive pay? For the latter to be the 
case, it must first be shown that the externalities of high executive pay, sufficiently 
warrant a public policy interventionist approach. To an issue which could 





The arguments in this Chapter, form the basis for the two research questions. The 
failure to show the company as a socially responsible institution, ensures that 
arguments regarding the implication of its compensation policies become irrelevant. 
In contrast, the view of the firm as a socially responsible public institution, invariably 
opens the door for state sanctioned reformative agenda. Hence, the arguments here 
are also intended to lay a foundation for some of the proposals on executive pay 
reform that would be discussed in Chapter Five. This Chapter would address the 
executive pay issue within the larger debate on the corporate objective, while 
considering the various arguments with regards to the latter. The arguments within 
are set out as follows: The following two sections would discuss briefly the growth in 
executive pay, outlining some of the commonly held reasons for the latter trend. 
While highlighting some of the arguments concerning the externalities of high 
executive pay, which would be expounded upon later. 
The fourth and fifth sections would examine the executive pay debate within the 
wider context of the role of the firm. Here the Chapter would consider arguments 
which favour the status quo of shareholder primacy within the corporate objective. 
Measured against more egalitarian conceptions of the firm as a public institution and 
its implication of executive pay as an issue of public policy. Section six would consider 
the contrasting arguments for the consideration of executive pay as an issue of public 
policy. While section seven would briefly touch on some of the externalities of high 
executive pay, by considering the distributive implications of high executive pay. The 
section would favour Rawls’ outcome-based justice thesis and consider Nozick’s 







2.2. The Growth in Executive Pay: Financialism and the Effects of 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Anglo-American executive pay has grown astronomically since the 1980’s. Figures 
record a growth rate of 940.9 per cent since 1978, for U.S CEO’s, while the UK has 
witnessed a similar level of growth15. The gap between executive pay and ordinary 
wages has widened significantly in that time, due on the one hand to the already 
mentioned rise in executive pay and the relative stagnation in ordinary wages16. 
This section would briefly highlight some of the reasons for this; which include the 
neoliberal conception of the firm as a nexus of contracts, which spawned shareholder 
primacy as the Anglo-American governance model. The prioritisation of the share 
price as a key performance indicator and the financialised corporate objective, worked 
to create and aid a culture of excess, allowing executive pay to flourish. 
  
2.2.1 Shareholder Primacy as a Governance Approach 
The Anglo-American corporate governance model prioritises the interests of 
shareholders above all other competing interests. The reasons for the governance 
approach would be dealt with in greater detail later in the Chapter. It is sufficient to 
not here however, that the prioritising of shareholder interests led to the 
                                                            
15 Chris Matthews ‘This One Chart Shows How Obscene CEO Pay Has Become’ Fotune.com. Available at 
http://fortune.com/2016/07/15/ceo-pay-2/>. High Pay Centre Report ‘Cheques with Balances: why tackling 
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centralisation of shareholder value creation within the corporate objective. As a 
result, share price movements have become the key indicator of company 
performance17. 
The preoccupation with the share price has led to a more financialised outlook. 
Whereas in times past, indicators of firm growth may have centred on attainment of 
scale or innovation, this appears to no longer be the case. Returns to shareholders is 
the primary target and this focus brings with it, certain negative implications. The 
following section would discuss the issues with a financialised corporate objective. 
 
 
2.2.2. Financialism as a Symptom of Shareholder Primacy 
Lazonick bemoaned the fact that the focus on shareholder interests had led to 
financialisation of the Anglo-American economy, with a negative impact on its 
productivity levels18. On a similar note, Lawrence Mitchell, argues that the American 
economy had shifted from capitalism to financialism19. 
It has been noted that the shift towards financialism coincided with a period when the 
corporate focus shifted to creating shareholder value20. The corporate obsession with 
the share price could be said to have originated from a school of thought that began 
to gain traction among economists in the 1960s. This stems from the efficient market 
                                                            
17 Lawrence Mitchell ‘A Very (brief) History of Financialism.’ Creighton Law Review [2010] Vol.43, 323. 
18 Lazonick contends that the need to maximise shareholder value, makes the economy more vulnerable to the 
harmful effects of globalisation. Lazonick (n14) 5. 
19 Mitchell (n17) 326. 
20 Ibid, 323. Also, Lawrence E. Mitchell: The Speculation Economy: How Finance Triumphed Over Industry 





hypothesis-which espouses the efficiency of markets and believes the share price fully 
captures the firm’s value21. These views began to take hold following the wave of neo-
conservatism in the 1980s. As such the share price, has been wholly and religiously 
upheld as the clearest index of corporate value and potential. This period also 
preceded the expansion and ascendency of the financial markets.22  
The shift to a financialised economic system has brought with it some of its own 
disadvantages. On this note, Lazonick highlighted rationalisation, marketization and 
globalization as some of the structural changes, that were necessitated by the focus 
on shareholder value and the share price23. He posits, that rationalism began to take 
hold in the 1980s following the inability of businesses to keep pace with foreign 
competitors. Who had superior organisational and hierarchical structures and as such 
higher quality and less costly output. The loss of a competitive advantage meant they 
had to find alternative ways to remain profitable.  
Firms increasingly opted to downscale their operations, as a groundswell of workforce 
reductions began to take place. This was worsened when the markets began to react 
favourably to companies who adopted these measures24. In support, Jung notes that 
these changes were easy to rationalise, given that the firm was increasingly viewed as 
accountable to a narrower constituency of stakeholders. Even as managers began to 
                                                            
21 Jonathan Clarke, Tomas Jandik, Gershon Mandelker, ‘The Efficient Markets Hypothesis’. Available at 
http://m.e-m-h.org/ClJM.pdf. Also, see Eugene Fama ‘Efficient Capital markets: A Review of the Theory and 
Empirical Work’ [1970] Journal of Finance, Vol. 25 Issue 2, 383-417. 
22 Dignam and Galanis (n9) 230-232. 
23 Lazonick (n14) 3. 





`face increasing pressure from external investors to increase profits, Jung mentions 
that more firms resorted to workforce reductions to increase investor wealth25.   
The marketization phase originated in the early 1990s when the very large firms began 
to wind down the previous implicit promise to provide lifetime employment to a 
dedicated work force. This worsened with the advent of technological advances, 
which encourages the globalisation of operations. Allowing companies cut costs by 
situating large portions of their operations in low-wage countries at a fraction of the 
costs26. 
Accordingly, the financialisation has led to a loss of innovation and industry. 
Characterised by a fixation on share price movement firms have become increasingly 
short-termist in their approach. A manifestation of this is the widespread use of share 
buy-backs at the expense of long-term value creating investments27. With an 
overwhelming number of corporations reinvesting corporate profits to bankroll buy-
back schemes28. As Lazonick notes, that these buy-backs which on the surface appear 
driven by the need to increase shareholder value, maybe driven instead by managerial 
self-interest.  Given that significant portions of executive compensation are equity 
based; executives stand to benefit personally from share price gains. Shareholder 
value may therefore be the perfect disguise for managerial greed. 
 
                                                            
25 Jiwook Jung ‘Shareholder Value and Workforce Downsizing, 1981–2006’ Social Forces, Vol.93(4) 1335, 1337. 
26 Lazonick (n14) 4, 5. 
27 Ibid, 7. 





2.3. How the Focus of Shareholder Value Theory Negatively Impacts Income 
Distribution? 
As noted already, there is an almost linear connection between the adoption of 
shareholder value approach and the growth in executive pay.  Furthermore, a similar 
connection could be made between soaring managerial compensation and the growth 
in income inequality29. Since CEO pay began to rise in the 1980s, CEOs and other 
executives consistently inhabit the top deciles of the earning spectrum30. This could 
be attributed largely to the utilisation of pay for performance to maximise managerial 
performance and eliminate agency conflicts31.  
This approach to incentivization necessitated the use of equity-based compensatory 
methods. Making executive pay variable and subject to share price movements and 
returns to shareholders, would ensure that the fortunes of managers and investors 
would be sufficiently intertwined32. The point being made is, performance-related and 
equity-based pay made shareholder value enhancement a personal pursuit for 
managers, as they had just as much to gain from firm success. Not to say making pay 
subject to performance is of itself a bad idea, however systemic corporate governance 
                                                            
29 Brian Bell and John van Reenen, ‘Bankers Pay and Extreme Wage Inequality in the UK’ Available at 
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/cepsp21.pdf). Also, Lazonick (n14) 6. 
30 Executive pay grew 940 per cent between 1978-2015, three times faster than the growth of the income of 
the top 0.1 per cent. Far outpacing the stock market, which grew by 73 per cent in the time. See Lawrence 
Mishel and Jessica Schieder ‘Stock Market Headwinds Meant Less Generous Year for some CEOs’ July 2016. 
Available at (http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-grew-faster-than-the-wages-of-the-top-0-1-
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31 Steve Pearlstein ‘When Shareholder Capitalism Came to Town’ The American Prospect, April 19, 2014. 
Available at (http://prospect.org/article/when-shareholder-capitalism-came-town). 





weaknesses have allowed managers to manipulate the system and extract rents in the 
process33.  
Symptomized by a patently irrational fixation on share-buy backs, dividend payments 
etc. none of which appear to be of great benefit to the firm, employees and the 
surrounding communities. But instead enrich managers as well as investors, 
perpetuating a wealth distribution system that places the greater share in fewer 
hands34. 
This raises questions as to whether executive pay could be regarded as an issue of 
public policy. Given the nature of the modern corporation, it is an issue which would 
inevitably be contentious and fraught with debate. Arguing, that high executive pay 
has a wider negative impact, provides the basis for its recognition as a public policy 
issue. Which could would in turn support the notion of state intervention in the 
public’s interest. The other side of the debate would be the market argument: that 
corporate matters are private and solutions to issues, sourced from within the market. 
These are questions which must be answered before a discussion on the current state 
of executive pay could be undertaken.  
 
 
                                                            
33 Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried: Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Cambridge, HUP 2004). 
34 Oxfam reports that the richest 1 per cent own half of the global wealthy. With the wealth inequality 
worsened by the 2008 crisis, and a recovery that was driven by increasing wealth at the top. Company CEOs 





2.4. Executive Pay and the View of the Corporation as a Private Entity 
It has been argued that issues related to executive pay should be privately ordered 
and resolved endogenously within the corporation35. But a contrasting argument 
could be made, that the externalities of high pay make it a public policy concern and 
an issue best resolved by the promulgation of mandatory rules36. It is therefore 
difficult to separate the debate regarding executive pay reform, from the wider 
contentions concerning firm governance and the corporate objective. Opinions 
regarding the creation of mandatory rules to govern executive pay, would very likely 
be influenced by the individual’s perception of the corporate objective.  
Advocacy for the view of the corporation as a private institution with an overarching 
profit-oriented responsibility, finds judicial support in a number of historical cases. 
Foremost is the English Appeal Court’s decision in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas37, 
where the court stated that the phrase “in the interest of the company as a whole” 
was intended to require directors to act in the interest of shareholders. The above 
decision was echoed in Dodge v Ford38, where the court also seemed to suggest, that 
the business of the corporation should be steered towards the attainment of 
shareholder ends. Stating further, that directors owed a responsibility to ensure the 
latter. Prior to this ruling, the 19th century corporation was viewed as an instrument 
for the furtherance of the state’s public policy aims39. 
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37 [1946] 1 All ER 512. 
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Shareholder primacy is underpinned by two major intellectual views: One precipitated 
by a rejection of an increasingly managerialist corporation brought on by the 
separation of ownership and control. The other emerged from the contractarian 
school of thought, with its view of the corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’. Both 
principles espoused shareholder primacy, albeit for very different reasons, i.e. the 
former attributed largely to the work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means and the latter 
by law and economics scholars of a neoliberal persuasion40. 
 
 
2.4.1 The Public Policy Debate: Shareholder Primacy or Corporate Pluralism? 
2.4.1.1 The Berle-Means Thesis and the Theory of the Firm as Nexus of Contracts 
Central to the corporate objective debate, are questions regarding the degree of 
consideration corporate managers should be required to give to the public interest, 
while managing the corporation. Or indeed if managers have a duty to consider the 
public interest at all. 
Those in opposition to the above statement, would argue that the primary objective 
is the satisfaction of investor interests, which should take precedence over all other 
competing interests41.  
                                                            
40 This view developed from a series of articles published, including; Eugene F. Fama ‘Efficient Capital Markets: 
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, Journal of Finance [1970] Vol.25 (2): 383–417; M. Jensen and W. 
Meckling ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial 
Economics [1976] Vol.3 (4): 305–60; H. Demsetz ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, American Economic 
Review [1967] Vol.57: 347–59. 
41 Michael C. Jensen ‘Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function’ Journal of 





Berle and Means argued that the corporation ought to be managed to the benefit of 
shareholders, but ultimately disagreed with the general notion that this shareholder 
entitlement was a proprietary benefit42. The idea of shareholders as proprietors 
originated from 18th century entrepreneurial capitalism and from the pre-industrial 
notion of businesses being an extension of its ownership43. The Berle-Means thesis, 
acknowledged that unlike the traditional family-owned business, the dispersed 
owners of the corporation were at best providers of passive capital. That the passive 
nature of their investments did not endow them with an especial status44. That said, 
they believed that managing the firm on behalf of investors was the most effective 
way to curtail managerial power. Believing, that the separation of control from 
ownership had created a power vacuum, which if filled by managers unchecked, would 
lead to absolutism45.  
Perhaps most notable with regards to Berle’s thesis, is his acknowledgement of the 
corporation’s moral significance, and its responsibility to consider the public interest, 
just like any other public institution would46. To this end, they stated; “It seems almost 
essential if the corporate system is to survive, that the ‘control’ of the great 
corporations should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of 
claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the 
                                                            
42 In Bligh v Brent [1897] AC 22, the court reset the ramifications of the concept of share ownership. Prior to 
this case it was believed that share ownership entitled the holders to an equitable interest in the benefits of 
the company’s assets. But the court in delineating the company from an ordinary partnership stated that 
unlike the latter, were ownership was regarded as part ownership of the assets entitling the part owner to a 
share of the benefits or liabilities because of their right of ownership. 
43 John Boatright, “Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: or what’s so special About 
Shareholders? Business Ethics Quarterly, 1994 vol.4 Issue 4, pp. 393-407 at 394. 
44 Adolf Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation (New York: Macmillan) at 355. 
45 Adolf Berle, Jr., "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note," 1372. 





income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity”47. Ultimately, 
the Berle-Means view of the corporation is collectivist in its perception of the firm as 
a socially responsible institution, even if shrouded in arguments for shareholder 
primacy. 
In contrast, the neoliberalist contractarian view considers the corporation as a wholly 
private institution, a view which finds its roots in Coase’s theorem which considered 
the corporation as a means of limiting transaction costs48. Continuing in this tradition, 
contractarianism views the firm as a “nexus of contracts”, between a collection of 
individual parties i.e. managers, employees, creditors and shareholders. With each of 
these parties having a direct contractual relationship with the other in contributing to 
the execution of the firm’s productive operations49. Here, the firm provides the 
parameters within which the contracting parties could interact, with each of the 
parties offering their respective inputs, in exchange for a corresponding output.  
To this end, corporate law exists to facilitate the governance arrangements that 
underpin private contracts, by providing “off the shelf” templates which the 
contractors can adhere to or alter to suit their needs50.  The fluidity of contract 
arrangements is pivotal to the contractarian view point, given its conviction that the 
heterogeneity of firm needs, demands that firms be allowed to contract on diverse 
terms that suit them. Founded on the belief that firms are better placed to determine 
their governance needs than outsiders not similarly privy to the information held by 
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insiders51. Contractarianism eschews mandatory rules for this reason and other 
reasons, which could include its belief, that mandatory rules are made irrelevant by a 
lack of externalities resulting from these types of private contracts. This is due to the 
fact that “market mediated individual choices would lead to socially optimal 
contracts”52. 
Of these contractual relationships, contractarians place greater value on that between 
managers and investors. In this relationship, managers promise effective corporate 
governance arrangements engineered to maximise shareholder value, in return for 
the premium paid for a stake in the firm, in the form of shares53. Contractarianism 
justifies the promotion of shareholder primacy within the firm governance matrix 
claiming their entrepreneurial risk-taking situates them as residual claimants. As such 
corporate law in recognising their importance, as well as the precarity of their 
position, grants certain rights to compensate, for their restricted claim to the firm’s 
resources54. This irony-of the contractarian reliance on mandatory legal rules to 
provide justification for one of its core tenets, was highlighted by Moore55. For this 
reason, shareholder exclusivity is justified not only as the most effective strategy 
towards corporate goal attainment, but to ensure a return on the investment made 
by shareholders. The following section would examine some of the common 
arguments for shareholder primacy. 
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2.4.2 Justifications for the Shareholder Primacy Model 
2.4.2.1 Shareholders are a Vulnerable class 
Contractarians argue that the position of shareholders as residual claimants places 
them in a vulnerable position, thereby imposing a moral duty on directors to prioritise 
their interests56.  The fact that shareholders are not generally given any preference in 
the process of liquidation of assets, ensures they must wait till all other competing 
interest have been satisfied57. Therefore, directors have a moral duty to look after 
their interests while the firm is solvent. Which is necessitated by their position as 
capital providers and the firm-specificity of their investments58.  
In retort, this argument however fails to consider the dispersion which hallmarks the 
Berle-Means corporation, as well as the increasing rarity of the singularly-vested 
investor. Of the competing interests within the firm, shareholders are in reality the 
least invested in the firm’s long-term future, often having an unmatched ability to 
divest their interests and diversify their investments. Employees, consumers and host 
communities over time make investments, specific to firms and mostly lack the 
mobility enjoyed by investors. Particularly the host communities which become 
economically dependent on the firm, and are often unable to withdraw their interests, 
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without suffering major economic loss. Given the often steep, sunk costs, put towards 
infrastructure, manpower and patronage59. 
Furthermore, some argue, that the absence of recourse through contract law, 
exacerbates the vulnerability of shareholders. Sundaram and Inkpen note that, other 
constituencies i.e. employees and creditors can enforce their rights through the 
courts. For instance, labour laws provide employee protections, while bond-holders 
have their entitlements to interest and principal repayments secured by contract law, 
there is a distinctive disparity in the protections provided to shareholders60. While 
acknowledging the derivative rights afforded to investors under corporate law, they 
cite the negligible success rates as a major limitation. Arguing further, that when these 
suits are successful, the benefits accrue to the firm, not the litigating shareholder 
directly61. 
 
2.4.2.2 Reducing Agency Costs 
Berle argued that the dispersion of share ownership placed managers in a privileged 
position with regards to the power they could wield62. In a bid to prevent the rampant 
managerialism which would inevitably result, Jensen believed that shareholders 
would need to incur costs in monitoring managers to have them focus on maximising 
shareholder value. Therefore, these monitoring costs would entitle shareholders to an 
                                                            
59 Freeman believed that functioning on behalf other constituencies would ultimately benefit shareholders on 
the long-run. See Freeman, Parman and Wick, “Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Revisited” 
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exclusive status, wherein they have their interest prioritised63. Contractarians argue 
for an agency relationship between managers and shareholders, whereby the former 
work on behalf of and in the interest of the latter64 
However, the very notion of an agency relationship between managers and 
shareholders was challenged by Boatright, justifying his arguments on the apparent 
lack of an express or implied contract between both parties, the very basis of any 
agency relationship65. He further challenged the agency claims stating that the 
relationship lacked the key ingredients of an agency relationship which he stated to 
be:  
Firstly, that agents should have power to act on the principal’s behalf without prior 
recourse. Managers sometimes require shareholder approval to take decisions that 
affect the prospects of the firm, i.e. decisions regarding corporate restructuring etc.66. 
Also, a primary characteristic of an agency relationship is the control the principal 
exerts over the agent, which in his opinion cannot be found within the manager/ 
shareholder continuum. Investors lack the day to day control over the decision-making 
process and the opportunity to review decisions taken by management only presents 
itself on a limited basis67. Therefore, when decisions taken are not in shareholder’s 
interests, they have very few options for redress, besides litigation. Furthermore, the 
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workings of the Business Judgement Rule, further complicate the issue. Unless of 
course the plaintiffs can prove the decisions were not made free of any conflict of 
interest and were not based on “reasonably thorough information”68. 
 
2.4.2.3 For Efficiency and in the Interest of the Public 
It is argued, that managing primarily on behalf of shareholders would make for 
efficient corporate governance69. Sustaining the interests of one constituency of 
stakeholders in the firm ensures that the executive is clear on its objective and as 
Jensen put it “multiple objectives is no objective”70. Berle argued that it was in the 
public interests that shareholder interests be prioritised71. Berle believed that 
managing for shareholders was the only way to protect the firm and community from 
managerial abuse. It is asserted that because Berle was communitarian in his 
approach72, he believed that the only way to ensure a socially responsible corporate 
entity, would be to manage on behalf of shareholders73. As such a focus on firm value 
would evidently increase social wealth.  
Admittedly, shareholder wealth maximization obviously positively impacts the firm’s 
immediate environment in the sense that an increase in corporate value could affect 
job creation and spending, both having obvious benefits to the local economy. In 
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contrast, the shareholder value approach could lead to directors managing in the 
short-term at the expense of true value creation74. It could also negatively impact 
inequality and skew income distribution, by creating wealth for a privileged class. A 
class which includes company executives, whose pay packets are often affected by 
share price movements75. This creates a cycle whereby managers become entirely 
focused on raising the share price often at any expense, bearing in mind the positive 
effect on their own compensation and regardless of the effect on the environment or 
employees and so on76. It becomes extremely difficult to comprehend how 
shareholder value could be in the public’s best interest.  
Dodd countered Berle’s efficiency argument, by questioning the rationality of insisting 
that the company, a separate legal person, be managed primarily in the interests of 
its investors. He answered this question from two logical perspectives: firstly, positing 
that since corporations are separate from their owners, the managers who run these 
companies should be regarded as fiduciaries not of the members, but of the company. 
Which itself is more than an aggregate of its members, “as they are………. trustees for 
an institution rather than attorneys for stockholders”77. Second, if the corporation was 
to be regarded as a legal person, then it should be held to the same standards as any 
other in a similar position, with regards to its standing and responsibilities to society. 
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He stated further that increasing designation of ‘business’ as a profession, would imply 
that it be held to some ethical standards as any other professional person, and such a 
standard could not be exercised to the benefit one stake-holding class to the exclusion 
of all others78.  
Furthermore, shareholder primacy does raise concerns about its potential to create 
an enabling environment for managerial excess, which it is ironically supposed to 
inhibit. Agency theorists argued, that closely linking executive pay to company 
performance, would lead to greater efficiency, both in its comparative and intrinsic 
value. That said there is a tangible link between shareholder primacy and high 
executive compensation, which skews the income distribution framework and 
concentrates wealth at the top. That research shows higher levels of income inequality 
in the jurisdictions which adhere to shareholder wealth maximization, cannot be 
dismissed as mere coincidence. The latter makes it difficult therefore to follow the 
argument the shareholder primacy works in the public interest or increases aggregate 
wealth79. 
 
2.5. A Case for the Pluralist Corporation: The Stakeholder Theory of the Firm 
In contrast to the latter argument, there are those who contend against the notion 
that shareholder primacy works in the public interest, arguing instead, that 
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considering the public interest in corporate governance, works to benefit the firm and 
all its stakeholders.  
Freeman believes managing for stakeholders is the most pragmatic form of corporate 
governance, as profits should be the outcome and not the raison d’ etre of value 
creation. Freeman posits that, the primary goal of corporate value creation is best 
attained when value is created for all the firm’s stakeholders80. He argues further, that 
a pluralist approach to corporate governance would lead to the long-term value 
creation and create sustainable wealth for investors. 
One of the strongest criticisms of shareholder primacy is the overarching focus on the 
share price, which could lead to “managerial myopia” and lead to short-term value 
creation often with quite significant and negative consequences in the longer-term81. 
It could be argued, that this overarching focus on shareholders, often works to the 
detriment of the other constituencies. When the dominant goal is profit maximization, 
firms are more likely to cut jobs, suppress wages, or less likely to consider the 
environment or the welfare of its immediate community, with even greater 
externalities. 
The crux of the debate is the role of the corporation in the society it inhabits; are 
corporations to be considered solely to be profit-oriented, amoral institutions, 
obligated only to investors? or are they to have a broader remit, having a moral 
responsibility to society as a whole? Donaldson believed corporations had a moral 
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obligation which exceeded the need to be profitable82. The preceding view may seem 
out of kilter with modern corporate ideology, however, this appeared to be the more 
normative approach over a century ago. 
That the corporation was to be viewed as more than a profit-making entity was 
reflected in the attitude of the 19th century courts, which urged the consideration of 
wider interests, so long as doing so worked to the benefit of the shareholders83. 
However, in Dodge v Ford, the Delaware court seemed to suggest that it was the duty 
of directors to manage the corporation in the interest of shareholders. This ruling 
witnessed the beginning of a change in attitudes and precipitated a debate on the 
issue of corporate social responsibility. Shareholder primacy advocates argue that 
corporations are to be primarily responsible to shareholders, stating further that was 
ultimately to the benefit of all corporate stakeholders, that the former’s interests be 
prioritised84. 
 
2.5.1 In Whose Benefit Should the Corporation Be Managed?  
s.172 of the Companies Act 2006, introduced the enlightened shareholder value 
approach to corporate governance. The section urged directors to “act in a way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole”. But in so doing, they were to have regard 
for the interests of the other stakeholders, like employees, creditors etc. Although the 
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section exceeded the erstwhile common law position, by calling for a broader 
approach to corporate governance, it however, left little doubt as to whom the 
corporate objective should benefit primarily. This approach was not coincidental, but 
rather resulted from the drafter’s deliberate intention to broaden the corporate 
objective, while consolidating shareholder rights85. 
The Company Law Reform Steering Group (CLRSG) was tasked with identifying the best 
approach to corporate governance. The committee was also charged with the 
codification of director’s duties, which was previously grounded in common law. The 
group’s objective was to maintain the common law approach of shareholder primacy. 
But sought to “strike a balance” between the competing stake-holding interests, to 
achieve the stated goal86. This approach was deemed necessary to encourage the 
cultivation of long-term relationships, which would help corporations to avoid being 
overly focused on the short-term. 
In deciding the best governance approach, the CLRSG considered and subsequently 
rejected the pluralist approach, for the following reasons: first, the group was of the 
opinion that latter would necessitate a wholesale reform of the director’s duties, 
already established in common law. Also, they viewed the pluralist approach as 
“unworkable” and a distraction from the goal of shareholder wealth prioritisation87. 
Instead it adopted the enlightened shareholder value approach, which maintained the 
erstwhile focus on shareholder wealth creation. The approach additionally obliged 
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directors to take “a proper balanced view of the short and long term: the need to 
sustain effective ongoing relationships with employees, customers, suppliers and 
others”88. Here, the drafters viewed relationships with the other constituencies as a 
means to maximize shareholder wealth. 
Dodd on the other hand, believed that the corporation and those who managed it 
owed a duty not only to shareholders, but to all those touched by corporate activity. 
Dodd challenged the contractarian notion of the corporation as private property. He 
argued that when private property was used in the provision of services to the public, 
such property is only private in a “qualified sense”, being subject to regulation and the 
dictates of public policy89. He argued thus, due to his perceived limitations on 
shareholder’s private property rights, which may include-but not restricted to- 
regulations such as labour laws which are placed to secure worker rights. That the 
latter did in fact dilute the strength of the argument that corporations were private 
institutions to be utilised solely for the optimisation of profits.  
Dodd believed the corporation’s profit-making prerogatives were subject to the will 
of the state. That where the law, through the state, allows a business to make 
“unregulated profits” it would be in consequence of a recognition of this being in the 
best interest of society at large. That this was not to be considered as deferent to the 
corporation’s or indeed its owner’s private property rights90. Believing that the 
corporations right to conduct its business, was recognised and permitted by legal 
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institutions because it ultimately served the wider community to do so, and not in 
recognition of its duty to generate profits for its owners91. 
Dodd believed the corporation should work to benefit anyone affected by corporate 
activity. He argues that the contractarian view originated from the erroneous 
perception of the firm as an aggregate of its members. Stemming from a rejection of 
the right of managers to wilfully utilise private property, in ways which do not directly 
benefit the owners. Due to a view of managers as agents acting on behalf and in the 
interest of investors92. Dodd rejects this view and argues that, the consideration of the 
firm as a legal unit with varied membership, required managers to be trustees for the 
entire unit, without a preference for any individual stake-holding constituency93. 
Corporate law progressives have argued that a pluralistic approach to corporate 
governance is the most strategic means to ensuring sustainable shareholder wealth. 
This goes against the conservative view of pluralism as wasteful altruism94. Dodd 
posits, that by accepting the communitarian approach to corporate governance, 
managers would be fulfilling their primary objective to maximise profits95. Because 
socially responsible policies would naturally engender goodwill from a beneficiary 
community, with the inevitable positive impact on the bottom line. For instance, 
higher wages would often translate into greater consumption levels.  
The pioneer Henry Ford recognised the viability of the above and sought to reinvest 
some of his company’s profits into higher wages for its employees. He withheld the 
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issuance of dividend payments to shareholders, to reinvest the firm’s profits in the 
business. The ensuing controversy formed the basis for the litigation in Dodge v Ford. 
The ultimate intent was to expand the company’s customer base, by producing 
affordable vehicles and increasing wages within the firm. Ford believed that higher 
wages would lead to productivity gains for the firm, and greater consumption of the 
company’s products, which would translate to higher profits. His instincts were 
validated, when the company enjoyed a significant growth in sales and profits96. The 
decision to withhold dividends, was challenged by aggrieved shareholders and the 
court decided that it was arbitrary and not lawful.  
What was most notable about the court’s decision, is that the court did not rule on 
the decision to invest the firm’s resources in strategic expansion-choosing to defer to 
the board on this issue-but ruled specifically on the issue of dividends. Which it may 
be argued, lends support to the notion that firms exist for shareholder wealth 
maximization. 
The communitarian view of the corporations as a public institution is particularly 
important to discussions concerning high executive pay. Considering the corporation 
as a public institution brings executive compensation within the realm of public policy, 
which brings with it a number of implications: 
 First, that the issues surrounding managerial pay in terms of its determination and 
quantum, cannot be detached from the discussions regarding the pay of the general 
workforce. Considering executive pay to be a private matter allows advocates of the 
private market approach to governance defend very high pay for instance, as a 
                                                            





justifiable outcome of an arm’s length contract. In that case, the issue of quantum 
becomes irrelevant, as the question shifts from what the compensation was, to why 
the level of compensation is necessary. If the latter answers meet the required 
normative standards accepted within private enterprise, then the compensation is 
just.  
Secondly, questions regarding executive pay reform would fall within the prerogative 
of legislative and regulatory bodies. Whereas free market ideologists would argue that 
executive pay issues should be left to the market, this becomes implausible, as the 
corporation as a public institution, leaves room for legislative attempts at reform. This 
latter issue would be revisited in Chapter five. 
 
 
2.6. Executive Pay and the Shareholder Primacy Debate: Could Executive Pay 
be Considered a Public Policy Issue? 
As discussed, the view of the firm as a private institution, would require that executive 
pay issues be resolved within a private market framework. The argument changes 
dramatically however, when the firm is considered as fully woven into the fabric of 
the community it inhabits, as well as a producer of externalities. Given that so much 
of corporate activity is regulated, a strong argument could be made also, for the 
subjection of managerial compensation to the volition of public policy. 
The egalitarian argument provides the strongest contentions in favour of treating 





impact on income distribution and as a contributor to inequality97. Egalitarians view 
income inequality as a root cause of power imbalances which work in the favour of 
executives and the corporations they represent. Egalitarians posit, that the inherent 
complexities of the firm make it akin to “private governments” and share deep 
similarities with political regimes. A fact which highlights its incompatibility with the 
notion of the corporation as a private entity98.Therefore, it is in the public’s interest 
that executive pay levels are mandated by the state, to ensure it is representative of 
the income distribution levels both within the firm and its wider environment. 
They argue that incorporated status is a privilege, with corresponding responsibilities, 
which gives the endowing state a right to mandate its behaviour, at least in some 
respects-to meet these responsibilities99. Therefore, the argument that the state 
cannot interfere in or regulate compensation matters becomes moot. However, 
having already established the state’s right, the question becomes, whether the state 
should in fact intervene? 
The contractarian response to the aforementioned question would understandably be 
in the negative. Viewing the private firm as a platform for the privately negotiated and 
executed contracts that define it, restricts the law to having a facilitative and not an 
interventionist function. Therefore, legislating or indeed regulating how much 
company executives could earn, by so doing, causes the legal framework upon which 
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these contractual relations are built, to transcend its role as a facilitator. A state of 
affairs, which contractarianism abhors and ultimately rejects. 
To understand the contractarian resistance to legislative interference in executive 
compensation matters, particularly with regards to how much executives could earn, 
we must first highlight, albeit briefly, the major justifications for current pay levels. 
Moriarty highlights three common justifications, the Agreement argument-that 
executive pay is the outcome of an arm’s-length bargaining process, the Desert 
argument-that high pay is earned and a reward for optimal performance, the Incentive 
argument-that high pay is required to attract and retain talented managers in a 
competitive labour market100. 
 
2.6.1 Theoretical Justifications for the Consideration of Executive Pay as a 
Private Matter. 
The proponents of the Agreement justification argue that executive pay is the 
outcome of negotiations between managers and the board of directors. Accordingly, 
for compensation to be optimal, the process must meet two important requirements: 
compensation must have been agreed to by an independent and adequately informed 
board and be designed to optimise firm performance. Accordingly, provided these 
requirements are met, negotiations are regarded to have been done at arms-length 
and the resulting agreement is just101.  
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The Desert justification for high pay, views it as reward for performance. This 
argument views the role of the CEO as pivotal to firm success, hence the need for their 
compensation to reflect the growth and productivity gains. In the latter case, pay 
quantum becomes irrelevant. The major challenge with this view is the quantification 
of managerial contribution to firm success, as we know managers are not solely 
responsible for success in the same way they are not solely liable for failure. The reality 
is, that the average corporation consists of thousands of employees, each making a 
limited but significant contribution to the company’s operations and strategy. The 
manager’s role therefore is to effectively oversee and manage these operations. The 
significant responsibility borne by CEOs, is not in dispute. But the major criticism of 
the desert view, is whether the responsibility matches current pay levels. Moriarty 
argues they do not.  
He criticises the view on two points, putting aside the performance-related aspect of 
CEO pay, and if contribution is in fact the basis of desert, he questions what the CEOs 
initial compensation should be. In many instances, even the non-performance 
elements of CEO pay are multiple times higher than the average wage within the firm. 
Secondly, he criticises the argument that compensation is significantly higher than the 
average, to maintain parity with the responsibility CEOs bear. He does this by 
comparing CEO pay to the remuneration of managers in other high responsibility, 
public sector roles, who earn significantly less102. 
Finally, the utility or incentive-based justification, on the other hand determines a just 
wage by its ability to attract, retain and ultimately motivate optimal managerial 
                                                            





performance. Whereas the desert argument views pay as a reward for performance, 
the incentive view on the other hand views pay as a means to incentivize optimal 
performance103. This view is highly focused on individual talent and sees 
compensation as a way to extract optimum performance from the individual and 
assumes monetary incentives as the most efficient motivator. A shortcoming of this 
view, is its emphasis on external incentives, to the detriment of intrinsic motivations 
which could precipitate optimal performance104. Also, assuming that paying above the 
odds, does indeed lead to more efficient performance, it however becomes more 
challenging to measure the impact paying multiple times above the average, has on 
performance105. 
Th utility of the preceding in arguing against the subjection of executive pay to public 
policy, is found in its privately ordered underpinnings. Therefore, where high 
executive compensation is paid by agreement, to reward or incentivize, these are 
manifestations of the corporation’s ability to contract as a privately ordered 
enterprise. With executive compensation being one of the more salient embodiments 
of the free market ethos, upon which the corporation subsists. 
Arguments that executive pay should be subject to public policy could be based on the 
impact high pay has on the wider society. Much has been made of the fact that 
executive compensation contributes to income inequality in Anglo-America, however 
these arguments transcend the income distribution concerns alone. But they 
challenge the very notions of egalitarian justice, upon which the modern democratic 
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society is built. These perhaps characterise the most compelling arguments for a 
public policy intervention with regards to executive pay. 
 
 
2.7 Executive Pay and the Distributive Justice Problem 
The argument for pay to be regarded as a public policy issue is that current levels are 
unfair or unjust. High or excessive pay is argued against not only for its sheer size, but 
for the distributive justice implications. That is the widening gap between executive 
and ordinary worker pay and how the former contributes to this phenomenon.  
The difficulty with current pay levels, from an egalitarian view point, is that it works 
to benefit CEOs and shareholders. None of the other stake-holding constituencies 
seem to benefit-at least not in any quantifiable sense-when CEOs are exorbitantly 
compensated. The age-old argument for high pay based on its impact on firm 
performance fails to hold water in the face of modern reality. 
This results from the key metric of measuring firm success via the creation of 
shareholder value in other words through share price movements, and the fact that 
share price movements often are not a reflection of a sturdy economy. By utilising 
short-term value creation mechanisms, like buy-back schemes, workforce reductions 
etc. managers could effectively create value for shareholders, but very little or in some 
cases value losses for the firm’s other stakeholders. This is further made worse when 
we consider the fact that shareholders represent a small subset of society, we are then 





privileged elite” of financial asset owners106. High executive pay, would need to benefit 
more within the society to be justifiable107. 
 
2.7.1 The Justifiability of Current Pay Levels: the Rawlsian Difference Principle 
To determine the justifiability of high executive pay, this section would consider the 
Rawlsian difference principle. The difference principle is two-pronged, the first argues 
that; “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others” and 
That; “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to position and 
offices open to all”108. 
This portion of the Chapter is concerned with the second principle and in a bid to 
determine how high executive pay benefits the least of the firm’s stakeholders.  The 
common neoliberal argument justifying inequalities of income, is that a rising tide 
would eventually lift all boats, hence wealth placed in the hands of those at the top 
would eventually filter downwards to those at the bottom ends. This would apply to 
the corporation, where high executive pay would motivate and incentivize the 
executive to maximize profits, which would lead to greater firm performance. To the 
benefit of all the stake-holding constituencies.  However, this neoliberal assertion fails 
to reflect reality and is left vulnerable on two grounds: 
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First, by the lack of a provable association between high pay and improved firm 
performance. In fact, if anything, the available evidence leads us to contrary 
conclusions, that paying executives more, does not always lead to greater value 
creation109. Some evidence suggests it could lead to loss of value or short-term value 
creation, with negative consequences in the longer term110. 
Second, assuming that high pay does lead to better performance, the argument here, 
is that the other constituencies are not positioned to benefit from said success. The 
reality is, better firm performance does not always lead to higher wages; this is 
underlined by the sluggish wage growth for average workers since the 1980s, relative 
to the rise in CEO pay. In fact, the growth in executive pay has outpaced that of the 
stock market index111. The facts show that the productivity gains of the last three 
decades have not translated to better wages for average employees within the firm 
and community. Instead, most of the benefits have gone to shareholders112. Which is 
problematic from a distributive standpoint, as the composition of the shareholding 
body shows that the majority of company shares traded on the stock exchanges are 
either held institutionally or by very wealthy individuals113. Therefore, to assert that 
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shareholder management increases social aggregate wealth, appears to be more 
fantastical than factual. Although these issues would be examined further in Chapter 
Four, it is important to note here, that a distributive justice evaluation of high pay, 
suggests that it fails to meet the egalitarian standard embodied by the difference 
principle. Instead, high executive pay could be said to produce sufficient externalities 
that could cause it to go against the public interest. Thus, justifying its consideration 
as a public policy issue. 
 
2.7.2. Nozick’s Argument 
As touching on the impact of executive pay on the income spread, Nozick’s thesis is 
less concerned with the distributional consequences of high executive pay, as he is 
with the manner in which said pay was obtained114. Nozick’s arguments as they relate 
to the pay setting process, would be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. It 
is however fair to state at this juncture, that the process-oriented bent of his 
libertarian thesis validates the outcome of all just processes, irrespective of the latter’s 
consequences. 
For a distribution to be just, according to Nozick, then the process of acquisition or 
transfer must meet the stringent justice requirements. That is, the historical 
antecedents of the distribution must be law compliant, i.e.. the goods must neither be 
stolen or obtained via unjust means. Once this requirement has been met, the 
distribution could be determined to accord with the requirements of justice, obviating 
                                                            





the need for a further analysis of its quantum and the inequities which may result115. 
Being a strong believer in the minimalist state, Nozick believed that the state’s role 
with regards to market interactions was simply to guarantee a conducive environment 
for the latter to be undertaken. As such, any action taken by the state of an 
interventionist nature, was manifestly unjust and an encroachment116. 
On this note, Nozick’s thesis differs from the Rawlsian principle. While Rawls is 
ultimately concerned with the externalities of executive pay and would ultimately 
determine executive pay to be an issue of public policy. Nozick on the other hand, 
would deem it to be an entirely private matter, to be determined in the absence of 
external influence. Nozick’s libertarian ethos would suggest a lack of concern with the 
current pay levels, provided they could be shown to meet the demands of justice-this 
would be discussed in Chapter Three. It may be fair to conclude that if the latter where 
proven not to be the case-that high executive pay is shown to be unjust and the pay 
setting process compromised-that Nozick would require that reform is left within the 
purview of the firm. 
To conclude, the decades long debate on the corporate objective, has renewed 
saliency with the issue of high executive pay. Raising the issue as to whether the issues 
surrounding executive pay, should be privately ordered or resolved within a public 
policy framework. However, it is fair to say at this point, that the distributive 
consequences and externalities it could sometimes produce, makes a strong argument 
for some form of regulatory intervention. Which brings us to the issue of executive 
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pay reform-assuming we agree it needs reform-and who should be responsible for it. 
Market enthusiasts would argue that executive pay should be left to the shareholders 
to decide what an appropriate pay level should be, and executives may be paid in 
accordance. Thus, there exists little or no tolerance for external interference in pay 
matters. On the other hand, those who view the firm as a socially responsible 
institution, would consider the negative social effect high pay could have and conclude 
that pay should be subject to the public policy mandate. Which would not be far-
fetched, considering other aspects of the firm are thus mandated.  
 
2.8. In conclusion 
The decisions in Greenhalgh and Dodge, amongst others, could be interpreted to imply 
judicial support for the notion, that the corporation should be run primarily in the 
interest of the shareholders. The reasoning behind this conclusion could be brought 
to question at this time, considering the established view of the firm as a producer of 
externalities. As a result, this view has been challenged in recent times, especially with 
the animus over executive compensation and rising income inequality. As studies 
show a linear connection between the diminishing wages the ordinary worker and 
rising shareholder capitalism. It is not merely coincidental, the U.S and UK-the poster-
children for this model of corporate governance-have the highest and most extreme 
levels of inequality and rent-seeking of all the advanced nations. 
Considering the role of the corporation in the context of the society within which it 
subsists, is particularly important to the executive pay debate. For to subscribe to the 





consideration of corporate governance matters against a backdrop of the public 
interest.  In that case, executive compensation becomes a public policy issue. One 
could argue, that in many ways, executive pay is somewhat already being considered 
to be a public policy issue, in the light of the recent legislative attempts at reform. 
Particularly in the light of its omnipresence in the public discourse.  
It is however, fair to note, that said attempts have thus far fallen short of the 
radicalism needed to effectuate true reform. It could be argued that the latter 
restraint from heavy-handedness, may in fact be a nod to and an acknowledgement 
of the firm’s autonomy from public policy demands. 
To consider the corporation a public institution, would be to consider executive pay a 
public issue and subject to state intervention, like all other issues touching on public 
policy. Although previous judicial declarations on this issue have sided with the notion 
of the firm as a private entity, it is an issue perhaps in need of a judicial declaration 
which fully considers the complexities of the modern corporation and of its role within 
a broad social context. The absence of which, would continue to encourage the 






Capturing the Pay Setting Process: Questions of Managerial 
Interference in the Fixing of Executive Pay. 
3.1. Introduction  
Current levels of executive compensation in Anglo-American firms, particularly CEO 
pay, have been the subject of public scrutiny, maybe even outrage. Outrage which is 
understandable given that overall wage growth has stagnated over the past few 
decades1. Something interested parties have failed to agree on is the reason(s) behind 
the persistent rise, what is needed to curb this rise or whether indeed it should be 
curbed.  
Bebchuk et al argued, that high pay results from corporate governance failures, which 
enable rent extraction by company executives2. Counter-arguments have sought to 
negate this thesis and regard current pay levels as the proceeds of efficient processes3. 
Arguing, that current pay levels result from an efficient bargaining contest between a 
disinterested board and a CEO or prospective CEO looking to earn his worth. The 
preceding is the conventional view of the pay setting process, known as the optimal 
contracting view. 
                                                            
1 Statistics show that with executive pay far outpacing average wages by a ratio of 180:1, 78 per cent 
of the public would support a maximum limit on how much the highest paid could earn in relation to 
the lowest paid, within any given company. See High Pay Centre Report, ‘Reform Agenda: ‘How to 
make top pay fairer’ www.highpaycentre.org (accessed on 25/01/2015). 
2 L. Bebchuk, J.M Fried and D. Walker, ‘Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation’. The University of Chicago Law Review, [2002] Vol. 69, 751-846. 
3 Randall S. Thomas, ‘Explaining the International CEO pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven’ 





The contrarian argument, states that a flawed governance system allows managers 
too much power and leaves them in a position of influence over the board, which 
translates into higher salaries. This, irrespective of whether there is corresponding firm 
performance4. This theory of the pay setting process is known as board capture 
theory/managerial power approach, intends to highlight the naiveté of the 
mainstream arms-length or optimal contracting narrative5. They argue, that the latter 
results from vulnerabilities which arise from the hierarchical managerial structure-
where some U.S firms have the positions of CEO and board chair vested within the 
same entity. Also, the fact that managers are usually allowed a broad discretion on 
issues such as the nomination and dismissal of directors. Highlighting the strong 
potential for creating a compromised and captive board6. It is safe to assume, that a 
captive board serves, rather than monitors.  
These points call into question the justice of Anglo-American executive pay levels. An 
argument could be made that current pay levels are not just high, but excessive. Given 
the subjectivity of the latter term, here the Chapter defines excessive pay, as that 
which exceeds the minimum effective compensation, needed to attract, retain and 
motivate the recipient to maximise firm value. This definition is premised on the 
assumption that managers are inherently self-serving7.   
                                                            
4 Viral Acharya, Marc Gabarro and Paolo Volpin, ‘Competition for Managers, Corporate Governance 
and Incentive Compensation’ July 2013 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/sternfin/vacharya/public_html/pdfs/AGV_paper_040713.pdf (accessed 
15/03/2015). 
5 Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation. (Harvard University Press; 2004). 
6 Vincent Warther, ‘Board Effectiveness and Board Dissent: A Model of the Board’s Relationship to 
Management and Shareholders’ Journal of Corporate Finance [1998] Vol.4 53. 
7 Jeffrey Moriarty ‘How Much Compensation Can CEOs permissibly Accept?’ Business Ethics Quarterly 





But beyond questions regarding quantum and the excessiveness thereof, is an issue 
which goes to the core of the high pay debate: the pay setting process. It goes without 
saying, that failures within the pay setting process not only sully the outcome but 
ensure its failure to meet required justice standards. To this point Nozick argues, that 
the process of acquisition, determines the justice of the thing acquired and the 
holder’s right to it. 
The crux of Nozick’s process-oriented view, is that executive compensation is justified 
by its process of determination and distribution8. Nozick’s libertarian outlook, and its 
predisposition towards “entitlement”, is less concerned with the outcome of the 
process-pay quantum-than he is with the process itself. He views any distribution 
derived through “justice preserving means” to be just, regardless of the inequities 
which may consequence said distribution. To this point he declares, that “whatever 
arises from a just situation by just steps is just”9. 
To meet this justice standard, the awarded pay packet must adhere to the core 
libertarian principles of voluntarism/liberty, transparency and acquiescence10. Which 
implies the absence of inordinate influence by the CEO over the determinative 
process. As well as the utilisation of clear and easily decipherable performance 
metrics, set out as part of an accessible remuneration policy and approval by an 
informed and unbiased shareholding body. 
                                                            
8 Ibid, at 237. 
9 To Nozick, any holding derived in accordance with the above standard is said to have been obtained 
by a “legitimate means” or process. This includes all holdings acquired by means which are subject to 
the principle of justice in acquisition and transfer. Robert Nozick ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’ 
(Blackwell, 1974) 152. 
10 Jared Harris ‘How Much is Too Much? A Theoretical Analysis of Executive Compensation from the 
Standpoint of Distributive Justice’ in R. Kolb (ed) The Ethics of Executive Compensation (Blackwell 





This Chapter is intended to answer the first research question, which is concerned with 
the integrity of the pay setting process and the compromises therein, which may sully 
the outcome. As such, it will proceed to examine the issues regarding the pay setting 
process, exploring the depictions of the latter as an adversarial, arms-length process. 
As well as those which view the pay setting process as anything but arms-length and 
adversarial.  This Chapter would utilise Nozick’s libertarian theory of entitlement to 
analyse the pay setting process, in a bid to determine the justice of high executive 
compensation. 
 The Chapter therefore will be outlined thus, the following section would consider the 
conventional narrative on the pay setting process, with its view of the latter as an 
arm’s length bargaining process. Wherein the independent board negotiates an 
optimal compensation package with the executive concerned, in a bid to attract, retain 
and incentivize good performance. The conventional argument for current pay levels 
is intended to justify the outcome by highlighting the adversarial nature of pay 
negotiations, which would bring the outcome it in line with Nozick’s thesis. The section 
would also highlight some of the justifications for current pay levels. 
Section three will examine contrasting arguments of managerial interference in the 
pay setting process, as encapsulated within the board capture/managerial power 
thesis. There the Chapter would consider arguments which favour a compromised pay 
setting process and outcome, as well as some of the drawbacks within the corporate 
governance framework, which inhibit the efficiency of the process. 
The following portion will examine the pay setting process, utilising the requirements 





highlighted by Nozick. Concluding that the highlighted failures within the process of 
executive pay setting, made it difficult to justify the outcome. This argument was 
furthered in the final portion of the chapter, where the utilisation of peer-averages 
was considered in the light of Nozick’s postulation of a legitimate process. The 
conclusion being, that the basing of an executive’s wage on that of another, could not 
be considered to be in tandem with Nozick’s process-oriented view of income 
distribution. 
 
3.2. The Conventional Narrative on the Executive Pay Setting 
Process 
3.2.1. The Role of the Independent Board in Pay Negotiations 
Berle and Means believed that the dispersion of shareholdings would have the 
unintended effect of giving managers wide and unfettered powers, which needed to 
be curtailed for owners to maximise their investment11. The burden of this task was 
supposed to be the primary function of the Board of directors, which should consist of 
executive and independent members. The intent being that Independent directors 
drawn from outside the firm, are better positioned to deal objectively with the CEO on 
behalf of investors. With the aim being, that managerial functions are carried out with 
maximum efficiency at the lowest cost possible12. 
                                                            
11 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Macmillan, 1932). 





Alongside these objectives is the negotiation of compensation of members of the 
management team, primarily that of an incumbent or incoming CEO13. The 
conventional narrative, is that board members embark on this function at arms-length, 
bearing no other interests but those of shareholders. In this instance, the independent 
board functions, as an agent acting on behalf of investors14. In performance of this, 
the independent directors are to populate the compensation committees specifically 
established for purpose, which in carrying out its duties is to be completely 
autonomous and free of managerial influence15. Aiming to negotiate a compensation 
package, that should incentivize managers to take the risks needed to maximize 
efficiency and firm output, at minimal costs. This view is widely known as the optimal 
contracting or arms-length bargaining view to executive compensation. Although 
theoretically sound, there have however been viable concerns about its practicality16. 
 
3.2.2. The Optimal Contracting/Agreement View on Compensation: Fact or 
Fable? 
Bebchuk et al, define the optimal contract as the one which minimises agency costs 
the most17. This theory, acknowledges that no contract could possibly eliminate the 
attendant managerial costs and perfectly align managerial interests with those of 
investors. As such, the optimal contract should aspire to attract, retain and incentivize 
the best executives to maximize their efforts, while keeping overall operational costs 
                                                            
13 B.K Boyd, ‘Board Control and CEO Compensation’ Strategic Management Journal [1994] Vol.15 335-
344, 336. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (n2) 765. 
16 See, Bebchuk and Fried (n5) 19. 





at a minimum18. Managers on the other hand, being aware of the need to keep costs 
down, would however seek to negotiate compensation that at the very least meets 
their “opportunity costs” or “reservation value”19. For this Chapter, the pay setting 
process needs to accord with Nozick’s conception of a legitimate process for the 
outcome to be just. 
Nozick’s legitimate process could best be described as one which adheres to the core 
principles of justice in transfer and acquisition. One which is transparent, voluntary 
and through which pay decisions are reached via mutual agreement20. These are 
characteristics the optimal contracting/agreement view seeks to embody. The latter 
view assumes an arms-length negotiating relationship between managers and 
management boards. Here, the board assumes an adversarial role in the pay 
negotiation process, poised with intent to get the best deal for shareholders. The 
theories’ veracity, has been challenged by optimal contracting cynics, due to the 
theories’ failure to explain the continuous rise in pay levels, even in the absence of 
corresponding performance21.  
But the mainstream argument would insist that current pay levels are efficient22. 
Below, are some of the reasons proffered to support the aforementioned: 
 
                                                            
18 Martin Conyon ‘Executive Compensation and Incentives’ Academy of Management Perspectives 
[2006] Vol.20(1) pp.25-44, 25. Ibid, 762. 
19 Ibid. See also, Thomas, (n3) 1229. 
20 Nozick (n9) 160. 
21 Ivan Brick, Oded Palmon and John Wald, ‘CEO Compensation, Directors Compensation and Firm 
performance: evidence of Cronyism?’  Journal of Corporate Finance [2006] Vol.12 403, 404. 
22 Alex Edmans and Xavier Gabaix ‘Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient’ European Financial Management, 





3.2.3. Some Reasons why the Current Pay Levels are said to be Efficient 
 The mainstream view argues basically that current pay levels are mostly the efficient 
outcomes of an efficient process23. Under agency theory, compensation packages are 
designed to align pay with firm performance with the intent being, to cause managerial 
wealth to move simultaneously with shareholder value24. This according to agency 
theorists is the solution to the agency problem and the optimal way of reducing 
transaction costs. 
Agency theory is premised on three key factors; a moral hazard problem, managerial 
greed and risk aversion25. These could negatively impact managerial output and cause 
them to shirk their duties, seek rents, and greatly inhibit their effectiveness.  All these 
problems per agency theory enthusiasts, are best countered by utilising interest 
aligning incentives26. 
 
3.2.3.1. As a Solution to Agency-Related Problems: 
Agency theorists, argue that there would be diverging interests between managers 
and investors and this divergence could lead to residual losses27. Manifestations may 
include, an excessive appetite for perquisites or unwarranted acquisitions causing the 
firm to grow larger, but less efficient. These are managerial idiosyncrasies which 
accordingly could be traced back to an inadequate incentive regime between the firm 
                                                            
23 Conyon (n18) 25. 
24 Ibid, 28. 
25 Ibid, 29. 
26 Michael Jensen and William Meckling ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 






and management28. Therefore, the way to effectively stem these losses, would be to 
pay executives well enough to eliminate the need for empire building or the thirst for 
superfluous perks. While ensuring that pay, is effectively and efficiently aligned to a 
firm growth index29.  
As it goes by paying more and efficiently linking pay to performance, the firm could 
eliminate the moral hazard problem. That managers, being aware of this link between 
pay and performance, would be less likely to shirk and more likely to maximise effort. 
In the same vein, be more willing to take the risks required to grow the firm and 
maximize potential and profits. It is important to note, that the efficacy of agency 
theory is premised on managerial self-interest and one to which agency theory has 
failed to legislate a proper cure. How do you eliminate greed in the manager-owner 
continuum? 
The failure to find an answer to the above question would mark a flaw in the 
agency/principal, pay for performance argument, and has possibly rendered it not 
quite as effective as it would have been intended to be. Some authors have recognised 
that managers being naturally greedy, would seek avenues to extract rents and having 
the kind of power they wield in the Anglo-American dispersed shareholder model of 
governance, makes it even more likely that they would succeed30.  
                                                            
28 Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy ‘Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got to here, what are 
the problems, and how to fix them’, Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, July 2004, 21. 
29 Bebchuk and Fried (n5) 19. 
30 Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried ‘Pay Without Performance: An Overview of the Issues’ Journal of 





Although the performance related pay theory looks valid in principle, the application 
rings a different tune entirely. It could be argued, that there exists a linear connection 
between performance-related pay and the current high executive pay culture.  
Pay for performance represents a fine concept which sought significance within a 
flawed system and took on different kind of significance far drawn from what could 
have been its original intent. The flaws could not be said to be with the concept itself, 
at least not entirely, rather with the governance structure in place in the system, 
within which it was meant to operate. This misuse could be owed in no small measure 
to the status quo of powerful managers and an inadequate or unwilling monitoring 
apparatus. It must be said that the current profligacy in the design and composition of 
CEO compensation, could mostly be attributed to a weak or possibly compromised 
monitoring framework31. Whether this bears as evidence managerial influence is yet 
to be seen, what it does state however, is that the system of compensation both in its 
structure and output is far from optimal, much unlike the mainstream narrative would 
like us to believe. 
 
3.2.3.2. Because Managers Deserve High Pay: 
High pay is frequently justified as the just deserts for CEOs in relation to their marginal 
productivity32. This argument is premised on the fact that larger portions of executive 
                                                            
31 Bebchuk et al critiqued the design of compensation packages stating that the use of ‘at the money’ 
options aided the growth of managerial compensation levels and further evidenced the influence 
managerial power had over the pay setting process. See, Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (n2). 





pay are performance-related33. It is believed, that company boards set performance-
related compensation higher than they would have if it were a fixed wage regime, as 
an additional incentive to naturally risk-averse managers. Bebchuk et al argue, that 
performance-related compensation is worth less to executives than a fixed salary. 
Therefore, those who design compensation structure it in such a way, to ensure that 
the manager’s potential earnings are similar to or higher than the manager’s 
reservation value34. As such, the board could tie pay to the attainment of certain 
performance metrics i.e. share price increases, return on earnings etc. which would 
trigger an award of shares and/or an accounting-based cash bonus. Plus, in some 
instances additional perquisites could be given as part of the system of reward. In the 
event of an award of company shares, the compensation realised would be 
determined by the share price at the time of vesting. Therefore, if the firm had 
experienced major growth spurts over the vesting period, the manager would be well 
rewarded thus.  
These share award programs have become an integral part of the compensation 
policies of most publicly traded companies in the U.K and U.S35. The apparent 
simplicity of this approach, ensures that it ignores certain important factors which 
would be looked at in the next section. 
                                                            
33 A survey of firms within the FTSE 350, has shown that salary payments comprise only a fifth of top 
manager’s total compensation, with incentive-based compensation making up the rest. See, High Pay 
Centre Report ‘Executive remuneration in the FTSE 350 – a focus on performance-related pay’ October 
2014. http://highpaycentre.org/files/IDS_report_for_HPC_2014_final_211014.pdf. (accessed 
16/03/2015). 
34 Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (n2) 762. 
35 Jensen noted in the early 1990’s, the negligible impact firm performance had on CEO pay and called 
for pay to be made more sensitive to company growth, by making CEO’s hold substantial amounts of 
firm stock. That being said, today it is estimated that over 95 per cent of U.S managers received some 





Furthermore, proponents of the mainstream view, argue that executive pay is just 
reward for talent. This is further exacerbated, they argue, by a shrinking pool of global 
CEO talent36. Citing the apparent lack of credible and tested managerial talent, which 
they believe gives managers leverage in the negotiation process. That the independent 
board, in a desperate bid to attract and retain the best talent, are forced to negotiate 
exorbitantly priced pay packets.  
This argument, appears to ignore figures which reveal that, more managerial talent is 
drawn from within the firm, than those hired from outside37. Although, it is said that 
outside managers usually command higher sums in wages, than those hired from 
within the firm38.  
Further on the managerial talent argument, one author has stated that CEO’s are paid 
better than other employees, due to their uncanny forecasting and risk assessment 
abilities and the importance of these skills in the post-crisis economy39. Srivastava, 
disregards prior research, which put current pay levels down to managerial rent-
seeking behaviours. He argues instead, that because CEOs can forecast share price 
movements and the firms overall risk exposure, better than the market can in some 
instances, they are able to command higher wages.  Stating that research had shown, 
that firms recognising the importance of this skill have begun to link certain 
components of compensation to these forecasting abilities. Which he believes could 
                                                            
36 Bebchuk and Fried (n5) 20. Randall Thomas (n3) 1230. 
37  A recent study showed that 80 per cent of companies within the global Fortune 500, recruited CEOs 
from within the company and of those with outside recruits, only four of such recruits were hired 
while holding CEO posts. See, David Bolchover ‘Global CEO Appointments: A Very Domestic Issue’. 
Available at (http://highpaycentre.org/files/CEO_mobility_final.pdf). 
38 Kathryn J. Kennedy “Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal Attempts to Curb Perceived 
Abuses” Houston Business and Tax Law Journal, Vol. 10 2010 pp. 198-259 at 207. 
39 Anup Srivastava ‘Do CEOs possess any extraordinary ability? Can those abilities justify large CEO 





explain the unparalleled rise in managerial compensation, which is maximized to 
encourage the utilisation of this ‘rare’ skill40. 
3.3. Rebuttal Evidence of Managerial Interference and Influence on 
Compensation Decisions 
To contrast the mainstream view, some commentators see the prevailing trends as 
evidence of managerial interference in the pay setting process41.  
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, recommended an alternate perspective to the mainstream 
optimal contracting view of compensation setting; the managerial power approach42. 
They posit that managerial power more adequately explains current trends in 
executive compensation. This theory however, is not intended to provide a wholesale 
replacement for the extant mainstream view, but instead they believe current pay 
trends would be best understood by utilising both approaches43. Much unlike the 
mainstream approach which uses compensation to counteract the agency problem, 
the managerial power view sees executive compensation largely as a manifestation of 
this problem. Accordingly, managerial power allows managers use compensation as a 
pretext to extract rents44.  
Although asymmetrical managerial power is a concomitant of the Berle-Means 
corporation, it is however exacerbated by failures inherent within the structure and 
operation of Anglo-American corporate governance and its manner of 
                                                            
40 Ibid 350. 
41 Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (n2) 786. 
42 Ibid 784. 
43 Kevin Murphy ‘Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of 
Stock Options’ University of Chicago Law Review [2002] Vol.69 847,849. 





compensation45. Such as must do, with the relationship between the CEO and the 
board of directors.  
These failures are nowhere more evident, than that fact that CEOs can play an active 
role, in the nomination of non-executive directors (NEDs). Considering, that the latter 
almost entirely constitute the membership of all the key monitoring committees, 
including the compensation committee46. Brudney states that due to these failures, 
boards are compromised in some cases, making it that much harder to assume the 
adversarial stance required to effectively function as a monitoring unit47.  
It must be said, however, that this hypothesis would not be the definitive explanation 
for every highly paid executive and there are many instances where boards adequately 
and are quick to replace underperforming CEOs48. That notwithstanding, the lack of 
informational parity between the CEO and the NED’s, which could be attributed to the 
limited time NEDs must devote to the firm, would arguably constrict their 
effectiveness49.  
                                                            
45 Murphy, K. and Sandino, T ‘Executive pay and ‘independent’ compensation consultants’, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics [2010] vol. 49(3), pp. 247–62 at 248, 249. 
46 The UK Corporate Governance Rules along with the NYSE Rules require listed firms to have 
remuneration committees to be comprised of directors who meet the independent requirement. 
While the UK rules require the committees to have a minimum of three NEDs, the NYSE requires them 
to be made up entirely of NEDs. 
47   Victor Brudney, “Independent Directors-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village? Harvard Law Review, 
[1982] Vol.95 597. 
48 As figures from 2007 study show, underperforming CEO’s were more likely to be removed in the 
2000’s than in the 1990’s, the statistics show that the global rate for dismissals for underperforming 
CEO’s, is 4.2 per cent, which is said to be higher than it was in the 90’s, while overall CEO turnover was 
said to be about 13.8 per cent for the same year. Which actually marked a slight reduction from the 
previous year. However, the figure show that CEOs are increasingly being given more time to settle 
even when underperforming as the median CEO fired in the year 2007, was said to have spent at least 
6 years in office. (see, Per-Ola Karlsson, Gary L. Neilson and Juan Carlos Webster, “CEO Succession 
2007: The Performance Paradox” http://www.strategy-business.com/article/08208?pg=all, (accessed 
on 20/01/2015). 
49 A recent publication has shown that directors on average spend about 10-12 days a year on their 
duties. See, Christian Castal and Christian Casper ‘Building a Forward-Looking Board’ Mckinsey 






3.3.1. How willing are Non-Executive Directors in the Monitoring of 
Managers? 
Unfortunately, NEDs are faced with the same agency-related problems they are tasked 
to limit. Some of which could mostly be classed as motivational or incentive related50, 
while others are either systemic or more domestic to the directors themselves. The 
Chapter would proceed to examine some of these issues. 
3.3.1.1. The Lack of Proper Financial Incentives as an Impediment to Director 
Effectiveness 
It is well known that independent directors are not compensated as well as the 
executives they are tasked to monitor51. This pay disparity, is merely a function of the 
wider disparity in their obligations and duties. While managers take charge of the day 
to day of management to which they are primarily obligated, NEDs on the other hand 
are barely involved in firm management52. As their board duties often represent 
secondary or tertiary roles53. Research has shown director busyness as having a 
                                                            
50 Thomas Clarke ‘A Critique of the Anglo-American Model of Corporate Governance’ Comparative 
Research in Law and Political Economy, [2009] Vol.5 No. p.4. 
51 The average FTSE 100 CEO currently earns about 40 times the average FTSE 100 NED. With the 
average chairman, currently being paid just a 9th of the average FTSE 100 CEO. See, High Pay Centre, 
‘Chairmen and Non-Executive Director Compensation’ 29 April 2013. 
52 There appears to be an informal rule that directors spend 1.5 days per week on their board duties. It 
is said that the total time commitment for the average FTSE 100 NED currently stands at some much 
improved 46 days per annum, while the chairman is said to spend 3-4 days in some instances due to 
the increased complexity of the role. First Flight Non-Executive Directors Ltd and ShareSoc Report, 
‘Chair and Non-Executive Director Guidelines (search, selection and remuneration)’ 
http://www.growthcompany.co.uk/article_assets/articledir_4289/2144598/ p.23, (accessed 
4/03/2015). 
53 A report shows that 10% of UK NEDs sit on the boards of more than 10 different companies, (see, 
ibid p.14). A trend which contradicts the provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code, which 
requires, “all directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge their 





negative effect on firm performance54. Contrasting research has found busy directors 
to be a positive, with smaller firms55. While this is understandable given the sparseness 
of what is required of them, the problem however is not with what directors are 
compensated, as much as it is with the way they are compensated. NED compensation 
is not only lacking in terms of its size and composition but could be found wanting in 
its method of determination as well. 
Directorial seats are relatively lucrative. Relative in the sense that although 
remuneration for occupying one of those pales when compared to average executive 
pay, they are still tastefully rewarding, when considered alongside the level of 
responsibility directors are said to bear56. It could be argued that the power and 
prestige of board membership make them too lucrative to give up. Creating a new kind 
of incentive one not linked to the fortunes of the company, but instead the protection 
of the director’s interests. Creating the same agency conflicts that the board was 
intended to help assuage57. Causing one to ponder the limited use of performance-
related compensation for NED’s. Although research shows the increasing use of 
performance related pay for NEDs in the UK, this is still not as widespread as it is 
amongst American executives58. It has been argued against its use, citing concerns 
                                                            
54 George D. Cashman, Stuart Gillan and Chulhee Jun, ‘Going Overboard? Director Busyness and Firm 
Performance. Journal of Banking and Finance [2012] Vol. 36, 3248-3259, 3249. 
55 Laura Field, Michelle Lowry and Anahit Mkrtchnya ‘Are Busy Boards Detrimental’ Journal of Financial 
Economics [2013] Vol.109 (1) 63-82. 
56 As noted earlier, the average FTSE NED on average spends less than 50 days a year on their board 
responsibilities for which they earn on average £61,000 in base fees, excluding further payments for 
committee membership. Not a bad return for minimal amount of work considering the median pay for 
an ordinary employee, working full time hours, which according to the Office for National Statistics, 
currently stands at £518 per week, adding up to a pre-tax income of just under £27,000 per annum. 
See, http://www.ons.gov.uk/annual-survey-of-hours-and-earnings/2014 (accessed 12/03/2015) 
57 Martin Conyon and Lerong He ‘Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in US 
Entrepreneurial Firms’ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=546110, p.6. 
58 It has been reported that in 2014, 50 per cent of S&P 500 companies within the, financial and 





about the implications on the ‘independence’ criteria for NEDs59. Linking some portion 
of NED pay to certain performance metrics might prove to be effectively incentive 
aligning.  
Directors in the UK are said to earn considerably higher than their counterparts in the 
rest of Europe60. Though the levels appear to have stagnated somewhat since the 
crisis, due in part to cost cutting on the part of companies. The past few years however, 
have witnessed a notable rise in NED compensation, with fees for 2013 said to have 
risen by 5 to 6 per cent in some firms in the FTSE 10061. It is noteworthy that 
membership of the remuneration committees has proven to be the most lucrative, 
with some fees said to have risen to 140 per cent62. The figures are said to be even 
higher in the U.S63. This is in addition to the perks and other indirect benefits of being 
a board member. It would not be over reaching to mention how this could potentially 
influence NEDs in the exercise of their discretion. 
Additionally, the fact the CEOs have a say in directors’ pay could further compromise 
their effectiveness. Potentially creating a quid pro quo situation, which could 
compromise the pay setting process. Brick, Wald and Palmon state the concurrent rise 
                                                            
directors. See, C-Suite Insight ‘Governance Outlook: a new focus on the governance Committee’ Issue 
16 2015, p.12 www.equilar.com (accessed 19/03/2015). 
59 Chris Mallin, Andrea Melis, Silvia Gaia ‘The remuneration of independent directors in the UK and 
Italy: An empirical analysis based on agency theory’. International Business Review (2014), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.07.006. 
60 Ibid. 
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in CEO and director compensation, as evidence of “mutual backscratching and 
cronyism”64. Believing that the rise in both CEO and NED compensation was evidence 
of a permissive and cronyistic governance culture, ruled more by self-interest, than a 
desire to protect and preserve company interests. They state that directors tend to 
benefit financially from powerful and entrenched CEO’s. Citing evidence that directors 
in firms where one person occupies the dual positions of CEO and board chair, tend to 
receive larger compensation65.  
While the method of nomination and appointment of NEDs would generally support 
the notion of deference and subservience to the CEO. It would be somewhat hasty 
however to assume this as having a major positive impact on director’s compensation 
in all cases. As Brick et al note, reported rises in NED compensation could also be put 
down to increased responsibility66. As we know NEDs in some instances are 
compensated on a per meeting basis, this could positively impact pay, where the 
directors are required to meet more times than the average. This explanation could 
be relevant in the UK, where NEDs have in the post crisis era been required to be more 
proactive in monitoring the executive than in previous times. In 2009, the Walker 
Review recommended the overall time commitment of NEDs should be greater, stating 
that they should be required to give a minimum 30 to 36 days a year to their board 
duties67. An increased time commitment on the part of NEDs would undeniably cost 
more, this could in turn offer a substitute explanation for the rise in directors’ pay. 
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3.3.1.2. The Problem of Shared Backgrounds and the Cognitive Biases that result  
As stated previously, a vast number of NEDs are either serving or erstwhile CEO’s68. 
This could hardly make for effective monitoring, as it is human nature to be permissive 
of situations with sufficient notoriety or to which one has become accustomed. This is 
known as the bandwagon effect. 
Defined as the, “the process of diffusion of a thought, behaviour, idea, or else in any 
given group, team, community, organization, or society due to its popularity”69. 
Described as a powerful form of groupthink the bandwagon mentality ensures that 
individuals go with the popular view or ‘follow the crowd’, even when the said view is 
far removed from rationality70. This is most significant with regards to executive 
compensation, where board members could also be serving executives. There would 
expectedly be few dissenters to pay suggestions either by the remuneration 
committee, pay consultants or the CEO himself, which would normally be unjustifiable. 
Research has shown that when corporate elites are faced with “complex business 
situations” their interpretations would usually reflect their functional backgrounds71. 
It must be noted however, that the bandwagon mentality could also in some instances 
have the reverse effect of encouraging dissent. As Vincent Warther reports, when 
companies release information which elicits outrage-e.g. a bonus award in a down 
market-a step taken by one director in opposition of management would usually 
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precede a full-fledged mutiny, with the majority toeing the line of the dissenting 
director72. 
The shared influences on the director’s cognition, being immersed within a high pay 
culture would prove the more likely pivot, when faced with testy pay situations. Such 
as whether to approve payments which are non-comparative with performance or the 
setting of metrics which are not guaranteed to enhance firm value. This could be 
explained by the fact that individuals operating within a field, “overtime become 
inculcated and socialized within the areas dominant mode of thinking and acting”73, so 
much so, that rational decisions take a back seat to normative perceptions. 
These shared backgrounds or strong social ties which precipitate a biased view of 
fairness and desert on the part of NEDs and could originate from shared social 
institutions. For example, a prestigious or exclusive secondary and tertiary educational 
institution, economic sectors known to draw its members from a certain social or 
intellectual class, for example financial institutions etc. These institutions act as a 
melting pot for individuals drawn from these exclusive classes, facilitating the 
establishment of networks, which in some instances are carried into the boardroom74. 
Sociologists describe this pattern of behaviour as falling within its resource 
dependence theory, which explores the links between members of elitist classes and 
the institutions that facilitate these links75.  
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These networks could also manifest themselves in board interlocks. Boards interlock 
when directors hold multiple directorships, a fact which as research shows, has a 
positive effect on managerial pay in firms which interlock76. These mutually beneficial 
relationships/networks could aid the diffusion of social norms, which encourage a 
relaxed attitude towards excessive rewards.77.  
Social norms in this regard could be necessitated by political orthodoxy or 
promulgated by market mechanisms. Emphasising the importance of social norms, in 
the three-decade long surge in executive pay, Kim, Kogut and Yang contend that in the 
setting of executive pay, boards “look around in their networks to determine what 
others view as acceptable compensation, this reliance on others and those in the same 
network in particular reproduces a self-reproducing social structure”78. The importance 
of social norms to the growth of high pay, cannot be understated79.  
The effect of networks in the diffusion of high pay norms is evidenced mostly in the 
use of peer groups in setting compensation. Aside from the use of pay consultants, 
NEDs who serve on company boards, over time could forge an idea of what the going 
rate for CEOs in similar positions earn. To which they may collectively decide to pay 
him, a decision not related to performance or shareholder value. As Kim et al aptly put 
it, “the reference point of the board as reflected in the network of its relationships 
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shapes what management and boards believe to be legitimate and acceptable 
practices”. Research shows that CEOs of the most connected firms earn 13 per cent 
more in total compensation than those of the least connected firms80. 
 
3.3.1.3. The Impersonal Cost of Ineffectiveness: indemnity clauses and the Business 
Judgement Rule 
It could be argued that directors could afford to defer to CEOs because they are not 
properly incentivized to do otherwise. Having already discussed incentives for NEDs or 
the lack thereof, this Chapter would not engage in a further discourse of the monetary 
kind, but incentives in the sense of the price for failure. What is the cost for failed 
boards? 
It may be argued that the reputational and possibly economic costs could function as 
a sufficient deterrent to board ineffectiveness81. However, there is no evidence that 
most the directors of failed boards are unable to find new positions after being 
removed. Neither is the compensation earned by serving NEDs so high as to be 
unobtainable in other paid positions. The argument here is not that directorships are 
not sufficiently prestigious to be coveted enough to want to do a good job at it, but 
rather that the consequences for negligent based failures are not a sufficient enough 
deterrent to ensure that they do.  
Furthermore, directors are granted a further layer of protection from negative 
consequences, by way of the reluctance of the Anglo-American courts to hold directors 
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responsible for the failure of their business judgement. This attitude of non-
interference is commonly known as the Business Judgement Rule82. It is now taken for 
granted that executive compensation decisions fall within the purview of the rule83. 
The implication of the Business Judgement Rule is that barring the rare instance where 
directorial conduct could be deemed to be egregiously negligent, directors would not 
be held liable for business decisions. Unless it can be shown that the directors acted 
with gross negligence, which has a notoriously low standard of proof84. So much so, 
that successful business judgement suits are a rarity and non-existent in compensation 
matters85. Which is hardly ideal, if the objective is a board which is effective in its role 
as a check on the executive. The aim should be to encourage board accountability and 
not to hold NEDs wantonly liable for business decisions, as this could be detrimental 
to board participation86. Also, the issue of hindsight bias-that the flaws in failed 
decisions are always obvious to an observer with full knowledge of the outcomes-
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cannot be ignored87. A system which encourages accountability, by setting adequate 
standards for liability would do little harm. 
Further worsening the incentive problem for NEDs is the presence of indemnity 
clauses in director contracts, which stipulate the companies’ obligation to bear the 
financial burden should a director be found personally liable for business decisions, 
due to negligence. These agreements have become standard corporate practice in the 
UK and America and even required by statute in places like Delaware88. These 
contractual clauses, commonly known as ‘Qualifying Third Party Indemnity Provisions’ 
are made legitimate by the Companies Act89. Accordingly, UK companies are currently 
permitted to indemnify directors, who are parties to civil or criminal proceedings 
instituted by third parties, the company or regulatory authorities, which allege a 
breach of duty, trust or directorial negligence.   
In civil or criminal proceedings, the company can offset the costs incurred by the 
director, however such payments are to be regarded as loans made to the director. 
Which would be immediately repayable should the director be found liable, convicted 
in criminal proceedings or when his application for relief is unsuccessful. However, 
where the director makes a successful defence, the company may be permitted to 
waive the loans. When proceedings are brought by a regulatory authority, the 
indemnity is not required to be made by way of loans, also were the directors defence 
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is not successful, the company may not pay the required penalties and/or levies on the 
director’s behalf90. 
As well as indemnity clauses, companies are permitted to take out insurance policies 
with directors as beneficiaries. These are known as directors and officer’s insurance 
policies and are permitted to insure directors for costs/personal losses for which the 
company is not permitted to indemnify the director91. These policies also indemnify 
the beneficiaries against the effects of the company becoming insolvent92. To note, 
these policies are available to both executives and NEDs. 
It is noteworthy that in Germany, S.93 (2) of the Stock Corporations Act ((Aktiengesetz 
– AktG), which was revised in 2009-allows companies to take out D&O insurance 
policies only on behalf of members of the management board. Furthermore, in the 
event of a claim directors are required to pay a deductible of no less than 10 per cent 
of the total liability. With the upper limit set at no less than one and half times the 
director’s fixed annual remuneration. The approach opted for by the Germans would 
more likely incentivise due care from managing directors, than that which is operative 
within Anglo-America.  
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3.3.1.4. Economic and Reputational Costs of Dissent 
The economic repercussions of challenging management could be nugatory to NEDs 
as well as shareholders. 
Brudney states that directors’ willingness to challenge managerial self-dealing, may be 
hampered by the realisation that such a challenge might not necessarily be in the 
interest of investors. He believes in the possibility that NEDs might allow managers to 
have their way, because over-restricting them might cause them to engage in 
behaviour which may be more detrimental to shareholders, than if there were no such 
restrictions93.  
Regardless of the arguments Brudney makes, about the possible altruism underlining 
NED inaction, there is no denying the personal interest that could motivate these 
monitoring inefficiencies. Organically, the lucrativeness of board seats, both in 
monetary terms and in other non-pecuniary ways i.e. status, could go some way to 
limiting board effectiveness94. It goes without saying that CEO’s are generally in a 
position to benefit directors financially and otherwise and are able to reward NEDs 
generously. Like Graef Crystal notes, “Whenever you find highly paid CEOs, you will find 
highly paid directors. It’s no accident.”95 
In addition, NED effectiveness may be impeded further by the reputational 
consequences of doing so. It would be fair to say that given that CEOs play a direct role 
in NED appointment, one would expect they would aim to fill vacant board seats with 
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agreeable characters. Meaning that directors with a reputation for opposing 
management would readily find board opportunities scarce. Finally, it is worth noting 
that, aside from the direct economic benefits of board membership in terms of fees 
earned, NEDs who themselves are serving executives, stand to benefit with every rise 
in average pay. According to Bebchuk et al, this arises as a result of “self-serving 
cognitive dissonance”96. 
A combination of one or more of these factors could arguably make CEO’s 
disproportionately powerful as far as directors are concerned. It is possible the 
managerial power theory has been critiqued as much as it has, due to a misplaced 
understanding that the theory dictates the wresting of power from the board by 
managers. However, the theory could be understood to be more than  the deliberate 
power grab by managers, but rather a partial relinquishing of control by the board for 
stated reasons.  
The managerial power theory could be understood alternatively to have arisen from 
board failure to effectively assume its control and monitoring duties, leaving a power 
vacuum which managers stepped into with consequences on overall CEO pay. 
 
 
                                                            





3.4. Executive Pay and Nozick’s Theory of Entitlement: Does the Pay 
Setting Process Compromise its Justice? 
Before analysing the pay-setting process using Nozick’s theory, it would be proper to 
briefly discuss the theory itself. Nozick’s theory which is premised on entitlement, 
espouses the view that the justice of a particular holding is determined by its origin, 
or “how it came about”97. 
Accordingly, holdings could only be justly held, if they result in agreement with either 
or both principles of justice in acquisition and transfer. For a distribution to meet the 
demands of justice, it must have been duly acquired that is, obtained through 
legitimate means. Hence, “a distribution is just if it arises from another just 
distribution”98. One can only legitimately claim ownership and be entitled to a thing, if 
the process of acquisition was uncompromised by illegality or injustice, similarly one 
can only transfer a holding to another if one is entitled to the thing in the first instance. 
Which consequently impacts the rights of the recipient to that holding. He states: 
“Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their 
product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others 
from competing in exchanges. None of these are permissible models of transition 
from one situation to another99” 
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Nozick believed that a justice analysis of a situation only need consider the matrix of 
the distribution. It is perhaps trite, but important to note that due to Nozick’s 
libertarian ideals, his conception of justice is less concerned with wealth disparities 
and outcomes, as it is with the process of wealth acquisition and transfer. Accordingly, 
the latter processes must adhere to the core libertarian principles of individual 
responsibility, free and unfettered market transfer and liberty in choice100.  
Harris argues with reference to executive pay, that for a distribution to meet the stated 
libertarian ideals, the beneficiary must have acted in accordance with normative 
principles of conduct and the transaction must meet the standards of economic justice 
i.e. be a free unencumbered transfer by adequately informed parties101. In 
emphasising this point, Nozick gave the popular Wilt Chamberlain example. Wherein, 
an American sports star enters into an agreement with his employers, which entitles 
him to 25 cents for every ticket sold to fans, allowing him to earn an additional 
$250,000, more than anyone else within his immediate environment. Nozick opines, 
that despite the resulting inequality in income, Chamberlain was entitled to the 
earnings. He argued thus for two main reasons: one, that the agreement entitling him 
to a percentage of the earnings, was a consequence of his star quality and ability to 
attract a fan base. Having noticed this, his employers in anticipation of the impact his 
‘celebrity’ would have on revenues-opted to contract on those terms. Secondly, the 
paying fans, duly informed of the terms and knowing that a portion of every ticket had 
to go to Chamberlain, voluntarily ‘chose’ to pay for the ticket102. 
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Nozick’s thesis is founded on the concept of desert, as such, relatively high 
compensation is justified by the scalability of the recipient’s talent and voluntariness 
of the parties to transact thus. For these reasons, Wilt Chamberlain’s share of the 
distribution was just, because his income was considered to be commensurate to his 
value proposition. The situation would be markedly different however, if Chamberlain 
lacked the status to warrant such an agreement and was only able to contract on such 
favourable terms, for less meritorious reasons i.e. due to prior relationships with 
certain members of the managerial hierarchy. Furthermore, the transaction would 
lack the key libertarian element of ‘choice’, if the paying fans were unaware of the 
agreement the team had with Chamberlain or were unable to opt out of it. On this 
note, Harris states that for pay to be just, it must meet the requirements of liberty, 
transparency and acquiescence103. 
 
3.4.1.  The Requirements for Justice in High Executive Pay  
A key ingredient of Nozick’s thesis is the ‘choice’ exercised by the transacting parties, 
particularly the transferor of the holding in question. What Nozick, attempts to 
emphasis as well, is the perceived value received which precedes or follows the 
exercise of one’s choice in the transference of the said holding to another. It is the 
“value proposition” of the recipient that causes the giver to transfer a portion of his 
holdings. As such, Nozick believes that in a free market society, distribution of income 
should be in tandem with “the perceived value of a person’s actions and services”104. 
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Applying this theory to executive pay trends, the latter could only be just, where it 
results from a free exercise of the giver’s right to give and pay is commensurate with 
the executive’s value proposition. 
 In addition, the transparency of the distributive process is necessary for it to meet the 
required justice standards. While parties have the right to transfer to another that 
which is theirs, however, to justify the distributive unevenness that would result, the 
reason for the transfer must be plain and obvious. Whether it be an exchange for 
services or a mere gifting of one’s resources to another. This Chapter would at this 
juncture proceed to examine each of these requirements as they relate to the debate 
surrounding the justice of high executive pay. 
 
3.4.2.  The Requirement of Voluntariness in Transfer of Holdings: Freedom of 
Choice in Exchange for Value Received  
Nozick criticised what he characterised as the egalitarian focus on “end-state 
principles”, which he believed inordinately focused on the right of the recipient to 
receive, while completely ignoring the giver’s right to bestow105. A libertarian critique 
of the debate surrounding current pay levels is that the debate is mostly concerned 
with how much executives earn and focuses less on the firm’s right to set pay at such 
a level. For the libertarian, pay is just when it is given freely, of one’s own volition and 
in exchange for received value. This view of transactional relationships is earmarked 
by the phraseology “to each according...”. Although Nozick intended his thesis as a 
                                                            





riposte to egalitarian paternalism, this approach could however be adopted in 
distributive justice evaluations in a much broader context, including executive pay.  
The freedom which must undergird distributive transactions is best illustrated when 
Nozick declares “from each as they choose, to each as they are chosen”106. Here the 
transferor’s choice is pivotal, wherein he chooses to allocate a portion of his 
distribution to another, of his own volition. It is assumed that in choosing to give to 
another, the transferor is unconcerned with the consequences of the transaction i.e. 
whether the recipient would end up with more than he. This is best illustrated by the 
Wilt Chamberlain example, where the sports fans chose to pay a premium to watch 
the latter play, supposedly aware of the unequal distribution that would result.  
Perhaps most important from the libertarian perspective, is the reason for the 
transfer. Nozick argues that in free market societies, distributions must be value-based 
and merited by the recipient. Therefore, “to each according to how much he benefits 
others, who have the resources for benefitting those who benefit them”, suggests just 
distributions should be in response to the value proposition of the recipient107. With 
reference to the Chamberlain illustration, the fans chose to pay the premium to see 
him play, but only in anticipation of the entertainment value the transaction 
presented. Hence, the value received from the transfer is equally as important as the 
choice to transfer one’s holdings.  
Applying Nozick’s principle in analysing theory to high executive pay, elicits two 
fundamental questions; are pay awards the voluntary exercise of the director’s 
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discretion and could it be definitively affirmed that high pay is an apt return for value 
created? 
This Chapter has already highlighted the debate with regards to the pay setting process 
and the potential for managerial control over the board. The perceived shortcomings 
of the Anglo-American corporate governance structure, heighten the plausibility of the 
managerial power thesis- which views high executive pay as the result of a captive 
board and powerful managers. The constitution of the board-in terms of the 
backgrounds of the membership-as well as the processes of nomination and 
subsequent appointments, call into question the ‘independence’ of its members. As 
well as their ability to exercise discretion in pay decisions. It goes without saying that 
for the pay setting process to adhere to the principle of liberty in choice within Nozick’s 
theory, it must eschew the merest hint of managerial influence. That said, when we 
consider factors surrounding board nomination, its composition, including the shared 
backgrounds of the membership, the likelihood of board capture and managerial 
influence over the pay setting process, becomes highly probable108. The latter could 
be countered by the argument that shareholders determine executive pay. However, 
the reality is, that shareholders only approve remuneration proposals made by the 
board and have very little say in the formulation of those proposals. 
Furthermore, it remains inconclusive whether executive pay levels are commensurate 
with company performance, as studies evaluating the sensitivity of pay to 
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performance have often spawned contrasting results. That regardless, there is 
incontrovertible evidence of excessive pay packets, including performance related 
bonuses, paid to CEOs and other executives, following a downturn in performance or 
outright corporate failure109. Anecdotal evidence of this nature makes it extremely 
tasking to make a shareholder value argument in favour of high executive pay. Given 
the libertarian requirement that the compensation be anticipative of the value 
proposition of the recipient, it is fair to conclude that current pay levels would 




3.4.3. Transparency in Distribution  
In addition to the principle of liberty in exchange, Nozick’s process-oriented view of 
justice in distribution requires for transparency within the distributive matrix for the 
end result to be just. Hence, though the parties within a free market economy should 
be free to transfer voluntarily from one to another, the reason for the transfer must 
be made clear. Which becomes even more important, where the transfer leads to an 
unequal distribution.  
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Nozick realised that distribution of income in exchange for value rendered forms but 
one strand of the entire distributive matrix. Which also includes transfers due to 
inheritance or arbitrary gifts. However, regardless of its precipitancy, society requires 
the reason for the transfers to be clearly stated, for it to regarded as  just and one to 
which the beneficiary is entitled. To this end, payments made to company CEOs are no 
exception. 
The last 20 years have witnessed an increased agitation for greater transparency 
within the pay setting process, later years have seen this requirement codified within 
both hard and soft corporate law rules110. The intent being to allow companies to show 
the thought process or reason behind remuneration awards. Hence, s.79 & 80 of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, require directors to produce a 
remuneration report setting out the firm’s remuneration policy. The contents of the   
said report are outlined in Part 4 of the Large and Medium-sized Companies and 
Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008. The aforementioned statute, 
requires that the report should contain information about the remuneration 
committee and the metrics for determining performance-related compensation. Also, 
the remuneration policy should take into consideration the pay of other employees, 
and “liabilities in respect of directors’ contracts”. The report is also required to contain 
information with respect to the compensation of each individual director, a 
breakdown of salary, bonuses and share awards etc.), as well as a statement of the 
returns to shareholders within the preceding 5 years. It should also set out details on 
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the director’s pension and other retirement benefits111.Furthermore, the report is to 
be put forward for shareholder approval every 3 years112.  
 These requirements have been a moderate success in terms of channelling 
shareholder outrage113. There are concerns about the willingness of the relevant 
directors to fulfil the disclosure and transparency requirements, judging by the 
complexity of some published reports. This could be attributed in part, to the 
increasing list of disclosure requirements on the one hand, even if, a more cynical mind 
might suggest is evidence of directorial subterfuge. The bottom line remains, that 
investors are left uninformed about the company’s remuneration policy and thus 
unable to make informed decisions concerning their right of approval. This led to calls 
for increased transparency in remuneration reporting114. Consequently, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2016, as part of its provisions, called for “a formal and 
transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for fixing 
the remuneration packages of individual directors”115. 
If we consider transparency as a prerequisite to meet Nozick’s standard of distributive 
justice, this then would place a duty on the directors to outline clearly and 
understandably the policy driving the pay decisions. These must be described such that 
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shareholders lacking the necessary technical background could easily decipher the 
contents of the report. Evidentially, this is shown to not always to be the case, as 
published reports are often very technical and voluminous, and lacking in 
understandability116. When shareholders are unable to make informed decisions 
about the firm’s remuneration policy, it hampers the resulting pay decision’s ability to 
meet the requisite justice standards. As Villiers notes, the voluntary nature of the 
exchanges within Nozick’s thesis, must be counterbalanced by stringent regulation, to 
ensure the fairness of the outcome. The fulfilment of which would require adequate 
disclosure117. 
Where the requirement for transparency through disclosure, in a clear and concise 
manner is not met, it raises questions about the process and ultimately affects the 
justice of the outcome. As Nozick notes the justice of a distribution is largely 
dependent on how it is conceived, as such when the distribution lacks transparency, 
the justifications thereof cannot be easily understood. As he states, “we feel more 
comfortable upholding the justice of an entitlement system if most of the transfers 
under it are done for reasons”. He goes further to say, that “it means only that there is 
a purpose or point to someone’s transferring a holding to one person rather than to 
another; that usually we can see what the transferrer thinks he is gaining, what cause 
he thinks he is serving, what goals he thinks he is helping to achieve”.  Without this key 
requirement, it would difficult to justify the pay setting process, regardless of the 
outcome. 
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3.5.  Benchmarking in Executive pay setting: Does this Accord with 
Nozick’s Legitimate Process? 
 Given the performance related bent of Nozick’s thesis, it then becomes relevant to 
determine how the use of comparator averages in the setting of executive pay, factors 
within his justice perspective. Utilising comparator averages in the determination of 
executive pay, is a widely regarded practice amongst compensation committees of 
some of the largest Anglo-American firms118. To determine whether the practice falls 
within Nozick’s postulation of a legitimate process, is to first understand the 
implication of basing executive pay on peer averages instead of performance, from a 
justice perspective.  
Benchmarking involves the use of industry averages in the setting of executive 
compensation. Compensation packages are determined by the going rate within a 
select group of peers-usually firms with similar core characteristics-and to which the 
movement of the CEOs pay would be pegged. In practice, compensation is usually set 
at or above the median pay within a given peer group. Figures from the year 2015 
show, that of the firms within the American S&P 500 index, 96% used peer groups in 
setting CEO pay, while over 56 per cent set pay based on the earnings of 80-100 per 
cent of the firms within the same industries119. 
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Proponents of the standard view of compensation, would argue that the pay setting 
process is above reproach in the majority of cases, this argument fails to factor the 
exacerbating effect benchmarking has on pay levels. Benchmarking could ensure that 
compromised pay packets become frames of reference in the setting of pay, becoming 
a standard for executive compensation, known as the mimetic effect of 
benchmarking120. Given the pervasiveness of the practice, it is important to a 
discussion on the purity of the process, to determine whether benchmarking in 
practice, meets Nozick’s standard of a legitimate process. 
 
3.5.1. Does Benchmarking Meet the Standard of a Legitimate Process? 
Shin critiqued the efficacy of basing the pay of CEOs on those of their more successful 
peers121. While Ezzamel and Watson note, that the upward adjustment of CEO pay is 
the more common reaction to peer reports which show an inequity, when considering 
his pay in relation to the industry average122. The fact that peer grouping 
predominantly leads to higher wages for the affected CEOs, could suggest some form 
of managerial interference in the pay setting process. Shin, notes that the ability of the 
CEO to restore equity-that is get his wages to match or better the peer average-is 
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stronger when he wields greater influence over the board, and would be far less able 
to do so, where he does not123. 
There are several reasons why firms would want to base pay on the going rate rather 
than performance: it could stem from a desire to make the CEO feel appreciated or 
valued, to retain his services or ensure the firm remains competitive on all fronts 
including the compensation for its head124. It could also be argued that benchmarking 
CEO pay could help facilitate the equitable distribution of wealth amongst CEOs of a 
similar standing125. As supported by evidence, which shows that CEOs who earn below 
the peer average, usually benefit from an upward revision of said pay in the following 
year126. This assertion however ignores the balancing effect of the theory.  
Equity theory is based on the need to restore parity when inequity in distribution 
becomes evident. A restoration of this nature may require upward adjustments of the 
subject’s earnings as well as deductions to bring it in line with the stated average. 
Therefore, the use of equity theory to justify benchmarking is worrisome, the reason 
being that the practice is more frequently utilised for pay raises rather than 
contractions. On this point Ezzamel and Watson, using a sample of firms trading in the 
UK, show the prevalence of peer average inspired upward adjustments in executive 
compensation as against the lowering of salaries for overpaid executives127. They do 
state however, that the trend should not be taken as evidence of “collusion between 
compensation committee members and the executives whose pay they are setting, nor 
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does it necessarily imply indifference to shareholder demands to render pay more 
dependent upon firm performance measures”128. It however, remains difficult not to 
draw such a conclusion. As Shin mentions, strict adherence to compensation 
benchmarking is as much determined by whether the CEO is overpaid or than the need 
to restore equity129.  
He draws a clear link between managerial influence and benchmarking inspired pay 
increases. Stating that upward adjustments are rarer in the case of overpaid CEOs, 
than when they are underpaid in comparison. Accordingly, when underpaid CEOs 
unduly influence the board, compensation committees are more willing to incorporate 
external evaluations of peer average in their pay considerations, than they perhaps 
would, where such deference does not exist. In the latter instance, pay considerations 
would take a more inward direction, in adherence to the pay for performance mantra. 
Similarly, powerful CEOs who are overpaid, might use said influence to limit the use of 
comparator groups in pay setting, while encouraging appraisals that are almost 
entirely performance based. While overpaid CEOs with little or no influence over the 
board may find themselves unable to prevent a downward adjustment to align pay 
with the peer average130. The former is most pronounced when the CEO dually acts as 
chairman of the board131.  
Furthermore, Hambrick and Finkelstein, found mimicry of industry averages to be 
more likely in manager-controlled firms, than in firms controlled by a single majority 
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owner132. Common sense would suggest that the latter scenario would be the least 
frequent, calling to question the usefulness of benchmarking as practiced, if not to 
justify high or excessive CEO wages. 
Even optimal contracting enthusiasts recurring contentions that current pay levels 
result from optimal and efficient processes, would concede that it would not be 
completely implausible to contemplate the possibility of managerial influence over the 
pay setting process, albeit in a limited number of instances. Whatever the 
nomenclature, basing compensation on peer performance does not evidence prudent 
contracting by company boards. The most important fact here, is not the frequency of 
such instances or how widespread the practice is, but rather the effect even a handful 
of manager influenced pay packages could have on overall pay levels. 
For example, statistics from the U.S show that in 2013 the top ten most benchmarked 
companies within the S&P 1500, were referenced a total of 580 times, with the most 
being manufacturing conglomerate 3M, which had 62 companies reference its 
compensation policy in setting executive pay. It is worthy of note, that 3M paid its CEO 
$16.4 million in total compensation for that year133. The least referenced company was 
food manufacturing giant Kellogg, which had 43 references to its name, along with 
Illinois Tool Works and Colgate Palmolive134. If any of these firms had their 
compensation policies drafted by captive boards then you have a situation whereby a 
minimum of 43 other firm’s base compensation practices on flawed standards.  
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Having noted the above, it then becomes difficult to argue that benchmarked pay 
packages are the outcome of Nozick’s postulation of a legitimate process. The 
centrality of the concept of desert to his entitlement theory, requires that every pay 
package should have a direct correlation to the service provided. Only when pay is 
given in exchange for the CEO’s value proposition, can the requirement for justice in 
distribution be said to have been met.  
It is fair to say, that even the most ardent proponent of peer averaging in 
compensation setting would struggle to defend the practice on the basis of Nozick’s 
theory. The already stated widespread use of peer averages, increases the potential 
for compromise pay packages, to be the basis upon which others may be set. Given 
the importance of the pay setting process to the question of the justice of high pay, 
this latter fact suggests that executive pay, in its current form, falls short of the justice 
standard upon which Nozick’s thesis is based. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The most salient objection to executive pay in its currency is the issue of desert. Do 
CEOs deserve their current wages? In the present socio-political climate, economic 
arguments in favour of current pay levels have become insufficient and has become 
necessary for proponents of high pay to prove the justice in the current wage disparity 
between company heads and the ordinary earners within society. Causing 
unprecedented attention to be given to the determinative process of pay and the 





The enthronement of shareholders as the focus of the Anglo-American corporate 
objective required that their interests be protected by a board consisting of 
“autonomous fiduciaries”135, who, in this opinion are the primal authority136. But this 
view, just like the shareholder primacy argument, before it fails to capture the 
practicalities of corporate governance in Anglo-American. It is thought to be that 
neither the shareholding body nor the board of directors are the central authority 
within the firm, but that managers hold sway, using their influence to control the 
board and extract rents. Enabled by a governance infrastructure which perpetuates 
managerial excesses.  
The highlighted governance failures could be attributed to board ineffectiveness, with 
the reasons for these already discussed earlier in the chapter. It is fair to conclude, all 
things considered, that the form and mode of the Anglo-American system of corporate 
governance, effectively guarantees the failure of corporate boards in the monitoring 
of managers, which affects consequentially, the setting of managerial compensation. 
As such, the growth in executive pay, appears to have less to do with managerial or 
firm performance, but rather the rent extractive tendencies of the latter. Wherein the 
interlocking and mutually interdependent relationships which form the governance 
and monitoring framework of these large enterprises, create the supple environment 
for managerial excess.  
The importance of the sanctity of the pay setting process to the justifiability of high 
pay, is highlighted by Nozick’s theory of entitlement. As noted within the Chapter, 
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Nozick argues that income is only just and deserved, when it arises through the justice 
regarding means of acquisition and transfer, implying that when it does not, said 
income is inherently unjust. It is fair to say that the current governance structure 
allows for managerial influence over the pay setting process as board capture theory 
would suggest. Even if this is only true for in a handful of companies and pay packages, 
the use of peer averages in the pay setting exacerbates the impact of these 
compromised situations, further worsened by the fact that this is more likely tool in 
firms with weak governance infrastructures137 Which would call into question the 
justness of the current regime of executive pay. 
 
                                                            






CEO Pay and the Income Distribution Conundrum: Putting 
High Pay into Context 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The problem with the high executive pay culture cannot be limited to the sheer 
magnitude of the quantum of the disclosed figures alone. For such an observation, 
would be isolationist and perhaps reductionist, but more so bearing the fundamental 
weakness of having the observer’s initial reservations about the trend easily justified, 
with valid reasons. 
This is so, because the pervasive attitudes toward CEO pay could be summed up 
expressively as having a ‘means justifies the ends’ approach. Whereby the focus on 
the process and the justice thereof outlines the importance of the ‘means’. But just as 
important, is the ‘end’ portion of that construct. Nozick best signifies this mind-set 
with the statement “Any set of holdings that results from a legitimate process is just”1. 
Earlier portions of the thesis had focused on the process of executive compensation 
setting, highlighting some of the practices that could potentially compromise its 
integrity2. The previous Chapter discussed the pay setting process, using Nozick’s 
theory of entitlement as a litmus test of its integrity. Highlighting Nozick’s argument 
that the justice of ‘ends’ could only be met by the legitimacy of the process. Legitimacy 
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in this context would refer to practices which do not fall afoul of commonly regarded 
ethical considerations. But viewing legitimacy in this context, strictly from the view 
point of ethics or legality, could prove myopic in the long term. For there exists a 
substantial gap between behaviours which are legal and those which are ethical or 
just3.  
 The point being made here is that the justice of high executive compensation cannot 
be determined simply by an evaluation of the means of attaining the disputed 
outcome but must also contemplate the wider impact of the trend, before making an 
accurate and informed judgement regarding its fairness. In this case the legitimacy of 
the process, would not sufficiently justify the end. 
Discussed in Chapter Three was Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example, which was 
intended to highlight the core principle of voluntariness which underpinned his justice 
theory. There it did not matter that Mr Chamberlain received substantially more than 
the average income due to receiving a portion of the ticket prices. Here Nozick 
concluded that Chamberlain was entitled to his income, as his fans had willingly paid 
to watch him play, fully aware of the distributional consequences. Nozick effectively 
concludes that the justice of a distribution can only be determined by the process 
through which it is received, regardless of the inequalities which result4. 
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In direct contrast to Nozick’s process-oriented argument, is the Rawlsian view of 
justice as fairness. Rawls rejects the notion of a process-based justification of 
inequalities, arguing instead that a system of income distribution which creates 
sizeable wealth disparities can only be justified where; those inequalities benefit the 
least within society and provides true equality of opportunity5. With regards to 
executive pay, the Rawlsian focus would be quantum-based-how much executives 
earn and the social impact of the latter-regardless of the integrity of the pay-setting 
process. Indicating that a comprehensive evaluation of high executive pay, must 
extend beyond the pay-setting process, and consider its externalities. The externalities 
of high executive pay, are most relevant to the issue of income inequality. 
Thomas Piketty attributed the rise in income inequality to the advent of the “super 
manager”6. He blamed the infiltration of the superstar mind-set in American 
corporations-and to a lesser degree, British firms-in the late 70’s and 1980’s on the 
rise in pay levels which began at about the same period. However, he is quick to note 
that the income gap between the top earners and the rest has more to do with the 
salaries paid to company executives than to other “superstars” with the latter 
consisting of just 5 per cent of the top 1 per cent of earners7. Whether managerial or 
sporting talent Anglo-American society pedestals outstanding individuals and pays 
accordingly. This is the reality Nozick captures and endorses in the Wilt chamberlain 
scenario. 
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The zeitgeist is, highly talented individuals are a valuable economic asset, deserving 
huge rewards8. While the nobility of just deserts cannot be overstated, issues arise 
when the marginal output of one, is priced multiple times above the average. We could 
endlessly debate the value of talent in general and it is not only within corporations 
that we are confronted with seemingly outrageous sums in salaries and wages. 
Sportsmen, entertainers and other highly talented individuals have for decades being 
very well remunerated. With these high sums not enjoying the same level of scrutiny, 
granted to company executives. 
Several reasons could be proffered in explanation but could simply be put down to 
conceptions of desert and worth. Sporting talent is obvious; we observe are enthralled 
and immediately evaluate its worth. Seven-figure pay packets juxtaposed against 
talent of intangible but euphoric value, would seem trivial. But the notion of the 
hardworking executive stashed behind the corporate veil, toiling for the sake of 
corporate performance would provoke far less magnanimity in the casual observer. 
The reason could be quite simple, said observer works with or for the executive, has 
first-hand knowledge of what most of the job entails and most importantly has 
watched his wages stagnate, as the latter swelled. The consequences of such an 
evaluation are multi-faceted, with the effect on morale, not being the least of these9. 
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The question of excess when it comes to compensation for services in general and for 
executives like most things is relative and often biased. Opinions of the current levels 
would vary, from the public sector to high finance. But regardless of the individual’s 
station, certain levels of compensation sufficiently evoke feelings of unfairness and 
inequity. The controversy surrounding executive compensation has not just to do with 
the figures alone, as issues of finance transcends merely the wage and lifestyle 
differentials but have wider effects on society. The most unequal societies would by 
implication, have higher rates of poverty than the more egalitarian ones and have 
been shown to be less productive also10.  
The aim of this Chapter is not to embark on a vast philosophical discourse on the 
negatives of income inequality, but quite simply an attempt to answer or at least 
contemplate the justice of a pay ratio of 129:1 in the UK, in favour of the CEO, as 
against the average wage earner in the organisation he leads. Or for CEO wages which 
have risen between 439-513 per cent since 1978 in the U.S, while the average private 
sector salary rose just 1.4 per cent in the same time11. Libertarians like Nozick, could 
suggest several reasons why this could be fair, but the most pressing question which 
neither the proponents nor the agitators have could answer convincingly, is whether 
the current pay levels have been arrived at organically or are they the product of a 
synthetically constructed process, advanced by a cabal of rentiers, utilising a legitimate 
process, to justify illegitimate gains?   
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Nozick’s suggestion that the process is everything, fulfil the process and the ends must 
be just, fails to fly in a post-crisis world coming to terms with the realities of a 
meltdown powered by greed and regulatory oversight, where citizens are becoming 
more socially aware of the inequalities that pervade and the reasons for those 
inequalities. This Chapter seeks to answer the second research question utilising 
Rawls’ justice theory. The thesis argues here, that even if high executive pay fulfils its 
procedural justice requirements, it must be viewed in terms of its impact in wider 
society for it to pass the test of fairness or justice. 
The rest of this Chapter is outlined as follows; the following section would look further 
into the glorification of talented and highly-skilled individuals and its effect on income 
inequality in general, and particularly into the celebration of managerial talent within 
Anglo-America and the tectonic effects this has had on executive pay within the region. 
The Chapter will analyse the effectiveness of celebrated CEOs especially as it impacts 
firm performance. Trying to answer the question of whether celebrity CEOs and all the 
exposure they elicit are good for business. Next, this thesis will attempt to answer the 
question of the justice of executive compensation, by examining some of the foremost 
theories of justice as they pertain to executive compensation, comparing Nozick’s 
entitlement theory with the Rawlsian principles of justice.  
To give these arguments real world context, the thesis will analyse these principles 
against modern phenomenon such as globalisation and innovation and adoption of 
technologies in business operations. Both are believed to have played a part in the 
growth of executive pay and widening the income gap in Anglo-American societies12. 
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Globalisation and technology appear to have a co-enabling effect on each other, a 
combination of which has maximized the productivity of the modern corporation 
allowing them to function in ways that could never have been anticipated in the past. 
It could be argued, that the workings of the corporation have ensured that the 
profitability gains from a globalised and techno-advanced world, have positively 
impacted managerial remuneration.  
As such the thesis seeks to show how the quest for greater compensation by 
executives underpins the increasing globalisation of firm operations and how the latter 
has led to a global convergence towards Anglo-American compensatory methods and 
levels. 
4.2. Executive pay and Inequality in Income Distribution 
Income inequality in American and British societies has risen dramatically since the 
1970’s13.  An issue described by former U.S president Barrack Obama as “the defining 
Challenge of our time”14. This statement itself encapsulates the concerns of the 
widening gap between the very wealthy and the rest of society. A wealth gap 
precipitated by a small but powerful class of rentiers, whose interest in wealth 
acquisition does not appear to have worked to the benefit of all, contrary to 
conventional economics15 
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Piketty estimates that by 2030, the top decile of earners in the U.S would earn twice 
as much as the bottom 50 percent of income distribution scale16. While in the UK the 
proportion of the national income filtering to the top 1 percent has risen to just about 
14 percent, and they have about as much wealth as the bottom, 60 percent17. There 
are a few reasons for the growing income and wealth gap, globalisation and-somewhat 
ironically-technological advancement topping that list. It is no surprise that income 
inequality is on the rise amongst the OECD countries, and measurable in traditionally 
more egalitarian societies18. However, on the income distribution scale, the top four 
most unequal societies have the U.S and U.K in 2nd and 4th respectively.  
Piketty notes two ways a society might attain and sustain high levels of inequality; 
having a predominance of rentiers and what he describes as a “hyper-meritocracy”. 
While the former largely belongs to a fading era of inherited wealth, the latter, which 
is more relevant to the discourse, involves an unequal distribution of income, due to a 
concentration of wages in the hands of a few talented or revered individuals or 
‘superstars’. Piketty’s focus in this case being on superstar CEOs or ‘super managers’-
corporate managers celebrated for their perceived managerial nous. He states 
however that it would be naïve to assume that a society could not be rentier-oriented 
and hyper-meritocratic all at the same time and cites the U.S and Britain as examples19. 
Suffice to note however that the current spate of unequal distribution of income, 
coincided with managerial wealth gains20. 
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A combination of technological advancements and globalisation has ensured 
productivity gains and higher CEO wages, but average earners have yet to receive any 
of the benefits. Advancements in technology have de-skilled the productive process, 
heightening the dispensability of the average blue-collar wage earner, while 
outsourcing to low-wage countries has only worked to exacerbate the problem. Thus, 
the Anglo-American corporation is more profitable, even though the economy less 
productive and its workers worse off financially21. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer in 2015 outlined a plan for a £9 per hour minimum 
wage by 202022. It is noteworthy that the average FTSE 100 CEO earns that much every 
30 seconds. Similar wage recommendations in the U.S faced significant push back from 
large corporations, arguing a loss in profitability might threaten the job security of 
existing employees23.  
At the core of the executive pay debate are the questions of desert it raises. Do 
executives deserve very high wages? Do less skilled and qualified workers deserve less 
than a fair wage? These questions raise a few endlessly debatable philosophical issues-
for instance, how we define skill or what could be regarded as fair in wage setting? 
Fairness from the viewpoint of economics is pay that reflects the value of the marginal 
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product24. This notion takes into consideration the time and effort required for skill 
acquisition and task performance. Whereas managerial expertise gained over years of 
educational and practical training, compared to lower-level roles which require less 
time and training. 
Inversely the adopted belief in the rarity of true managerial talent, is at the core of its 
economic value25. This economic value is celebrated and this celebration precipitates 
outsized rewards26.  
As we know the celebration of talent within Anglo-America culture transcends the co-
existing worlds of entertainment, sports, politics etc. These individuals fall within a 
broad classification of Entertainers, Athletes and other Superstars (hereinafter EAOS) 
revered for the abilities they possess, which the market prices well above the average 
and whose product is almost always readily consumed by interested parts of society.  
The dynamics of demand and supply helps ensure the perpetuity of a high reward 
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4.3.  Justifying High Executive Pay: Making an Argument for Talent 
Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example briefly illustrates the value Anglo-American society 
places on skill and talent.  
In sports for instance, multi-million pound pay deals were non-existent or rare in 
Europe four decades ago. But such agreements were not quite as foreign in America 
within the same period. The culture of high salaries for American sports people 
officially began in the 1970s27. Similar levels existed for entertainers28. 
However, forty years later the trend has significantly altered, as participants in team 
sports in Euro-Asia are more likely to be far better compensated than their American 
counterparts. Per a global salary survey for sports teams done in 2015, seven of the 
top ten best paid teams are based in Europe with Paris St-Germain, a French football 
team leading the pack, with an average salary of £5.3m annually29. The culture for 
paying excessively for sporting talent has metastasized beyond continental Europe to 
places like Russia (where the highest paid salary was £35.9m in 2012)30 and China (with 
the average salary in the Chinese Super league in 2011, in the region of £1m)31, as well 
as Japan32. The trend is not limited to football alone as other team sports have joined 
in the high pay bandwagon. For instance, of the top forty highest paying teams in the 
world, four are members of the elite Indian Cricket league, each paying their players’ 
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salaries more than £2m on average33. The same goes for film stars in India and some 
of Asia34. 
The fact that none of the above-mentioned countries are known to be particularly 
inegalitarian makes the trend more puzzling. With Russia and China having very strict 
socialist backgrounds, with the latter still widely regarded as being a communist 
country in designation at least, if not in practice. It shows how the celebrity status 
afforded certain highly skilled individuals in certain professions, could alter the 
dynamics of income distribution. With this same reverence being afforded to company 
CEOs in the last few decades. 
In 1981, Sherwin Rosen described a superstar system as one in which “there is a 
concentration of output by a few individuals, marked skewness in the associated 
distribution of income and very large distributions at the top”35. Noting further that 
“there is a strong tendency for both market size and reward to be skewed towards the 
most talented individuals”. Although this mind-set had been pervasive in popular 
culture, it is perhaps odd that this media-driven popularity has found a place within 
corporate governance culture36.  
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This sort of exposure is perhaps not always unmerited. With there being a multiplicity 
of examples of pioneer CEOs whose innovations have vastly improved our quality of 
life. Others having no hand in the inception, have however, overseen the growth and 
prosperity of the firms they managed37. And these managers are subsequently 
recognised for their efforts, and rightly so. Research has shown managers of successful 
firms usually witness a spike in their monetary rewards as well as perks and other like 
benefits38. There are two identifiable and yet inevitable problems with a superstar 
mentality in rewarding executives; the concentration of wealth that would 
unavoidably occur and inevitable consequence of underperforming CEOs benefitting 
from such a system. 
Starting with the latter problem. Having earlier on addressed the practice of 
benchmarking39, the thesis wish not to dwell any further on it. However,  paying high 
performing executive’s celebrity like wages would help set the going rate for CEOs in 
general, even for those whose performances fail to reach the requisite level. Just like 
the proverbial tide that lifts all boats, benchmarking in executive compensation helps 
level a playing field with varied talent levels. In a system, where it could be argued that 
even the most deserving managers are overcompensated, such a trend could only ever 
have undesirable consequences for the firm first, as well as the economy and society. 
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It could be said that a key argument for high pay could be that the market generates 
the prices that are to be paid for services on all levels, and if the market does not 
“transfer holdings…. on an irrational and arbitrary basis”40, then the sums must be 
right. Nozicks’s contention that marginal product determines earnings and that 
distributions are the product of the “party’s voluntary exchanges” is steeped in the 
joint notions of entitlement and desert. Party A gives voluntarily to party B, to 
incentivize and reward the latter for his talent and effort. In critiquing Rawls’s ideal of 
inequalities being just, only when they are to the benefit of all, Nozick states: 
“the serviceable inequalities stem, at least in part, from the necessity to provide 
incentives to certain people to perform various activities or fill various roles that not 
everyone can do equally well” 
On this note he goes on to rhetorically ask, “to whom are these incentives to be paid, 
to which performers of what activities?” Nozick’s answer to these questions are fairly 
obvious, given the general direction of his thesis-those with the higher marginal 
product. Incentivizing marginal product by inversion excludes or should exclude an 
incentive structure rewarding anything other than apt performance. Basing pay on the 
industry average, is not an incentive structure that rewards performance, but one that 
rewards an individual for the performance of others. That would take most 
benchmarked pay packages out of the purview of Nozick’s notion of entitlement, and 
the question of justice, would be a forgone conclusion. 
Flowing from the earlier point is the second problem precipitated by a celebrity-like 
reward system for corporate executives, the problem of wealth concentration at the 
                                                            





upper end of the income distribution scale. Celebrity-like status enables executives 
and CEO’s capture a larger portion of the wealth distribution than they would have 
had they not been so regarded41. Research shows that most executives who have been 
the recipients of awards or been recognised for performance enjoy a significant rise in 
pay afterwards42. The reasons behind the trend would be addressed later, however it 
would be safe to conclude at this point that celebrity-like status does have perceivable 
positive effects on executive pay43. Which in turn further skews the distribution of 
income. 
As Rosen noted there are three characteristics of a superstar system; a concentration 
of output amongst a small number of persons, which results in skewness in income 
distribution and the emergence of a top-heavy wealth concentration framework. All 
three characteristics could be said to be evident within the current executive 
compensation culture.  Since the 1970’s and 80’s executives have increasingly had 
their fortunes tied almost inextricably with that of the firms they managed and have 
increasingly demanded that they be credited as well for the successes these firms have 
enjoyed44. It may be down to pure happenstance that the recognisability of managers 
coincided with the rise in CEO pay or a direct consequence of said recognition. Leading 
to a situation where-just as Rosen evinced-a few individuals reap the largest rewards.  
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4.3.1. The Falsehood of Transferable (Generic) Managerial Talent 
Elson and Ferrere blame the celebration of CEO talent on a false notion of the 
transferability of managerial skills. A notion which fails to recognise that CEO success 
is often attained by investing a significant amount of time working within a firm or 
industry. Skills acquired thus are not always transferable being more specific to the 
firm in question. Unsubstantiated claims about their transferability may have 
stemmed from misguided comparisons between CEOs and star athletes45.  
Rosen noted that advancements in technology had provided the platform for talented 
individuals to develop valuable skills, which enhance their earning potential46.  
Advancements in and utilisation of technology had caused Anglo-American firms to 
dominate markets and consequently grow the size of their operations, with some of 
the gains going to larger pay packages for executives. There are however notable flaws 
in making such comparisons: one is the fluidity of movement across industry and genre 
that athletes and entertainers have, allowing them to find success in areas outside 
their natural artistic/athletic inclinations. For instance, recording artists could delve 
into film making and succeed or athletes could move across teams-or sports-and 
flourish, the firm or industry-specificity of CEO talent may inhibit such fluidity47. 
A second limitation has more to do with the discernibility of executive talent as well 
as those for athletes and other like professionals, discernibility impacts the way they 
are subsequently priced. Compensation for athletes and entertainers is purely market 
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driven, simply put, demand determines the price paid for supply48. Barring the outlying 
instance where reputation could be artificially enhanced to advance productivity, 
generally star entertainers and athletes are perceived by the buying public to be worth 
the value of their product, which in this case is the athlete or entertainer himself or at 
least the persona he exudes. But the pricing of CEO talent varies markedly, despite the 
contentions of high pay advocates, the pricing for executives is not entirely market-
driven, contrary to conventional thinking49.  
Further on the issue of discernibility, CEO ability as well as contribution to firm growth 
and success tends not to stand out as much as that of the average EAOS. With the 
talent of the average superstar being on display for the casual observer to make a 
value judgement on his marginal product. Value judgements of CEO talent and ability 
are based on second-hand information as their activities are rarely witnessed on a 
first-hand basis by those outside the upper-echelons of management. As noted by 
Elson and Fererre, executives are tasked more with the formulation and organization 
of the corporate policy and operations, as such “rather than being a factor of 
production an executive directs and organizes other factors”50. 
Pouring further scorn on the comparisons between CEOs and EAOSs is the pay for 
performance aspect which is substantially more apparent in compensation for EAOSs 
than with CEOs. With EAOSs a dip in performance levels-a downward surge in the value 
of the product-would necessarily cause earnings to follow a similar path. With CEO pay 
however, a flailing firm would not always have as negative an impact on managerial 
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pay, as evidenced by the much documented ‘reward for failure’ instances pre-and 
post-recession51.The bottom line as Elson concludes, is that managerial expertise 
within a firm or industry is acquired by experience gathered only by functioning within 
that firm or industry, hence CEO skills are not so easily transferable52.  
Those who argue for transferable CEO skills, believe in the existence of core 
knowledge-based skills, which are applicable regardless of industry53. Murphy and 
Zabonjnik correlate the unprecedented rise in CEO pay levels to the increasing 
generalisation of managerial skills and state that “over the past three decades, the 
society has steadily accumulated a body of knowledge in economics, management 
science, accounting, finance, and other disciplines, which, if mastered by a CEO, can 
substantially improve his ability to manage any modern corporation successfully”. As 
well they put forward the impact technology has had in enhancing CEO talent. Stating 
that the digitization of   company operations can allow CEOs transition more fluidly 
between sectors, allowing them to learn the nature of the firm’s operations easily, 
with the aid of available interactive technologies. They cite the increase in the number 
of external hires as evidence of a shift towards generalisation in management, to 
alternatively explain the rise in CEO pay, as external hires tend to earn higher than 
those promoted from within the organisation54. The theory is the demand for 
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generalised managers has led to competition amongst prospective employers in the 
market for managerial talent, causing prices to increase.     
However, this view is unsupported statistically. Ang and Nagel, found it to be more 
beneficial economically to promote from within than hire from outside. Using a sample 
of firms gathered over two decades, their results show that firms hiring from outside 
should have expected to make a loss 86.2 percent of the time55. That one could 
mention a few other instances of outside failures, is not conclusive of the futility of the 
generalisation argument. Corporate management like any other skill-based endeavour 
requires, time in a methodical process of skill acquisition and dissemination, just as 
the best dramatists and athletes learn their craft for extended periods of time so would 
successful management require an in-depth knowledge of the workings of the specific 
market. It is no surprise that some of the most successful managers, spent an 
incredible amount of time at the firms they managed56. It is on this note that 
arguments for transferability fail to convince. 
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4.3.1. CEO Celebrities: good for performance? 
Having already mentioned the debate about the efficacy of externally hired CEOs, as 
determined by the effect on performance, it is perhaps proper as well to focus briefly 
on CEO performance in the aftermath of firm and personal success. 
Malmender and Tate enthuse a steeper likelihood of a dip in firm performance 
following recognition for its CEO. However, this retardation in performance often 
coincides with an increase in managerial pay57.  The reasons for the latter are not so 
farfetched, least of these is the heightened reputation following success, coupled with 
increased bargaining powers of successful CEOs. It is however not quite as clear cut 
with regards to the performance issue. Malmender and Tate on this note proffer a few 
reasons of their own.  They argue that CEOs become distracted following recognition, 
especially by the media. They claim award winning managers become taken with the 
trappings of celebrity, subsequently neglect their managerial responsibilities and the 
focus instead becomes less about managing firm success as it is about personal 
business. An over-indulgence in extra-corporate activities usually follows a la external 
board memberships, writing biographies, philanthropy, undertaking expensive pet 
projects i.e. investments in sports teams etc. are just some of the manifestations of 
the tendency58.  
Similarly, Samuelson’s studied observation within academia notes a decline in output 
of Nobel laureates in contrast to performance before the award and the recognition 
that came with it. In this case, recipients become enthralled with and overwhelmed by 
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the prize money and the media attention, leading in some instances to a meltdown 
within professional and personal circumstances59. Barnard notes certain pathological 
traits exhibited by successful CEOs namely; fear, depression and anger. As well as a 
need to consolidate their current positions and place in history, by empire building 
often leading to ill-advised acquisitions and loss of value60. These characteristics 
evidence a deviation from the corporate focus of value maximization, to a more 
personal and perhaps narcissistic need for recognition.  
Behaviourists term this the “hot-hand effect”, derived from basketball, it is a term used 
to describe a performance streak61. The hot-hand streak is a hubris trap, where a 
person coming of a string of successes, begins to view themselves as infallible, 
becoming assumptive in their behaviour towards present and future endeavours. 
Taking steps premised on the conclusion that past successes would translate into 
present or future ones. It “represents a pattern of behaviour where initial success 
inhibits an individual from making adaptive strategic decisions”62.  Researchers on 
organizational settings believe that successful and celebrated CEOs could become 
rigid, eschewing experimentation in favour of tried and tested methodology. This 
rigidity could lead to decline “as the firm will not have gained the necessary knowledge 
by undergoing the experimentation needed to adapt to environmental change”63. This 
view is supported by research by Miller, which showed that although CEOs usually start 
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by adopting a comprehensive range of strategies, over time they tend to favour those 
which proved effective in the past64 
Malmender and Tate confirm that powerful and distracted CEOs are more common in 
firms with a weak monitoring apparatus. As such “CEOs extract more rents and 
consume more perks” engage in extra-corporate activities, take more leisure time than 
they should, focus less on managing the firms and often oversee a downturn in 
performance thus. In summary, celebrating CEOs could in fact have a negative impact 
on firm performance65. 
On a concluding note, Bogus evinces the waste of paying CEOs vast sums for any 
reason other than that the payments equate to the value created. He mentions the 
futility of paying for talent or CEO mobility and skill transferability. Stating that, it was 
needlessly excessive to make incentive payments that exceed the value of the 
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4.4. Justifying High Compensation in the face of Growing 
Income inequality 
As mentioned it would be an inchoate exercise for an evaluation of executive pay to 
be based on quantum only, without any relevant context. A context-based analysis 
would inter alia involve comparisons with average earnings across the income 
distribution spectrum. This approach to the subject-matter must be taken cautiously 
however, given its sensational nature and populist inclinations. As Harris notes, pay 
ratio evaluations could be complicated and become an easily manipulated exercise67. 
Executive pay ratio disclosures, are useful in so far as they aid discussions regarding 
the equitability of executive pay. workers generally desire to be treated fairly, and 
there is no greater indication of this, than the way they are compensated. Even 
though, it has been suggested that definitions of fairness differ and are determined by 
hierarchical positioning within organisations or society68. However, for all people, the 
‘fair wage, for fair work’ standard is imperative.  
 
  
                                                            







4.4.1. What then is a Fair Wage? Conceptions of Desert as Postulated by 
Nozick and the Rawlsian principles of justice 
Nozick’s definition of a fair wage as one which came about by legitimate means69. 
Having a process-oriented approach to conceiving justice, he postulates that outcomes 
are only just, if they were acquired by means which are in tandem with either the 
principles of justice in acquisition or transfer70. Simply put “whatever arises from a just 
situation by just steps is itself just”. Adopting this argument in favour or against high 
executive pay, ignores one of the major arguments against high pay; its effect on 
income inequality. 
Income and wealth Inequalities appear to be intricately intertwined with the notion of 
free markets and ownership in capitalist societies, whereby outcomes are determined 
by effort, and thus just. But such a narrow-minded view assumes all play by the rules 
and that all economic activity is regulated by an ‘invisible hand’ which ensures that 
outcomes are commensurate with input, while self-serving antics are dealt with 
appropriately by natural processes. But recent economic history has shown that to not 
always be the case, it would cause one to question the solidity of Nozick’s process-
oriented thesis. 
However, assuming executive compensation accorded with all the demands of justice 
in acquisition and pay levels are attained by “justice preserving means”, accepting high 
pay as fair would in turn justify the differentials between CEO pay and average 
earnings within organisational settings and wider society. The use of CEO pay ratios 
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has been criticised by Harris for being overtly political and that they fail to legitimately 
control for the complexities in pay and pay differentials71. CEO-worker’s pay ratio 
analysis requires, the juxtaposition of the wages of highly skilled managers against a 
group of average workers with varying skill levels. When regarded from that view point 
it could perhaps suggest a hastiness in pay differential analysis. Harris argues that 
calculations of differentials between CEO pay and average workers, factoring salaries 
of top level managers (i.e. CFO and COO’s) would invariably bridge the gap between 
CEO pay and the average. That the often non-inclusion of the salaries of these highly 
paid managers in the average pool, leaves the motive behind the utilisation of pay 
differentials in CEO pay analysis, somewhat suspect72. 
That said, if we adopt the libertarian conception of a fair wage, the issues surrounding 
pay differentials become irrelevant, due to its focus on the pay-setting process73. 
Although both Nozick and Rawls have procedural justice at the heart of their 
respective justice perspectives, they however diverge on the issue of outcome. While 
Nozick concludes that the fairness of the outcome is assumed once the justice of the 
process is proven, Rawls on the other hand makes no such assumptions. The Rawlsian 
perspective argues instead that; outcomes are only just when they are to the benefit 
of all. 
The second Rawlsian principle, which involves wealth distribution and social and 
economic inequalities, states in sum; that the inequalities that would arise from just 
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processes, should be arranged in such a way that they are to the benefit of the least 
privileged; and “are attached to offices open to all”74. Whereas Nozick leaves the 
justice of the outcome to be determined by the process, i.e. wealth acquired through 
justice preserving means would be fair, regardless of the inequalities that result. 
Rawls’ contemplation of a just distribution would ideally be an equal one, but, unequal 
distributions could be tolerated if they eventually worked to the benefit of all within 
the spectrum. A contemplation of justice in distribution which is not limited to the 
procedure resulting in the outcome, but of the outcome itself. An unjust outcome in 
that case, would be one that produces “inequalities that are not to the benefit of all”75. 
To determine the justice of current pay levels would be to question, how inequalities 
produced by executive compensation work to the benefit all. Rawls provided the 
template for answering this question. Although he admits that the conceptions of 
justice do not recommend a threshold for permissible inequalities, however they do 
require everyone be left better off by said inequalities. That every individual within the 
spectrum “prefer his prospects with the inequality to his prospects without it”76 
Rawls’ conception of justice does not differ much from the Lockean proviso, whereby 
an appropriation of a previously unowned thing is only justified if there is enough and 
as good left for others. Locke believing acquisition was complete upon the mixing of 
one’s labour (effort and skill) with an unappropriated resource, however caveated this 
by his insistence on the effects said appropriation would have on the welfare of the 
next man. Which if when negative, would place the acquisition on the wrong side of 
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the proviso. These arguments highlight the importance of exploring the impact of 
executive pay in a wider social context. 
As well, the second arm of Rawls second principle suggests that for an unequal 
distribution to be fair, the opportunities afforded to the most well off must be open 
to all. The right to equality of opportunity - “positions are not to be only open in a 
formal sense but that all should have a fair chance to attain them”- as Rawls himself 
admits is somewhat stymied by the limitations of natural abilities and talents. Bearing 
this in mind he then goes further to clarify, what is meant by a fair chance at 
attainment; 
“but we might say that those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life 
chances. More specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those 
who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use 
them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the 
social system”77 
The question here is the attainability of managerial positions, are they truly positions 
open to all, or exclusive to a certain social stratum? Rawls theory would suggest that 
for high pay to be justifiable, the answer would need to lie closer to the former. If not, 
then high pay and the resulting inequalities would not be. The issue is how much of a 
weighting education and social positioning have on one’s ability to attain these 
positions. More importantly, the impact social positioning has on one’s ability to attain 
the requisite educational qualifications. The increasing competitiveness of the market 
for managerial talent requires that often the best qualified individuals only, are 
                                                            





considered for these coveted positions. With these individuals drawn mainly from a 
quorum of elite institutions.  
A 2014 report by the governments Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, 
found that 22 per cent of FTSE 350 CEOs were privately educated, even though just 7 
per cent of the UK population were thus trained. Also, 18 per cent of FTSE 350 CEOs 
were ‘Oxbridge’ alumni, compared to just 1 in 100 of the total UK population78. The 
figures are worse when you exclude those educated outside of the UK, where 41 per 
cent of British educated FTSE 350 CEOs were privately educated and 43 per cent 
attended a Russell group university. Only 7 per cent of the entire sample did not have 
any university education. Although these figures are admittedly not as overwhelming, 
as similar trends in politics and the wider public sector, which show much higher levels 
of representation of those with privileged educational backgrounds79. They could 
however support suggestions of elitism and social engineering in the CEO selection 
process. 
Given that increase in mobility is meant to compensate for income differentials for 
these differentials to be just, it goes without saying that the absence of said mobility 
becomes then a serious indictment on an unequal distribution. On this, Piketty notes 
that if every individual were to spend a year in the “upper centile of the income 
hierarchy” then increases in the wages of high earners would not automatically imply 
an increase in wage inequality80. There is a similar situation in France, where most 
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corporate executives are alumni of the country’s prestigious Grand Ecoles81. They 
could however support suggestions of elitism and social engineering in the CEO 
selection process. 
 
4.5. Does High Executive Pay Work to the Benefit of All? 
The first part of Rawls’ second principle would require high CEO wages to ultimately 
work to the benefit of all within society. A libertarian response to this requirement 
would probably touch on the success inducing force which is high and the fact that an 
overwhelming majority of CEO pay packages have a performance related element to 
them. However, such an argument could be easily rebutted in the face of modern 
realities. The fact is high pay and pay for performance has placed an unprecedented 
emphasis on firm profitability, for which CEOs are required to increase returns to 
shareholders often at the expense of genuine value creation.  
Much has been made of the increasingly short-sighted outlook of the Anglo-American 
corporation, the endemic profit-oriented attitudes and the apparent willingness to 
sacrifice future value for immediate wealth. It could be argued that some of the more 
laudable achievements perhaps function to the detriment of true value creation and 
help perpetuate inequalities. Take for instance the opinion-splitting concept of 
globalization, which has been facilitated and accelerated by advancements in 
productive and communicative abilities, that have helped improve the quality and 
productive pace of goods and service provision. As well as, increasing our abilities to 
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communicate and transport these from place to place, more quickly and efficiently 
than in the past. Making the globe smaller as distances have narrowed and erstwhile 
barriers more easily breached.  
Globalization, as driven by advancements in technology has been immensely beneficial 
to firm growth, however the benefits to firm productivity do not appear to have always 
worked to better the lot of the least in society. Having had a simultaneously negative 
impact on middle to low income wages82. By achieving the previously unthinkable 
proposition of placing labour from the developed world in direct competition with 
their counterparts from low-wage countries. With this having a suppressive effect on 
wage levels for the ordinary low-skilled worker, while the wages of highly-skilled, 
managerial level earners have grown83. In the following portion of the Chapter the 
thesis argues that, globalisation and technological advancement have been utilised by 
self-interested managers to improve the corporate bottom line and extract rents, 
causing executive pay to rise. Thus, this chapter argues that there exists a causal link 
between high pay and wage stagnation for ordinary workers. 
 
4.5.1.  Firm Profitability and Wage Suppression: adoption of new technologies 
Piketty described education and technology as “the decisive determinants of wage 
levels”84. A statement which buttressed the importance of education and technology-
particularly the latter-in wage and earnings distribution. Technological innovation and 
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its adoption impacts wage distribution in two broad ways; first, it determines the skill-
level needed to perform the required tasks and how this skill acquisition is priced85. 
Secondly, it has revolutionised firm operations in the production of goods and 
provision of service, also functioning as a determinant in the way these supplanted 
roles are priced. On the one hand, technological innovation has helped drive wages up 
for those possessing the requisite skill-levels, having the opposite effect with regards 
to the latter86. 
Piketty noted a race between education and technology, stating that inequalities 
exacerbate, when the latter fails to keep pace with the former. He concludes that best 
way to “reduce inequalities……. is to invest in education”87. His assertions are based on 
statistical evidence from Europe and America which showed inequality increased as 
access to quality education at secondary and tertiary levels declined88. He states that, 
the wage gap began to grow in the 1980s coincided with the decade in which university 
graduation rates began to stall in America. Comparing this to the more egalitarian 
Scandinavian societies, which have comparatively moderate levels of inequality, which 
accordingly, is partly due to the inclusiveness of their educational system89.  
The role of education as a major contributor to earnings disparities is in relation to its 
position in the development and operation of technology as an indicator of individual 
marginal productivity90.  
                                                            
85 Daron Acemoglu, ‘Technology and Inequality’ NBER Reporter (Winter 2003) www.nber.org. 
86 Martin (n25). 
87 Piketty (n6) 265. 
88 Milton Friedman, ‘Capitalism and Freedom’ (CUP 1962) 161. 
89 Piketty (n6) 307. 
90 A study on the impact of education on lifetime earnings, shows those with He degree on average 
earn a return of 27 per cent, as against those who do not. As well, the study found that the stages of 





Marginal productivity theory; the free market basis for income distribution and 
justification for the inequalities that could result, could best be described in the words 
of Milton Friedman as a system that gives “to each according to what he and the 
instruments he owns produces”. A pattern of distribution that bases allocations on its 
perception of the worth and value of the individual’s skill and labour. This accordingly 
is the true equality of outcome i.e. pay based on preferences in sum91. Advances in 
technology have invariably impacted such perceptions. It is believed, that the 
diverging movements in wages at the top and lower ends of the scale, have been 
greatly influenced by “endogenous technical change”92. 
That technological advancement has been endogenous, suggests that the adoption of 
new technologies by firms has not simply been a response to external impositions, but 
rather an outcome of deliberate attempts to improve productivity, profitability and 
perhaps managerial rewards93. As Acemoglu notes, while history shows technological 
adoption to have had a downward effect on the wages of skilled artisans, the present-
day complementarity between technological advancement and skill acquisition has 
ensured higher wages for those with the requisite skills. He mentions further, that the 
demand for skill-biased technology was in recognition of the impact innovation and 
utilisation of technology would have in increasing profit potential. On this note 
Acemoglu states: 
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 “Put simply and extremely, it can be argued that the increased skill bias of technology 
throughout the 20th century and its acceleration during the past 30 years resulted from 
the changes in profit opportunities which were, in turn, a consequence of the steady 
increase in the supply of skilled workers over the past century and its surge starting in 
the early 1970s”. 
This bias manifest itself more glaringly in widespread automation, which is most 
evident in service provision. With the biggest argument against automation being, its 
ability to makes labour replaceable94. The application of a “downward pressure” on 
the cost of labour, coupled with factors like neutered collective bargaining, severely 
limits unskilled labour’s ability to make demands95. Karl Marx observed this potential 
vulnerability over a 100 years ago, noting that the application of technology during the 
industrial revolution in Britain had allowed capitalists to wield greater power over 
labour, “believing that the introduction of machinery during the industrial revolution 
had completed the domination of the employers over the employed”96. 
Modern British service provision is largely automated, from banking halls and 
supermarket checkout stalls to warehouses across the nation. This threat is not limited 
to low-skilled occupations alone. Previously untouchable professions, have begun 
experimenting with machines and software as a cost-effective alternative97. In 1983, 
Nobel Laureate Wassily Leontief stated, “the role of humans as the most important 
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factor of production is bound to diminish in the same way that the role of horses in 
agricultural production was first diminished and then eliminated by the introduction of 
tractors”98. Three decades later this statement may not seem so far-fetched. 
To emphasise the point, none have benefitted more from the advancements in 
technology and their adoption and utilisation in business operations than CEOs. As 
already stated technology allows firms to attain greater productivity, which in turn 
translates to increased profits, thus impacting CEO pay. As larger portions of CEO pay 
become equity-based, firm success becomes a personal undertaking. It could be 
argued that this personal stake has helped drive the increasing focus on the short-
term99. Profits are generated by keeping costs as low as possible, while maintaining or 
increasing productivity. Where there are productivity shortfalls, measures are soon 
taken to reverse the trend, which would often include work-force reductions, site 
closures etc.100. These measures hardly ever include CEO pay cuts, to the contrary, 
examples exist of bonus payments to CEOs and executives in the face of a downturn101. 
Puzzling indeed, given that CEO pay as well as those of other executives continue to 
claim increasing portions of company revenue102. 
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The profit-oriented motivations of automation, are as obvious as the undeniability of 
its efficiency gains. For example, Apple generated a profit of $18bn in 2015, with 1/6th 
of the total workforce General Motors had 50 years earlier, a time which the latter 
company posted profits of about $7.64bn in today’s currency and was considered 
then, to be the most valuable103. 
Lanchester notes the benefits of increased productivity are too restrained being 
mainly to its owners and managers, to sufficiently impact the wider economy. Stating 
on this note that “capital isn’t just winning against labour: there’s no contest”104.  
 
 
4.5.2.  Firm profitability and Wage Suppression: Globalisation 
In 2011, an OECD report on the growth of income inequality amongst its member 
states, identified globalisation and trade integration as one of the main drivers of 
inequality105. As mentioned, globalisation allowed companies to circumvent the 
geographical barriers and allowed them to cut costs by creating competition between 
workers in the developed world and the peers in low-wage countries. Buoyed by 
advancements in information technology and transportation, it became cost-effective 
to relocate and produce goods and services at offshore locations, at a fraction of the 
costs of producing same in the developed world106. 
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It is important to note, that even though globalisation may have been a natural 
occurring phenomenon, its pace and acceleration was largely man-made107. Lazonick 
draws a line between the acceleration of globalisation which began in the 2000s and 
share buy-backs which boost share prices in the short-term and are of immense 
benefit to managers108. Buy- backs are representative of the shift from a value-creating 
focus, to value-extraction. As companies have increasingly scaled back the pursuit of 
innovation and growth, in favour of dividend pay-outs and stock repurchases, 
committing significant portions of its resources that may otherwise have been 
earmarked for research and innovation109. 
The point being made here is, that the alignment of managerial wealth to shareholder 
value creation, ensures that self-interested managers would take the needed steps to 
ensure the creation of value, but only as it would precipitate short-term spikes in the 
share price. Globalisation provided an opportunity to grow the business, create value 
and minimise costs all at the same time.  
 
4.5.2.1 Outsourcing and Offshoring as Manifestations of Globalisation 
The latter stages of the 20th century, leading up to the 2000s witnessed a surge in 
production relocation and outsourcing110. Larger portions of the manufacturing and 
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production-based industries have been outsourced to low wage countries by some of 
the largest and most profitable Anglo-American corporations111.  
Outsourcing has had a suppressive effect on middle and low-income wages112, and this 
works well for the corporate bottom line and executive pay, given that wages could be 
a particularly steep business expense. Given the minimum wage requisites and the 
need to provide costly employee benefits in the UK and most of the developed world, 
outsourcing these roles to low wage countries, provides the advantage of having these 
tasks performed at much lower costs. The implication being that companies maintain 
or even increase their level of productivity, without being burdened by the financial 
obligations within their home country.  
It is important to mention that the economic benefits of globalisation in general and 
offshore outsourcing to the developing world have not come without costs to the host 
communities, as revealed following the recent spate of factory collapses in Bangladesh 
and Cambodia113. These incidents are in no way isolated, as other examples exist of 
human rights violations in third party work environments, utilised in the production of 
goods by major Anglo-American corporations114. What these incidents however 
suggest, is a callous indifference to the basic labour rights and international labour 
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standards. Perhaps, companies do not feel any social responsibility to third party 
employees and host communities, they are being merely collateral to the primary 
objective of shareholder wealth maximization. This indifference, is at the core of the 
mutual dependence that underpins the relationship between corporations and low 
wage countries.  
The benefits of globalisation to corporate profits are exponential, but these benefits 
are not enjoyed by all. Stiglitz mentions that, the gains from globalisation are enjoyed 
mainly by the owners of capital115. Presumably under corporate influence, 
governments pass laws which actively encouraged the globalisation of corporate 
activity. A prime example would be the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which provided protections for companies that relocated operations to 
Mexico, as well as a tax-payer funded compensations scheme to cover resultant 
losses116-or the EU-U.S Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership - of which the 
UK was signatory pre-Brexit - was negotiated heavily in favour of multi-national 
corporations. The justification for trade agreements of this nature is almost always the 
economic benefits they present in the form of cheaper goods and greater job 
creation117. As Stiglitz mentions corporations have managed to purvey these two 
questionable assumptions about globalisation as fact; that globalisation helps increase 
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GDP and that the benefits of increased GDP would “trickle down to” to all levels of 
society118.  
In sharp contrast to these projections, the middle-class has been besieged by wage 
reductions, underemployment and even unemployment119. In a world pervaded by 
corporate short-termism the margins may prove too attractive for companies to 
prioritise the social benefits of local job creation, against siting these jobs abroad. 
Especially considering the immense impact on firm profitability and direct benefits in 
bonuses and other forms of monetary compensation for CEOs and other managers. It 
has become a classic case of ‘heads I win; tails you lose’. 
 
4.5.3.  Share Buy-Backs as means of Increasing Profitability in a Globalised 
World 
Share buy-backs have steadily been utilised by the largest corporations as a 
mechanism to increase firm value in the short-term. What was once considered to be 
a form of market manipulation, has due to policy changes, gradually exploded into 
widespread use, with the percentage of corporate profits ploughed back into share 
repurchases, having grown exponentially over the past two decades120. 
Share buy-backs or repurchases, as the term implies, involves the use of corporate 
funds to repurchase shares previously sold to investors on the various exchanges, with 
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a view to increasing the share price and firm value in the shorter-term. The practice 
functions on the standard economic theory of demand/supply, whereby the more 
funds committed to repurchases, the less of the firm’s stock becomes available in the 
open market, causing a demand, with the invariable rise in the share price being the 
consequence. 
Prior to 1982, buy-backs were faux pas, a way to manipulate the market and frowned 
upon. However, following the wave of deregulation of the financial sector which began 
in the 1980’s, a change in policy ensured that buy backs were rebirthed as a way to 
“confer a material benefit on shareholders”121. With the latter providing the ideological 
cum economic justification, the utilisation of share repurchases increased greatly. On 
this note, Lazonick reports that between 2003-2012, the largest firms dedicated 91 per 
cent of their earnings towards share repurchases, leaving just 9 per cent for other 
corporate activity122. Going beyond profits, even when firms have been granted a 
windfall due to government legislation, the figures show that a larger portion has been 
used to buy-back shares, with far less being dedicated towards job creation and wage 
increases, which is the intent of such measures123. 
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Share buy-backs evidence a current dispensation, where firms habitually eschew 
investments in employees and communities they inhabit, in favour of increasing 
shareholder value. Furthermore, the methodology of managerial compensation-
wherein managerial wealth is intricately tied to shareholder value creation-ensures 
personal wealth increases as well. Hence, an argument could be made that share buy-
backs are as much about CEO rent extraction than they are about shareholder wealth 
maximization. 
As Lazonick highlights, firms that engage in share buy-backs attempt to justify the 
practice on the need to foster confidence in the firm’s future prospects, as measured 
by share price performance124. By repurchasing stock, executives intend to signal to 
the market that their stock is undervalued. However, as Lazonick argues, if the latter 
were the case, there would be a “massive sell-off of corporate stock” to take advantage 
of “the speculative boom” to raise funds to either “pay off corporate debt or bolster 
corporate treasuries”. But rather, he stated that during the speculative boom of the 
1990’s, CEOs began selling off their own stakes in the company, following price hikes 
which had been triggered following massive repurchase schemes125. 
He argues that share buy-backs are a value extracting exercise and goes on to mention 
a plethora of industries and sectors which have been inhibited by the corporate focus 
on investing its profits and returns in repurchasing its shares, to detriment of 
                                                            










innovation and long-term growth126. Undoubtedly, the prime beneficiaries of the 
practice of repurchasing shares, are the investors and executives, particularly the CEO. 
Given the argument that the utilisation of buy-backs boosts executive pay to the 
detriment of longer-term firm value, it becomes then difficult to argue that the 
practice in its guise as a stimulant for executive pay, meets the requirements of the 
Rawlsian difference principle127. 
While CEO pay has grown, research has shown a linear connection between buy backs 
and cost cutting measures within firms, like wage stagnation, job cuts and relocations 
etc. all factors contributing to the wealth gap between CEOs and ordinary workers. 
Considering Rawls’ requirement that the least must prefer their prospects with the 
inequality than without, the adverse effects of the buy-backs to the well-being of the 
ordinary worker, ensures that this cannot be the case. Therefore, the significant 
benefits of buy-backs juxtaposed against the adversity to other workers as a result, 
further indicts the justice of executive pay in its currency. 
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4.6. Globalization: The Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems 
as a Driver of Executive Compensation 
Having already discussed the effect of globalisation on wages of low-skilled workers-
as exerting downward pressure on wages-in sharp contrast to the latter, globalisation 
is argued to be one of the greater drivers of executive pay, particularly within 
companies outside of the U.S128. As already established over the course of the thesis, 
the interdependency of the UK and U.S markets, has led to inherent similarities in the 
respective modes of corporate governance, particularly with respect to executive 
compensation. This section would argue that executive pay levels are less susceptible 
to performance, than they are to external influences and market trends. 
U.S-based CEOs are better paid on average than those based outside of the States. UK 
CEOs come a close second, with overall levels closer to the U.S levels than what could 
be obtained in most of the developed world129. Proper place to start would be to 
examine some of the reasons put forward for this in the literature. 
Gerakos et al, cite globalisation as one of the core drivers for CEO pay in the UK. 
Increasing globalisation has led to higher levels of interaction between the UK and U.S 
markets and they posit that this increased interaction, places UK firms in direct 
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competition with their U.S counterparts130. A competition which is not only product-
based, but which extends to CEO talent. Their position is supported by Marin, who 
argues that the popular explanations for the continued surge in pay are unsupported 
by data and blame the rise in pay on globalisation and the “changing nature of the 
corporation and the integration of rich economies into the world economy”131. Citing 
long-run data from 1936-2005, Marin argues that Bebchuk’s theory of managerial 
power due to the inadequacies of internal governance mechanisms, falls short as a 
comprehensive explanation for the rise in pay levels. She mentioned that although 
corporate governance was significantly weaker half a century ago, pay levels in the 
1950’s and 60’s was much lower than they have been more recently. Stating that the 
rise in pay levels in the 1970’s coincided with the acceleration of international trade 
and the focus on performance -sensitivity in pay determination132. 
Arguing further that the increase in trade exposure for firms has led to a “war for 
managerial talent”. Making managers assets to the firms they serve, as such pay is 
artificially ratcheted up resulting from a bidding war firms must engage in to prevent 
their best talent, being poached by foreign or international competitors. This threat is 
higher in firms outside of the U.S, whose exposure to U.S markets, places their 
managerial talent in full view of their American competitors133. This argument finds 
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support in a study by Cunat and Guadalope, who also find that executive pay levels 
were driven by a sensitivity to international trade exposure134.  
They surmise that the increase in pay levels was catalysed by an increase in “foreign 
competition which results from a reduction in trade barriers and globalization of 
economic activity”. They find that greater foreign exposure leads to more “incentive 
provision in a variety of ways”. Amongst the reasons for these are; the fact that 
competition leads to greater performance sensitivity and higher competition also 
leads to greater CEO mobility135. To the first point, their research showed that 
increasing foreign competition led to a reduction in the levels of fixed compensation. 
Showing a focus on the utilisation of incentives in a bid to spur a competitive edge, 
hence the greater performance sensitivity, which also impacts “the steepness of pay 
inequality within the firm”136.  
The integration and internalisation of trade, has inadvertently led to the globalisation 
of labour markets, for all levels on the skill rung, having a particularly positive effect 
on the pay of highly-skilled workers in general. Whereas the levelling of geographical 
barriers has negatively impacted, low-skilled wages, CEO wages on the other hand 
have risen exponentially. Cheffins notes that the internationalisation of the managerial 
labour market, and the cross-border hiring which results, has had an ‘Americanising’ 
effect on executive pay in firms outside the U.S, particularly in the UK. Echoing Marin’s 
argument, that the “fear of losing top people”, would compel firms to adopt American 
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compensatory practices-with its focus on variable pay-which could effectively drive 
pay upwards in countries like the UK137. Mentioning also that the hiring of U.S CEOs 
could also have swelling effect on pay levels. Arguing that American executives would 
be reluctant to take up positions outside of the U.S, unless they were guaranteed to 
earn similar levels of pay as they would in the states138.  
Similarly, Gerakos et al find that UK firms with local directors with U.S board service or 
who have American directors serving on their boards, have a greater tendency to pay 
higher wages. This is because directors with U.S based experience, would be more 
likely to adopt U.S style compensatory practices, opting for a mix of fixed and variable 
pay, with the latter consisting of a number of incentivized arrangements. Hence, they 
are more likely to offer larger cash bonuses and option grants, than firms without U.S 
based directors serving on their boards139. 
Furthermore, Gerakos et al posit that compensation is higher amongst UK firms listed 
on U.S exchanges. They find this fact to be true amongst non-UK firms, whom are 
similarly listed. They suggest however that the higher remuneration levels are in effect 
a reward for the heightened risks associated with a foreign listing140. 
In sum, these authors argue that the shift to American style compensation is part of a 
larger convergence to the U.S corporate governance model, of which the erstwhile 
mentioned forces of globalisation, represent the primary conduits through which that 
is attained. The following section would briefly discuss the theoretical postulations of 
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a global convergence towards the Anglo-American governance model and how these 
impacts executive compensation levels in the UK amongst other countries. 
 
 
4.6.1. Global Corporate Governance Convergence and its Effect on Executive Pay 
At the turn of the century, Harvard academics Hansmann and Kraakman declared an 
end of the history of corporate governance, declaring that Anglo-American 
governance model had proven to be the most likely to foster peak efficiency. Thus, 
there would be the inevitable convergence towards this model globally, in recognition 
of its superiority and in a bid to emulate the U.S economic success141. They claim that 
the forces of competition brought about by increasing globalisation would compel 
convergence to the shareholder model142. To create a backdrop for their arguments, 
it perhaps fair to mention that their research was published while the American 
economy was experiencing unprecedented boom and U.S firms were at the pinnacle 
of international trade and commerce. 
Bebchuk and Roe had previously rejected the notion of a global convergence towards 
the Anglo-American governance model, arguing that the path dependence of 
corporate governance models, would force a persistence that would deter a wholesale 
adoption of the Anglo-American model143. Accordingly, these forces of persistence are 
both structural-as represented by the complementary and formal structures that 
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support the existing governance model-as well as the legal and regulatory frameworks 
that are derived to legitimise the entrenched structures144. This argument recognises 
that corporate governance systems are reflective of the inherent cultural peculiarities 
of a given jurisdiction, therefore the wholesale transplantation of the American model 
may not be feasible.  
The arguments for convergence are not without an evidentiary basis however, 
convergence enthusiasts cite the expansion of capital markets in countries not 
previously known for great levels of shareholder dispersion, as evidence of this. 
Furthermore, they site increasing shareholder activism, increasing levels of corporate 
acquisitions, the cross-listing of firms in continental Europe due to internationalisation 
and the adoption of Anglo-American compensation methods, to support this 
argument145. Gilson on the other hand posits that these examples iterate a 
convergence in function rather than form. Whereas formal convergence would require 
a complete revamp of the existing governance system, ideologically and 
administratively, convergence in function only requires a shift in the methodology of 
attaining the corporate objective146. This functional convergence is most evident in 
executive compensation. 
The last decade bore witness to the increasing adoption of Anglo-American methods 
of executive compensation in jurisdictions outside the U.S. the UK has traditionally 
                                                            
144 Ibid at 10. 
145 Marc Goergen Miguel C. Manjon Luc Renneboog, “Is the German System of Corporate Governance 
Converging Towards the Anglo-American Model? Journal of management Governance [2008] 12; 37-
71. 
146 Ronald Gilson,“Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, in 
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borne similarities to the U.S both in function and form, and generally began adopting 
U.S style compensation practices in the 1980’s147. However, functional convergence in 
compensation is most evident in jurisdictions in continental Europe, with Germany as 
a prime example. Although German corporate governance model has remained largely 
unchanged, with its co-determinative structure of dual boards and employee 
representation in all aspects of corporate governance including executive pay setting. 
The have however been changes in the way corporations reward executives, like the 
use of cash bonuses and the establishment of equity participation schemes for CEOs 
and other executives. Thus, German executives whose pay historically lagged their UK 
contemporaries, exceeded the latter for the first time recently148. This functional shift 
towards the Anglo-American pay levels and methodology is also evident in countries 
like France and Switzerland149. 
All of this is evidence of a wider trend which Cheffins referred to as the 
‘Americanization’ of executive compensation in jurisdictions outside the U.S. he posits 
that there would be a convergence towards American compensatory practices, when 
high CEO wages are accompanied by sustained growth in corporate performance150. 
However, he did note that a slump in economic performance-like the 2007 financial 
crises-might raise a barrier to the potential shift to the Anglo-American model of 
executive compensation. 
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It is important to mention on a final note that the persistence noted by Bebchuk and 
Roe as an obstacle to convergence, could also apply to executive compensation. There 
are few nations outside the U.S and UK, with the requisite tolerance for the levels of 
pay inequality found within Anglo-American companies and wider society. As such the 
socio-cultural tendencies towards egalitarianism, might have a suppressive effect on 
the growth of executive pay, such that despite the adoption of Anglo-American 
methods of compensation, the levels of pay would remain below the average levels in 
UK and U.S. Such is the case in jurisdictions in continental Europe, where except for 
countries like Switzerland and Germany, which have pay levels similar to the UK, the 
rest of Europe while largely converging towards the methodology of compensation i.e. 
utilising equity-based compensation, cash bonuses etc. pay levels have remained 
comparatively low.  
The preceding discussion is germane to the theme of desert in discussing the justice 
of high executive compensation, in the context of society with rapidly growing income 
inequality. The notion of an artificial convergence towards a compensatory ideology 
to maintain a competitive edge belies the arguments of desert, based on marginal 
productivity. Averaging pay at levels beyond reason, on the justification of a scarcity 
of managerial talent-which is unsupported by evidence-appears beyond the pale, 
given that the present culture of high executive pay does not appear to work to the 
benefit of the least in society, or any beyond the actual recipients of the awards. 
Also, of relevance to the wider discussion on the antecedents of high executive pay, is 
the fact that there has been a notable rise in inequality levels in jurisdictions, not 





compensation is on the rise. Countries like Germany, Sweden as well as other Nordic 
countries, witnessed unprecedented increases in income inequality levels in the last 
decade151. The growth in inequality in these countries outpaced the growth elsewhere, 
although they remain largely egalitarian at least in comparison to the UK and U.S. It 
would be unfair to attribute this entirely to the rise in executive pay, however it could 
be argued that the growth in inequality mirrors the latter. 
 
 
4.7. In Conclusion 
The thesis has sought in the preceding to engage the subject of the justice of high 
executive pay, by analysing it in context and considering its externalities. In other 
words, is high executive pay avarice or just desert? Having examined both Nozick’s and 
Rawls’s thoughts on the concept of justice in distribution, against a real-world context, 
it could lead only to the conclusion that high executive pay is neither justified nor could 
it be justifiable given the status quo. 
The main argument that could be made against high executive pay is its role as a 
contributor to income inequality, which does not render it unjust-as excessiveness of 
a reward is not prima facie proof of its injustice-largely because questions of excess 
are subjective by their very nature. In this case, high executive pay is rendered unjust 
by the presence of two key factors; the way it is ultimately determined and the 
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absence of key redistributive mechanisms that would allow the benefits filter to the 
least. 
With regards to the first instance, the pay determination process goes beyond the 
deliberation of an independent remuneration committee. The latter instead, adhere 
to an accepted regime forged by a culture of excess. Pay is less sensitive to individual 
performance as it is to the status quo, a standardised level determined more by firm 
size and cults of personality, than by actual performance. Furthermore, the 
prioritisation of shareholders’ interests, ensures that measures taken to the maximize 
value are often to the detriment of the constituencies, mainly the firm’s other 
employees and the host environment. That the legacy of increased productivity and a 
more prosperous economy is outlandish pay packages for the executives and wage 
stagnation, underemployment and job insecurity for the almost everyone else, speaks 
of a system rigged to benefit a few at the expense of the most. Such a system would 
be incapable of producing just outcomes. 
The absence of a viable system of redistribution acts as a further indictment on high 
executive pay. Rawls theorises inequalities in income could only be justified when they 
work to the benefit of the poorest in society. That could only work when proper 
redistributive policies are in place to ensure that the excess filters down to the rest of 
society. However, the willingness of the elite classes to share the benefits of their 
wealth, is at historic lows and has been aided by the gradual but consistent erosion of 
the redistributive qualities of tax policies in recent times. Such that wealthy 
corporations and individuals are required to pay less than they would perhaps been 





This very fact may be evidence of the efforts by the wealthy-popularly referred to as 
the “1 percent”-using their influence and reach to limit their financial obligations to 
the state. It would be fair to state that any effort to tackle income inequality, would 
not only require making executive pay fairer, but would need to  ensure that when the 
inevitable disparities in income distribution occurs, the appropriate redistributive 








The Issue of High Executive Pay in Anglo-America: The Judiciary and 
other Solutions 
5.1. Introduction 
Rising executive pay levels have in recent years become a major topic of public debate. 
Helped in no small way by the recent global financial meltdown, which triggered losses 
of jobs and homes, vanishing personal wealth and stagnated wages globally with the 
pinch felt hardest by ordinary people. Raising questions on the appropriateness of high 
pay and its role as a catalyst of corporate short-termism1. The debate on the justice of 
high executive pay, could be linked to similar debates in the inter war years2.  
The executive pay issue could be traced back to 1930’s America, the age of the ‘million-
dollar executive’3. What was thought at that time to be excessive compensation 
packages being handed out to executives led to radical enforcement procedures put 
in place in a bid to stymie the rise in executive pay. Procedures such as the then novel 
practice of disclosure of pay packages, enforcement of which was the mandate of a 
newly established Securities and Exchange Commission, given powers under the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934. The populist opinion was that 
executive compensation needed to be reined in and vehicles to that effect like the SEC 
Act 1934, were thus welcome. 
Executive pay was largely unaffected by the economic downturn and increased as 
corporate revenues recovered and then soared to pre-crises levels in some cases. As 





firms, continues its upward trajectory. With recent figures showing the median CEO 
pay within the FTSE 100, standing at £3.93m, while average CEO pay stands a lot higher 
at £5.65m4. Average executive compensation for U.S based CEOs currently stands at 
£18.9m, according to 2017 figures5. With the three top earners receiving a combined 
$300m in compensation6. 
 In the UK, the ratio between average FTSE 100 CEO pay and the average wage is 147:1, 
while CEO pay to average total pay is 129:17. It has been the mainstream argument 
that executive pay is the endpoint of an efficient market system and the interactions 
therein8. However, the aim here is not to examine the validity of that argument but 
rather the justice of high or perhaps high executive pay, through the lens of the 
judiciary. 
For long, prescribed solutions to excessive pay rises have darted between market-
oriented solutions and increased government regulation of pay issues, but there has 
not been as much of a call for judicial review of executive pay levels.  
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This chapter is intended to discuss the solutions to the issues surrounding executive 
pay which have been examined via the two research questions. Having highlighted the 
corporate governance failures which allow a culture of excess in Chapter Three and 
the wider implications of said culture in Chapter Four, the present chapter will look to 
explore prescriptions to the highlighted problems. Given the nature of the issue, in 
terms of its justice implications, the judiciary would be an obvious place to begin. 
However, this Chapter argues that the courts cannot be relied upon to provide said 
solution, due to its historical reluctance to engage in an ex-post examination of 
business decisions, in the absence of compelling evidence of managerial foul play.  
This attitude of non-interference has been recognised as the Business Judgement Rule 
in some jurisdictions, and codified in countries including the U.S. Although there 
currently is no formal recognition of the Rule as a legal doctrine in the UK, the attitude 
of non-intervention in business decisions-with the exception of instances of gross 
misconduct by directors-prevails. This attitude impacts the courts approach to the 
issue of high executive compensation. 
As would be discussed in this Chapter, despite several opportunities-most of these 
arising in the U.S-the Anglo-American courts have refrained from lending a voice to 
the executive pay debate. Manifested mainly by its strict adherence to the inordinate 
procedural complexities involved in executive pay litigation, regardless of the justice 
demands of the individual cases.  
This failure suggests the judiciary, perhaps cannot be relied upon as an instrument in 






The Chapter is outlined thus; the following section will briefly recap some of the 
arguments surrounding the executive pay debate and highlight prior attempts to make 
pay fairer. The following section will examine some of the difficulties in litigating 
executive compensation cases and why the courts cannot be relied upon in the effort 
to make executive pay fairer. Following this, the chapter would analyse the non-
interventionist approach of the Anglo-American judiciary to pay issues, as manifested 
through the Business Judgement Rule in some jurisdiction. The final section would 
discuss existing measures put in place to enhance the fairness of executive pay, in a 
bid to highlight their efficacy thus far. The section would also discuss further reforms 
to the current governance framework in terms of their potential to heighten the 
fairness of executive pay. 
 
 
5.2.   Current CEO Pay levels: A Manifestation of Managerial Rent-
Seeking? 
Reasons have been proffered to explain the growth in executive pay. Some of those 
reasons have been mentioned in Chapter 3, however to provide context, I would 
briefly highlight some of these arguments. 
Discussed in Chapter Three was Bebchuk and Fried’s theory managerial influence over 
the management board. They argue, that the role CEOs play in the nomination of 





where board members are sufficiently beholden to the CEO, allowing her to exert 
undue influence on matters including compensation9. 
In contemplating the efficacy of the independent board as a prophylactic to 
managerial overreach and rent-seeking behaviours, Brudney underlined a number of 
factors which could impede board effectiveness.  Like Bebchuk et al, he posits that the 
psychological and social factors at play in the boardroom-the collegiality amongst co-
directors, arising due to prior relationships and similar social background-could make 
directors biased towards the CEO’s needs10. 
Taking these theories at face value could precipitate the conclusion that current 
executive pay levels do not result from symmetrical transactions between the CEO and 
the board. The process by which board members are elected and the circumstances 
under which the board is meant to function, evinces some of the flaws inherent within 
Anglo-American corporate governance and this is representative of some of the areas 
in need of reform. 
Benchmarking pay to the industry average has been cited as a reason for rising pay 
levels11. This practice has become pervasive and widely used by compensation 
committees in pay setting12. It however goes against the grain of the pay for 
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performance justification for high pay and in a sense, exposes the weak link between 
executive pay and corporate performance.  
Concerns and outrage about executive pay levels led to calls for reform in a bid to 
make pay fairer. This has led to legislative attempts to improve the transparency and 
accountability of the pay setting process. Steps have been taken in the U.S to improve 
the disclosure of pay packages i.e. the figures and metrics through which they were 
realised and the company’s policy on executive compensation, could be found in the 
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, known 
colloquially as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act , which provided for stricter disclosure 
requirements13, and the passing of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (hereinafter the Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010, which had extensive say on pay 
provisions, exceeding previous provisions of a similar tenor14. 
In the United Kingdom, the Greenbury Report plus recent amendments to the 
Companies Act 2006 via the S.79 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
and the Financial Reporting Council’s Corporate Governance Code all have, in varying 
degrees, provisions urging for full pay disclosure15. Recent research shows a failure of 
these disclosure requirements to stymie the growth of pay as well as the income 
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divide. Evidenced by the continued rise in pay even for those executives whose pay 
had been voted against by shareholders16. As a matter of fact, heightened disclosure 
may have the inadvertent effect of aiding the growth of total compensation17. 
Proposed solutions to the pay conundrum have been centred around better 
shareholder engagement and increasing pressure from institutional investors18. 
Neither of these options appear to be viable in practice.  For one, institutional 
investors are primarily concerned with the return on their investments and while they 
may occasionally raise concerns on the size of executive pay, they could be expected 
to side with management as long as the company remains profitable. Furthermore, 
institutional investors are often plagued by the same agency and short-termist 
problems, much like the firms they monitor19. Some even lay the blame for rising 
compensation levels at the feet of institutional shareholders20. Since “shareholders did 
not adequately constrain executive compensation that was set by managers with little 
outside control”21. Furthermore, the fickle nature of share ownership, and the ease 
with which diversified investors could liquidate their interests, makes the prospect of 
a shareholder led intervention as a stop gap to executive and corporate excess 
unlikely. 
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5.3 Adjudicating Executive Pay Issues 
5.3.1 Executive Pay Litigation in the U.S: The Business Judgement Rule 
The Business Judgment Rule, as codified in the U.S amongst other jurisdictions i.e. 
Australia, requires that judges when faced with matters that may involve a review of 
business decisions, defer to the decision of the board of directors in the absence of 
clear evidence of fraud or that the directors had failed to exercise its common-law 
duties of care, loyalty and to act in good faith when taking the decision22. It must be 
stated that the Rule applies solely to business decisions, i.e. “decisions to take or not 
to take action in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations of the 
company”23. Therefore, the rule can only be applied when the disputed decisions were 
a product of a valid exercise of director’s discretionary business judgement and not a 
responsibility imposed by statute24. The Delaware courts in Aronson v Lewis25, held that 
provided the directors, acted in good faith, were duly informed on the of the stated 
transaction, acted not out of self-interest but reasonably believed the decision at the 
point of making it, to be in the best interest of the company, they could not be 
personally liable if the decision turned out not to be in the company’s best interest26.  
This restraint on the courts ability to adjudicate business decisions that qualify for 
protection under the Business Judgement Rule, has limited the court’s capacity to 
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intervene in executive compensation matters. While also severely limiting the ability 
of shareholders aggrieved by executive pay awards, to challenge these through the 
courts.  
The direct consequence of applying the Business Judgement Rule to executive 
compensation cases, is that the courts cannot be relied upon to curb the growth in 
executive pay. The indirect consequence of rule is that the courts are inhibited in their 
role as a bastion of justice and fairness and unable to make a meaningful impact, 
despite the growing public agitation to make executive pay fairer. As a result, the 
income inequalities to which high executive pay contributes, continue to persist. This 
reality perhaps opens the door to a discussion of a wholesale exemption of executive 
compensation matters from within the purview of the rule. 
The law does provide exceptions to the overarching rule in cases where the 
egregiousness of the challenged compensation, in a sense unmasks the underlining 
intent. The requirements for qualifying for exception from the rule are steep and 
difficult to meet. Two of these exceptions, namely; the corporate waste doctrine 
devised by the U.S courts and the broadly defined unfairly prejudicial relief, which the 










5.4. The Exceptions to the Application of the Business Judgment Rule. 
5.4.1. The Corporate Waste Doctrine. 
The reluctance of U.S courts to review business decisions has generally been extended 
to executive compensation cases27. However, the rule is excused when compensation 
awards are so egregious as to necessitate a judicial review of such decisions. This 
happens in corporate waste cases, where the plaintiffs allege there has been a gifting 
of corporate assets. In these instances, the onus is on the claimants, usually a 
shareholder(s) to prove that the compensation paid out to the CEO and or other 
serving executives was so out of proportion with the contemporaneous performance 
as to constitute making a gift of corporate assets.  
The court in the old American case of Rogers v Hill28 held that if compensation paid to 
executives was out of touch with the performance for which they were given they 
could be considered a gift of corporate assets which directors had no right to do. The 
case involved a million-dollar award made to a tobacco company’s CEO at the height 
of the great depression and the court decided that even in the absence of fraud or 
clear evidence of self-dealing, that compensation could be so high as to be regarded 
as unreasonable. The onus once again is placed firmly on the shoulders of the one 
supposing such an irregularity or unreasonableness of the sum awarded. 
However, before the courts would entertain a claim, the claimants would need to 
overcome a litany of procedural hurdles. Firstly, due to the old common law doctrine 
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laid down in Foss v Harbottle29, which states that only the company can remedy 
wrongs done to it. This doctrine was explained further in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd 
v Newman (No 2)30, that “an individual shareholder cannot bring an action in the courts 
to complain of an irregularity in the conduct of a company’s internal affairs if the 
irregularity is one that can be cured by a vote of the company in general meeting”31. 
Such an “irregularity” would stand so long as it’s ratified by the majority32. However, 
S.261 of the UK Companies Act 2006, gives the court the right to grant permission to a 
shareholder who institutes a derivative action, if it believes there is a prima facie case 
to answer33. This provision has effectively replaced the common-law position in 
England34.  
Similar provisions allowing derivative actions to exist in America35, but in executive 
compensation matters the claimants must unravel an extra layer, known as the 
demand requirement36. This is the requirement by the courts that a shareholder 
intending to challenge an executive pay decision because the award constituted a 
waste of corporate assets, must first prove that he had a placed a demand that the 
board remedy the wrong or otherwise prove the futility of such a demand being 
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made37. The hardships this additional requirement poses to claimants in the litigation 
of compensation cases would be discussed in the following section. 
 
5.4.1.1. The Demand Requirement: An Impediment to Successful 
Excessive Remuneration Litigation? 
The Delaware Supreme Court in Brehm v Eisner38 stated the benefits of the demand 
requirement, as: allowing the board of directors the chance to settle the matter within 
the company, thus avoiding potentially damaging litigation and giving the board the 
chance to determine between frivolous and meritorious suits. However, this 
requirement may be excused if the court, on the urging of the plaintiff has reason to 
believe that the making of such a demand would in the end be fruitless. The 
responsibility for proving the futility of a demand would invariably be on the plaintiff, 
to do this he must first satisfy what is known as the Aronson’s Test39.  
The first part of the two-pronged test requires the plaintiff to provide evidence that 
the board was beholden to the CEO. Precedent has shown this requirement difficult 
to prove as Aronson would suggest. In that case, despite the presentation of evidence 
that the embattled CEO had handpicked the board members and owned large portions 
of the company’s shares, the court refused to consider this proof of potential foul play. 
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Holding in effect, that in the absence of evidential proof that the close relational ties 
between the CEO and board members had influenced their pay decisions, the directors 
could not be said to have failed to meet the demand requirement. 
Secondly, the plaintiff must prove that the disputed pay package was not subject to 
the Business Judgement rule. As noted, the requirements for a business decision to 
qualify for protection under the Business Judgement Rule-the stated payments must 
have been an exercise of a valid business judgement, must have made an informed 
decision, acted in good faith and in the honest belief that the said transaction was in 
the company’s best interest40. Unless the plaintiff can prove that the directors in 
deciding to make the disputed payments failed to meet the above requirements, the 
plaintiff would have failed the second test. This as illustrated by the Delaware courts 
in the Aronson decision. Where it stated:  
“In sum, we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts with particularity 
indicating that the Meyers directors were tainted by interest, lacked independence, or 
took action contrary to Meyers' best interests in order to create a reasonable doubt as 
to the applicability of the Business Judgment rule”41 
The second requirement, was considered in the more recent Brehm v Eisner, there the 
plaintiff challenged the decision of a lower court absolving the board of entertainment 
firm Disney of a breach of their duty of care and loyalty and of committing a waste of 
corporate assets, by making certain payments to its disgraced former CEO Michael 
Ovitz to an employment agreement entered prior to his employment. Per the court in 
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Aronson’s case, for any board decision to be protected by the Business Judgement 
Rule, including compensation-based decisions, the directors inter alia must have met 
the information requirement i.e. they must have informed themselves of all aspects 
of the disputed transaction before acceding to it42. This issue was raised in Brehm, as 
the plaintiff tried to create reasonable doubt that the board had met this requirement 
and the trial judge in dismissing the claim stated that the requirement was that the 
directors be “reasonably informed”, rather that they be informed of every fact in 
considering the transaction43. On appeal, the court of chancery stated that the 
‘reasonably informed’ requirement as stated at first instance was more of an 
abbreviated  
“attempt to paraphrase the Delaware jurisprudence that, in making business decisions, 
directors must consider all material information reasonably available, and that the 
directors' process is actionable only if grossly negligent”44. 
The Appeal Court stated that the ‘reasonably informed’ standard did not require that 
the directors in exercising their judgement consider every piece of information 
regarding the transaction, but only those which were readily available to them, 
certainly not information that was beyond their reach of which there could have been 
no reasonable expectation that they would be made aware of45. The court declared 
that the plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence so as to rebut the 
presumption that the directors had duly informed themselves, the court had heard 
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evidence by the plaintiff, that the board had no knowledge of what the financial 
exposure of the company would be, as none of the directors had taken the time to 
total the sums as laid out in Mr Ovitz contract of employment, a fact which was 
admitted to by the compensation expert hired by the board in his witness testimony. 
The claimants argued this was proof that they had failed to meet the requirements for 
the decision to ratify the contract, to be considered a valid business judgement, 
warranting protection under the rule. 
However, the Delaware Court of Chancery saw it differently and the court in describing 
these allegations as insufficient proof of directorial negligence, declared:  
“I think it a correct statement of law that the duty of care is still fulfilled even if a Board 
does not know the exact amount of a severance pay-out but nonetheless is fully 
informed about the manner in which such a pay-out would be calculated”46.  A strange 
decision considering the absurdity of the particularized facts surrounding the case. But 
the objective at this point is not an analysis of the merits of the court’s decision, but 
rather to emphasise what an uphill task it is for plaintiffs bringing waste claims even 
at the preliminary stages.  
Statistics show the success rates at this stage of proceedings to be about 41 per cent 
on average, adjudged by a sample of cases which included those decided within and 
outside Delaware47. Perhaps this single fact could be the reason for the relative 
shortage of executive compensation litigation stemming from publicly held companies 
in America. Such cases are more likely to initiate from private companies than they are 
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the latter as the success rates tend to be higher48. However, the overwhelming 
ubiquity of compensation-based litigation originating from privately held companies 
when pitted against publicly traded firms, as viewed by Thomas et al could be down 
to the fact that there is more susceptibility in the former to improprieties in the pay 
fixing process49. Stating the dual positions held by officials in these closely held entities 
as indicative of a self-interest by the manager in fixing his own pay, where they are 
often able to vote on proposed pay packets. Scenarios of this nature are less likely to 
occur in public companies, with their better-defined management structures and 
hierarchies. Besides compensation related issues are usually left to the compensation 
committees, which in some jurisdictions, is to be comprised mostly of ‘disinterested’ 
non-executive directors50. This and the other procedural intricacies in public 
companies grossly limit the possibility of a potential conflict of interest.  
Further reasons could be the innate professionalism with which corporate boards of 
traded companies are run, being mainly comprised of seasoned and experienced 
business managers. Also, a greater allotment of the holdings in public companies are 
controlled institutionally, resources helping them wield considerable influence on the 
board51. Furthermore, the lack of a personal involvement by public shareholders in the 
governance of the firm-only too willing to sell at the first sign of trouble-and the higher 
compensation to profit differential in traded companies, could be further reasons why 
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there is less of an outrage than in their smaller, closely held counterparts52. In general, 
there is a higher conflict potential in private companies, due to the nature and 
composition, this could be attested to by the higher success rates in compensation-
based litigation arising from these types of companies53. 
 
5.5. Why have Corporate Waste Claims been largely Unsuccessful in the 
U.S? 
As stated already the protections offered by the Business Judgement Rule greatly limit 
the chances for success by aggrieved claimants and these limitations are nowhere 
more obvious than in corporate waste cases. As one American jurists succinctly put it, 
successful waste claims are a rarity that could only be likened to sightings of the Loch 
Ness monster54. 
The difficulty could be with the way corporate waste is defined55. The earliest decided 
waste claims starting with Rogers v Hill, seemed to set the standard for waste at the 
blatant gifting of corporate assets by directors. The issue at hand in these early cases 
was the consideration or lack thereof in exchange for the payments made. Therefore, 
compensation policies that encouraged spousal payments56, and bonus payments that 
could be taken to be retroactive salary reimbursements, as was the case in Hurt v 
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Cotton States Fertilizer Co57, or stock options which could be exercised instantaneously 
and did not require continued employment were easily determined as falling within 
the scope of “corporate gifts” defined in Rogers v Hill. But it becomes less 
straightforward when the disputed payments were made pursuant to an employment 
contract and in ‘reward’ for services rendered. 
As previously mentioned so long as the procedure adopted in arriving at the 
challenged pay matched the standard laid out by statute and case law, the rebuttable 
presumption of due care and diligence lies in favour of directors. The courts would be 
averse to review pay related decisions or policies in the absence of facts that suggest 
fraud or underhand dealings between the parties involved. This regardless of the 
stated sum or the level of disproportion between the pay-out and company 
performance. This approach would appear to be validated by the standard in Rogers, 
which is that there must be “a relation between what the corporation gives and 
gets”58. 
Thus, due to its quid pro quo nature this standard has aided in effectively excluding 
cases that involve compensation for services rendered from within the purview of the 
waste doctrine. In Brehm v Eisner, the first instance court in reiterating the standard, 
as a transaction so one sided that no business person of sound mind would believe 
that the company had received adequate consideration, dismissed the plaintiff’s 
application as failing to meet that standard. The ruling was upheld on appeal, to which 
the Delaware Supreme Court stated, again reaffirming the view of the lower court that 
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executive compensation cases were subject to “great deference” stating that it was up 
to the directors to determine whether a person was worth a lot of money and such 
issues should not be open to judicial review59. Chief Justice Veasey, Quoted Chancellor 
Allen, in Lewis v Volgestein,60 when he stated: 
“The judicial standard for determination of corporate waste is well developed. Roughly, 
a waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately 
small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to 
trade. Most often the claim is associated with a transfer of corporate assets that serves 
no corporate purpose; or for which no consideration at all is received. Such a transfer 
is in effect a gift”. 
On what the approach for the court should be in these instances, the chancellor in that 
case went further to state that: 
“if there is a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is 
worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude 
ex post that the transaction was unreasonably risky” [emphasis mine]. 
The court in affirming the lower court on the waste issue, did however concede that 
there was an outer limit to the waste doctrine, but these were limited to individual 
cases were the facts showed an irrational squander of corporate assets61. A similar 
decision was reached in in Re Walt Disney Company Derivative litigation62, which was 
one of several cases that dealt with the Walt Disney compensation saga. Here the 
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court refuted the plaintiff’s allegations of waste because the contract was entered in 
pursuit of a rational business purpose, since the agreed sums were intended to 
incentivize the recipient to take up employment with the company and payments 
made consequent to that agreement could not be considered wasteful63. 
The above decisions seemed to leave the corporate waste doctrine in a stalemate64. 
However, the preliminary ruling in the Re Citigroup case, is said to have reaffirmed the 
doctrine65. A case heard before the Delaware Court of Chancery that arose in the wake 
of the 2008 mortgage crisis, instituted by shareholders aggrieved by the erstwhile 
CEO’s multi-million-dollar retirement package, inter alia. The court dismissed all the 
claims save the compensation claim. Stating that the director’s discretion to make 
compensation awards, albeit protected by the Business Judgement Rule, was not 
unlimited and that where an agreed compensation award was so disproportionate 
when juxtaposed with the concurrent services, would not cause a reasonable person 
to believe that there had been adequate consideration given in exchange for the said 
payments. Hence such a decision could not be regarded as a valid exercise of the 
director’s business judgement, restricting interference by the courts.  
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5.6. Excessive Remuneration Litigation in the United Kingdom: 
‘the Unfairly Prejudicial Remedy’. 
Despite the absence of a statutorily defined Business Judgement Rule, the British 
courts have generally abstained from a review of business decisions. As a result, 
compensation-based litigation in the UK has been relatively scarce, especially those 
involving quoted companies. with the vast majority of excessive remuneration cases 
involving privately owned companies66. Not surprising given that the nature and 
governance makes them more prone to litigation of the sort. Where the more modest 
earnings ensure that large pay-outs constitute a larger portion of the profits, than in 
the much larger quoted companies. Here, excessive remuneration could substantially 
lead to bankruptcy or failure to pay dividends67. Therefore, the outrage potential in 
response to such levels of compensation would understandably be higher in these 
types of institutions. This fact could perhaps explain the disparity in decided cases 
between private and quoted firms, in favour of the former68. 
This fact could not be demonstrated any more clearly than in the English case of Smith 
v Croft (No.3)69, here three minority shareholders challenged payments made to 
executives to cover expenses as ultra vires gifts and a fraud on the minority. Here the 
court noted that the excessive payments might well have been an abuse of powers by 
the executive, it stated however “the uncontradicted evidence of the very special field 
in which the company operates and the very high level of remuneration which obtains 
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in that field” put forward by the defendant, as contradictory of that notion70. The 
dictum on this point is very much in contrast to the reasoning of the court in the more 
recent Irvine v Irvine decision, and the “objective commercial criteria” standard of 
excessiveness which would be considered later.  
The ability of a minority shareholder, who alleges misconduct by the majority or 
management that impinge on his rights as a shareholder, to bring a claim pursuant to 
that right have been greatly limited by the Foss v Harbottle rule which as earlier 
mentioned declares the proper plaintiff in such matters to be the company. However, 
both case law and statute allow a shareholder, to bring a derivative claim on behalf of 
the company, subject of course to a grant of permission by the court71. Furthermore, 
s.994 of the Companies Act 2006 allows a petitioner who is a shareholder in a private 
company, who believes his interests have been greatly prejudiced by the way the 
company’s affairs have and are being conducted to seek relief from the courts.  
But before delving into the constituents of the Unfairly Prejudicial Remedy for minority 
shareholders, it is perhaps important to lay a proper foundation for such a discussion 
by first highlighting the English Laws position on the process of determining executive 
pay, as derived from case law. Highlighting the historical reluctance to delve in matters 
of corporate strategy and decision making in general72, as well as the remuneration of 
those of whom it is their responsibility to make these73. 
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5.6.2. The English Courts General Attitude Towards Adjudicating 
Compensation Matters 
In the UK, there is an established principle that company directors are not entitled to 
remuneration while acting within their capacity as fiduciaries74. The principle persists 
with exceptions of course, which include: when remuneration for directors was 
authorised by contract, authorised by a meeting of the members, or by the company’s 
constitution75. 
It was held in Guinness v Saunders76, that the authority to set directors pay was to be 
determined in accordance with the articles of association.  Which in turn creates a 
potential snag with regards to a possible legal challenge. Where on the one hand, it 
could create a vehicle for members to challenge compensation deemed to be 
excessive and without the limits of the company’s constitution, it could on the other 
hand make it difficult to challenge pay decisions or policies which fall within the 
purview of the company’s articles, even when those policies spawn remuneration 
packages which could be regarded as excessive. 
S.171 of the Companies Act 2006, outlines a duty for directors to act in accordance 
with the company’s constitution. Directors are required by statute, to develop 
remuneration policies when the latter duty is carried pursuant to statutory provisions. 
Any member challenging the fairness of the policy or remuneration package itself, 
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would need to establish that the directors acted dishonestly in setting the disputed 
pay77. However, that is where the difficulty begins. 
In general, the setting of director’s remuneration, particularly in large quoted 
companies, is the responsibility of the remuneration committee. Remuneration 
committees have become widely utilised by quoted companies in the UK, following 
recommendations made by the Greenbury committee in its report published in 199578. 
Remuneration committees have become a mainstay of the different iterations of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, including the 2016 version. The 2016 code requires 
company boards to establish a remuneration committee consisting of two to three 
independent directors. The committee should be tasked with setting compensation 
and benefits for all executive directors including the board chairman. Furthermore, 
the Code recommends that “the committee should also recommend and monitor the 
level and structure of remuneration for senior management”79. In accordance with 
s.420 of the Act, the committee is tasked with preparing a remuneration report for 
directors, which must be presented to the board for approval, under s.422. Given the 
sensitive role of the remuneration committee, the key therefore to its effectiveness is 
its independence.  
The committee by intent and composition is contrived to be completely independent 
of the CEO. The obvious reason being the need to, at the very least, eschew any 
appearance of managerial influence over the pay setting process. Therefore, a 
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successful challenge to excessive compensation, must go beyond its excessiveness, but 
prove that by awarding compensation at such a level, the board via the remuneration 
committee, had acted dishonestly and as such breached its duty to promote the 
company’s success, outlined under s.172 of the Act80. Which is difficult to prove, 
particularly when decisions where taken in unison by committee members in 
accordance with the articles of association, as held in Guinness v Saunders.  
Therefore, a successful challenge must show that the decision regarding the 
compensation award, was not taken collectively and the pay decision ultimately 
contravened the provisions of the company’s articles, as was the case in Guinness. 
With regards to the former, the court had to determine if a bonus payment made to a 
director following the completion of an acquisition was ultra vires the company’s 
constitution. The court determined that the responsibility to make decisions with 
regards to an award of special remuneration must be the board’s, in accordance with 
the company’s articles. That the decision could not be delegated to a committee, even 
less one of which the recipient was a member. However, it is not uncommon for the 
English courts to decide that a director is entitled to remuneration in equity, even 
when the directors’ actions or the circumstances surrounding the pay award fall short 
of the requisites in the company’s articles. In Re J Franklin & Son Ltd81, a resolution 
made by directors to award remuneration to one of their own, was challenged having 
had certain irregularities which would have voided it. In that case, the court decidedly 
relieved the affected director of his obligation to repay the sum owed. 
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In Guinness, there was an obvious conflict of interest in the pay setting process, tainted 
the award, making the court’s decision inevitable. It raises questions as to what 
happens when the facts do not lead to such an inevitable consequence? 
The non-interventionist position of the English courts was restated in Guinness v 
Saunders. With the presiding judge stating that the courts “are in no position to 
determine equitable allowance or remuneration”82. The court decided similarly in 
Smith v Croft (No.2)83.  
Be that as it may, there are instances where the court has delved directly into the 
remuneration issue and made decisions regarding pay awards. One of those instances 
was in the earlier mentioned case of Re J Franklin & Son Ltd and in Re Barry and Staines 
Linoleum Ltd84.  In both cases the court did not deny jurisdiction to decide on the issue 
of remuneration. In the latter case, Maugham J while admitting jurisdictional 
competence, however decided “that the views of the shareholders (solvent company) 
or creditors (insolvent company) must first be heard”85. 
Furthermore, in 2013 the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act was passed to make 
executive pay fairer. Section 79 of the Act provided for shareholder approval of 
director’s remuneration report, accordingly, members would be allowed an advisory 
vote on said remuneration policy annually and a binding vote every three years. 
Although the Act has the stated intent of making pay fairer by requiring shareholders 
approve the proposed remuneration, this could perhaps have the unintended effect 
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of creating barriers to a legal challenge.  As it would be difficult to argue against 
something which had been approved by a majority of the members. Even though we 
know that a large portion of traded stock is held by large institutions, who perhaps fail 
to share the concerns of ordinary shareholders, with regards to pay86. It must be noted 
that, any reasonable defence to a legal challenge would be built on the approval of the 
majority.  
However, considering the overall paucity of remuneration-based litigation arising from 
large quoted companies in the UK, prior even to the passing of the Act, S.79 therefore, 
is unlikely to make any considerable difference.  The reasons for this could range from 
shareholder apathy to the relative cost to a minority, of sustaining a legal challenge-
when it could perhaps be less costly to divest one’s interests. However, it is likely to 
be that executive remuneration does not represent a significant enough cost to large 
corporations, for to be taken seriously enough by institutional shareholders or worthy 
of the costs to the minority87. This explains the greater likelihood of remuneration-
based cases arising from privately-held companies. 
As would be discussed in the following section, when members of small privately held 
companies are aggrieved by the actions of the majority-including matters having to do 
with compensation-the Companies Act, through S.994 allows minority members to 
bring an action for relief. 
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5.6.3 The ‘Unfairly Prejudicial’ Relief Under S.994 Companies Act 2006: An 
Exception to the Principle of Non-Interference 
S.994 allows a minority shareholder who believes an act or omission being committed 
either by the company or on its behalf, would be unfairly prejudicial to the rights of 
the members in general or in part. This provision could be regarded as an exception to 
the English courts reluctance to delve into company matters and question directors’ 
business judgement. 
A reading of S.994 would show two requirements to qualify for the relief i.e. one the 
wrong must be suffered in the petitioner’s capacity as a shareholder88 and the acts or 
omission complained of must potentially endanger his position as such. However, the 
petitioner is not required to show that the injurious acts were done in bad faith or 
intentionally89. In O’Neill v Phillips90, Lord Hoffmann put forward a two-fold test of 
unfairness. First, the majority exercises its legal power contrary to good faith and 
engages in an act or acts that put an end to the basis upon which the members entered 
association with each other91.  On the second arm of the Hoffmann test, it goes 
without saying that the basis for a shareholder agreement, much like any other 
agreement, would be based on mutually held trust. Which must be backed by properly 
articulated terms entitling either party to relief, in the event of a breach. A breach 
therefore of these terms would significantly alter the trust dynamic of this association, 
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severely limiting its ability to engage meaningfully in the purpose for which it was 
initially established. S.994 allows the court to offer relief at this point, to the injured 
party, which would require an ex-post evaluation of the actions of the majority. 
Additionally, where the grievance involves remuneration deemed by the minority to 
be excessive, an evaluation would involve an inquiry into the decision to pay the 
challenged sum and the effects or potential effects said payments would have on the 
minority. Prior to this, it must be made clear that where the disputed payments were 
made consequent to a prior agreement and duly authorized by the shareholders in 
sum, the contending minority must plead evidence of the adversity such payments 
would wreak in terms of their strict legal rights as beneficiaries of the company as a 
going concern. Therefore, regarding the contractual agreement between 
shareholders, an unfairly prejudicial claim for excessive remuneration would only 
succeed when a prior agreement existed between parties regarding their financial 
entitlements i.e. dividends and the challenged compensation was likely to jeopardise 
the director’s ability to meet these obligations as required92. In Irvine v Irvine, where a 
director’s remuneration package jeopardised the firm’s ability to meet profit sharing 
obligations under the member’s agreement, it was held that the director had violated 
said agreement. 
What is significant about Irvine is that in deciding that the defendant’s compensation 
was unfair, the court adopted the approach taken in Re a Company (No 004415 of 
1996)93, where compensation was deemed unfair, because it was “outwith the 
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objective commercial criteria” for CEO’s within the defendant’s commercial bracket in 
terms of company size, responsibilities etc. In this case, the salary package had 
weakened the financial position of the minority it was held to be unfairly prejudicial. 
In summary compensation, would be deemed unfair, where it is comparatively 
excessive i.e. the objective comparative criteria referenced in Irvine etc. must have 
been agreed to in bad faith and diminished the financial position of the minority. 
 
5.6.3.1.  The Objective Commercial Criteria Test 
The Scottish courts in Fowler v Gruber94, recently considered a petition for unfairly 
prejudicial conduct by the majority shareholder in a privately held company. Amongst 
the grounds for the petition, included remuneration received by the sole director of 
the company. Here, the court in granting the petition held that the respondent’s 
remuneration had been unjustified, when upon an evaluation of the earnings of 
directors of a similar peer group or objective commercial criteria. This decision echoed 
the dictum entered more than a decade earlier in Re a Company (No 004415 of 1996) 
where Sir Richard Scott V-C stated that: 
“If the respondents are unable to justify by objective commercial criteria that the 
companies' dividend policy was a reasonable one and that the remuneration the 
…directors were paid by the companies was within the bracket that executives carrying 
the sort of responsibility and discharging the sort of duties that they were carrying and 
                                                            





discharging would expect to receive, the petitioners will, in my opinion, have succeeded 
in establishing their s.459 case.” 
To determine unfairness in excessive compensation, we would need to understand 
what these objective commercial criteria are. 
The objective commercial criteria standard for determining excessiveness had been 
previously used in Re a Company ex p Burr95, where Vinelott J. in dismissing an 
excessive remuneration claim stated, 
“There is no evidence that the directors are paid in the aggregate…. more than the 
company would have had to pay to secure suitable replacements or that the 
remuneration is out of line with that paid to directors of other companies with similar 
size and turnover” 
Here the court iterated that compensation exceeding the peer average was not of 
itself conclusive of its unfairness. In Lloyd v Casey96, the court reached a similar 
conclusion. The above mentioned suggest that, a proper evaluation of the 
excessiveness of director’s remuneration, should go beyond a mere contemplation of 
the quantum of the disputed pay package. Therefore, to be successful, petitioners 
would need to establish the unreasonableness of the challenged payments. The test 
for reasonableness of remuneration was stated in Irvine as whether “an intelligent an 
honest person” having knowledge of the relevant facts, would consider what was paid 
to the director to be reasonable97. 
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On the issue of reasonability, Ferris J. stated in Lloyd, a petitioner trying to establish 
that the salary received by the defendant were prejudicial to his interests would need 
to “invoke some general concept that remuneration received shall not exceed what is 
reasonable” [emphasis mine]. Though the judge admitted that the courts have no 
“yardstick” for determining the reasonableness of such payments, he went further to 
state that such an inquiry would have to be subjective, stating that, “the amount 
involved was so large in relation to a company’s trading that, perhaps with the 
assistance of expert evidence it would be possible to reach a conclusion that what was 
paid was, by any standard, unreasonable”98.  
This approach was adopted in Irvine, where to prove the defendant’s remuneration 
was without his peer bracket, the court relied on the testimony of an expert witness, 
called on the petitioner’s behalf. Wherein the witness, who was described by the judge 
as “an extremely impressive witness with a wide knowledge on remuneration issues” 
gave evidence outlining his research which involved a survey of data involving the 
compensation paid to CEOs within the defendant’s industry (insurance brokerage). 
Taking into consideration the size of the firm, its turnover and the intrinsic 
entrepreneurial qualities of the defendant in terms of his capacity to acquire and grow 
a company and the salaries he would be likely to earn if he were to take up 
employment in another firm within or outside the sector. As such the witness 
concluded that a reasonable pay package would have seen the CEO’s takings range 
anywhere from £100,000 at the lower end peaking at no more than £300,000 per 
annum. Stating that only exceptional circumstances would justify a raise above these 






levels and that such circumstances (should they arise) would have the effect only of 
taking the defendants compensation to the higher end of the spectrum and not 
beyond. Although the judge disagreed with this analysis, he still decided that the 
decision to compensate himself exorbitantly was prejudicial to the interests of the 
members. Especially as he had consistently been excessively paid in the years 
preceding the petition. 
 
5.6.3.2 Additional Factors in Determining Unfairness 
Ferris J. in Lloyd seemed to imply in his dismissal of the excessive remuneration head 
of the petition, that to be successful, the petitioner must not only show that the 
payment was overly generous in that it exceeded a prior agreement, but also there 
was an element of bad faith in authorising and making such payments99.    
Since we know that high pay does not of itself connote unfairness a successful claimant 
must show that the payments were. Not only more than what the directors were 
entitled to but were made in bad faith also. Payments agreed to or ratified by the 
shareholders, would not fall under the above heading100. In Croly v Good101, large 
payments made to a director were upheld as it appeared to be the norm between 
directors, having each received an amount more than their legal entitlements in the 
past. In contrast, the court in Hequet v McCarthy102, held that agreements made 
between directors to award a significant portion of the profits from a road resurfacing 
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contract to themselves, despite the protestations of the minority to be unfairly 
prejudicial and a breach of their fiduciary duty. 
Payments received in excess of an existing compensation agreement, could potentially 
breach the director’s duty to promote the success of the company, in the event that 
they endanger the financial future of the company103.  
Subsequently, the failure to pay dividends, as a direct result of excessive remuneration 
must breach a prior agreement between shareholders104. In O’Neill v Phillips105, the 
court considered the ‘legitimate expectations’, which flow from such agreements. In 
rejecting the concept, however conceded that despite the advent of circumstances 
that would ordinarily necessitate a breach of an agreement between equity partners, 
either party was precluded via the agreement to act in a way that the court would 
consider to be “prejudicial and unfair” to the other’s rights as secured by the 
agreement106.  
 
5.7. Anglo-American Judicial Non-Intervention in 
Compensation Matters. 
5.7.1 The Doctrinal Essence behind the Non-interventionist Approach 
The current attitude of non-interference, was first introduced in common law in the 
English case of Overend & Gurney Co v Gibb 107, where the court, stated that only in 
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cases were there had been gross negligence on the parts of directors in the 
performance of their duties would the courts be justified in reviewing decisions made 
by men presumably accustomed to business, having the knowledge required to act on 
behalf of the owners.  
The rationale behind the non-interventionist approach under the common law, was 
stated most clearly in Shuttleworth v Cox Bros & Co Maidenhead Ltd. Here, Scrutton J 
opined that when a decision was honestly reached and believed by management to be 
in the company’s best interest, provided reasonable men would come to a similar 
decision, it should be allowed to stand regardless of any disagreements the court 
would have with the path taken. It concluded that it was not the business of the courts 
to manage companies108. 
As a result, provided and unless a plaintiff challenging a business decision with dire 
consequences can prove negligence on the part of the directors in making the decision 
the court would disregard his claim. The burden of proof lies on the person(s) making 
the allegation of impropriety109.  
With regards to the U.S., where there is a codified Business Judgement Rule, it has 
been decided that, to waive the rule’s application, the plaintiff must sufficiently prove 
the directors in performing their duties breached one or more of their fiduciary duties. 
                                                            






Particularly the duty of care, although the court would treat as seriously a breach of 
any of their fiduciary duties110.  
 
5.7.1.1 The Reason for the Attitude of Non-Interference 
There are two schools of thought regarding the general approach of non-interference 
and the Business Judgement Rule-in the U.S. on the one hand argues the Rule was 
intended to shield company directors from liability, the other states the company is 
the intended beneficiary. Jeremy Telman argues in favour the latter111 stating that the 
American Business Judgement Rule was not formulated to protect the directors from 
personal liability for the consequences of their business decisions, but rather the rule 
operates essentially for the benefit of the company and by implication the 
shareholders. Bainbridge posits that, the rule as established holds within it the 
advantage of encouraging managing boards to take the risks which would generate 
shareholder value112.  
5.7.1.2. The Courts Choose Non-interference to Encourage Risk Taking 
Bainbridge believes the potential for personal liability for the poor decision making, 
would evoke the kind of risk averse behaviours that shareholder value and agency 
theories would be too quick to denounce. He mentions the “basic corporate law 
principle of limited liability”, the diversified portfolios of shareholders and the 
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hindsight bias involved in an ex post judicial review of business decisions as supportive 
of the rule’s existence and implementation113. He states that a combination of the 
limited liability protections offered to shareholders of quoted companies and their 
unenviable position as residual owners was sufficient reasons for shareholders to 
require that managers be highly risk inclined.  
Arguing further that, because it is impossible to recreate the exact circumstances 
which preceded the decision in question, therefore, an ex post review would be had, 
with full knowledge of the outcome of the decision, which raises questions as to the 
efficacy of such a process.114. He states further, that a hindsight review would blur the 
foreseeability of the outcome of a decision, rendering it punishable, regardless of the 
“ex ante quality of the decision or the decision-making process”115. Creating a situation 
whereby managers are punished for bad outcomes rather than a failure to exercise 
due care in decision making.  
The question of hindsight bias in judicial review of business decisions was briefly 
addressed in Weavering Capital (UK) ltd v Dabhia116, a case involving a violation of 
S.174 of the UK Companies Act 2006, where the defendant insisted he had not failed 
in his duty of care by relying on information given by a senior colleague, with disastrous 
consequences. The court in disregarding this argument, held that, performance of his 
duty required that he investigated the claims of his superior, and had he done so the 
deficiencies in his answers which were so glaringly obvious would have been visible to 
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him, by him taking his colleague at his word without any further investigation was a 
breach of the duties stated in S.174.  
Furthermore, the absence of personal liability could be justified by the need to 
encourage the best and brightest to take on board role, as well as the need to 
encourage bold management by company directors117. On this point, Telman argues 
that the rule could present a potential moral hazard, when directors can take risks with 
funds belonging to shareholders, without any personal liability, when decisions taken 
later prove to negatively impact shareholder value118. 
 
5.7.1.3 The Courts Lack the Required Expertise to Review Business Judgments and 
the Director Primacy Argument 
A second justification for the rule and a frequent excuse for judicial deference to board 
decisions, is that “judges are not business managers”119. In Dodge v Ford the court 
decided it lacked the necessary expertise to engage in an analysis of the merits of the 
decision taken. Here the rule was applied on the grounds of a lack of expertise. The 
eagerness with which judges refuse to examine business decisions on those grounds 
have been questioned120. Bainbridge challenged this argument citing as its limitation, 
its generic suppositions as to the corporate expertise or lack thereof, of jurists. Stating 
further and using Delaware as an example of jurisdictions were members of the bench 
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frequently come from within the corporate sector121. That Delaware accounts for a 
large portion of the corporate law litigation in America, would mean judges in such a 
jurisdiction, would have the expertise and experience needed to adjudicate 
thoroughly on these issues122. 
The lack of expertise argument fails the credibility test, considering judges are 
frequently required to examine the consequences of expert judgements. For instance, 
in examining medical negligence cases, judges do not plead a lack of requisite expertise 
and thus defer to the professional’s expertise. raising questions about the tendency to 
defer to business judgments123. If anything, the previously mentioned qualifications of 
judges in jurisdictions like Delaware, where there are several judges with sufficient 
knowledge of the corporate sector should qualify them to engage in an analysis of 
challenged business decisions124. 
Also, corporate boards themselves rely on expert opinions in arriving at certain 
decisions. A useable example would be executive compensation decisions, where 
compensation committees frequently utilise the services of expert pay consulting 
firms in making pay decisions. It could be argued that when courts decide to defer to 
directors on executive pay, they in fact defer to the opinions of paid consultants, who 
lack the requisite fiduciary responsibility. Given that boards refer to consultants when 
making pay decisions-as they are required to do in some situations125-would the 
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application of the rule be justified in such an instance? The purport of the rule and the 
basis for its application would seem to imply that the answer to the question would 
be no126. 
Furthermore, the director sovereignty or primacy model, provides a further 
justification for the rule’s application127. This model as opposed to the shareholder 
value and managerialist model, places directors at the top of the corporate pyramid. 
The director primacy model is derived from contractarian view of the corporation, i.e. 
the firm as a “nexus through which all the contracts making up the corporation, and 
whose powers flow not from shareholders alone, but from the complete set of 
contracts constituting the firm”128.  
Director primacy refutes the commonly held view of the shareholders as the central 
authority, for the simple reason that besides exceptional circumstances-i.e. mergers 
and acquisitions where shareholder consent is required by law-board decisions are 
usually not subject to any form of judicial review. It devolves that the one who makes 
the decisions has the control. Citing Arrow’s authority-based theory, that the 
corporation because of its size and make up, needs to have a hierarchical management 
structure with the decision making done by a central authority familiar with the 
business. Bainbridge states that if the alternate consensus-based theory were 
adopted, the modern corporation would lose its organizational advantage.  
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5.8. Qualifying for Protection under the Principle of Non-interference: 
The Rational Actor Requirement 
For the courts to decide against adjudicating on a business decision, the director(s) 
involved must meet the foundational requirement of reasonableness129. That is, the 
decision must have been the outcome of a reasonable exercise of his business 
judgement. To determine whether a decision was rational or not, the arbiter must first 
make plain the granules of a rational decision-making process, asking and answering 
the question of what a rational decision entails? 
The Australian case of ASIC v Rich130 provides the perfect place to begin such an inquiry. 
Here, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, brought an action against 
the directors of a troubled company. Stating a breach of their duties to exercise 
reasonable skill and judgment as codified under, S.180 of the Australian Companies 
Act 2001. The court dismissed their claim and declared that the defendants could have 
invoked the Business Judgement Rule as provided for under S.180 (2) of the same Act, 
had it not. 
In determining the applicability of S.180 (2), the court determined that a defendant 
seeking to rely thus, must meet the standard of reasonableness stated therein. The 
Act provides in S.180 (2), that the business decision in dispute must have been made 
in good faith, without any conflict of interest and on an informed basis, in (2)(d), that 
the directors must “rationally believe the action to be in the best interest of the 
                                                            
129 Similar provisions on the requirement of ‘reasonableness’ could be found in the Australian, South 
African and the UK Company’s Acts and the American Law Institutes’ Principle of Corporate 
Governance. Also, see, Jean Du Plessis, “Open Sea or Safe Harbour? American, Australian and South 
African business, Judgment Rules Compared” Company Lawyer, Vol. 32 Issue 11 [2011] 347 at 380. 





corporation”131. The sub-section goes further to define a rational decision, in stating 
that a business decision would be deemed to be a rational one, unless it was such that 
no reasonable person would ever make. This requires an objective test of what a 
rational decision might be, so long as it seemed reasonable at the time to make the 
decision, the decision by implication could be said to be rational. It seems like a fair 
but low standard to measure up to.  
Speaking of low standards, the standard of care set by the UK Companies Act 2006, 
does not appear to be any higher. S.174, sets the standard as a reasonable exercise of 
care, skill and judgement. However, subsection (2) attempts to define what a 
reasonable exercise of one’s care, skill and judgement could imply, by first limiting the 
object of such an exercise to be a “reasonably diligent person”. Sub-paragraph (a) goes 
on to enunciate the qualities this reasonably diligent person is expected to possess, 
which are; 
“(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person 
carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company” 
This is a broad generic standard without much specificity and leaves the reader 
wanting with regards to the skills and knowledge to be had by the director and if they 
are they to be firm specific or meant to be part of a broad range of skills? Sub-
paragraph (b) goes on to answer the first question by limiting this seemingly broad 
range of skills, knowledge and experience to; 
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“(b) The general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has” 
In other words, directors cannot be held liable for lapses in business judgement in the 
absence of proof they possessed the ability to do a better job. This second paragraph 
dashed any hopes of a reasonably high standard of care that the first paragraph may 
have held, by making the standard subject to the intrinsic qualities of the errant 
director and not some objectively desirable standard with requisite qualities which he 
must have. The section echoes the sentiments of the common law on the issue, stated 
by Romer J, in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd132  when he declared: 
“A director need not, in the performance of his duties, exhibit a greater degree of skill than 
may reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience”. 
This decision followed a judgement entered a decade earlier in Re Brazilian Rubber 
Plantation and Estates Ltd133 where Neville J, decided against holding three evidently 
incompetent directors liable for the disastrous consequences of their decisions, 
holding instead that if the company, while being fully aware of their professional 
shortcomings thought them fit to be directors, then they should be prepared as well 
to live with the consequences of that choice. 
However, more than half a century later, the Australian courts decided in Daniels v 
Anderson134, that “the tort of negligence and the modern duty of care formed an 
acceptable basis of [personal] liability for director’s breach of their duty of care”135, the 
decision is said to have objectified the duty of care, skill and diligence to be exercised 
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by serving directors in Australia. Terminating the hitherto subjective approach of a 
lateral analysis of perceived negligence, which juxtaposed the director’s skill and 
knowledge against the requirements of his role136. This objectification of director’s 
duty of care was echoed in S.180 (2) of the Act, the Australian statutory equivalent of 
the American Business Judgement Rule. Du Plessis believed the enactment which was 
ironically a legislative response to the decision in Daniels v Anderson, was intended to 
provide a “safe harbour”137 for directors from the minefields of personal liability that 
resulted from the Daniels’ decision.  
The reasons for this are as much a subject of debate as the protection provided 
thereunder, however the explanatory memorandum to the act stated that the rule 
under S.180 (2) was intended both as a standard of liability and a doctrine of review. 
It is not difficult to comprehend how the drafters could have intended the rule to be 
all of the above, given that the doctrinal perception of the rule has been a source of 
debate even within its jurisdiction of origin among jurists and commentators on the 
subject. The following section would briefly examine these varied theories on the 
function of the rule. 
 
5.9. The Nature of the Principle of Non-interference: is it intended as an 
Absolute Preclusion of Judicial Review? 
It has been argued that by the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co 
v Technicolor, Inc.138  that the American Business Judgement Rule was therefore to be 
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regarded as a standard of liability. A means by which the courts were to review 
business decisions taken by company directors to determine whether they had met 
their required duty to exercise due care, loyalty and skill139. On a similar note, Du 
Plessis argues just as well, that the English Appeal Court’s decision in Overend & 
Gurney Co v Gibbs140 “was them expressing their view of the Business Judgement Rule 
as a standard of conduct and personal liability”141. However, this conception of the rule 
has been challenged in the literature.  
Bainbridge amongst others, stated the standard of liability/review doctrine of the 
nature of the rule as going against the original intent of the rule142. Positing that 
business decisions were never intended to be the subject of judicial review or an ex 
post review of any kind, stating the earlier mentioned justifications for the rule as a 
defence of his thesis. In contrast, he conceives the rule in what he believes to be its 
original intent, as a doctrine of abstention. He cites the Delaware court’s decision in 
Shlensky v Wrigley143 to buffer his argument. In that case when faced with an issue that 
would require an assessment of a business decision made by a manager, which he 
believed to be in furtherance of the corporation’s core goals, the courts declined to 
engage in such an assessment choosing instead to defer to the decision taken, stating 
that:  
“The response which courts make to such applications is that it is not their function to 
resolve corporation’s questions of policy and business management. The directors are 
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chosen to pass upon such questions and their decision unless shown to be tainted with 
fraud is accepted as final”144 
A similar tone was taken in Howard Smith v Ampol Ltd145, were the Privy Council 
declared that the courts had no standing to substitute its opinion for those of 
management in matters concerning the best interest of the corporation and that there 
was “no appeal on the merits from management decisions to courts of law”. It is 
perhaps important to state at this point that the Howard Smith decision was indeed 
an accurate reflection of the common-law perception of the nature of the rule. Which 
appeared to be more as a doctrine of non-review than anything else146. Similar 
positions were adopted in Harlowe’s Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lake Entrance) Oil 
Ltd147, where the court held: 
“Directors in whom are vested the right and the duty of deciding where the Company’s 
interests lie and how they are to be served may be concerned with a wide range of 
practical considerations, and their judgment, if exercised in good faith and not for 
irrelevant purposes, is not open to review in the courts”148 
In addition, Telman mentions that the courts have also regarded the American rule as 
an evidentiary presumption of proper conduct in favour of directors. In Aronson v 
Lewis, the Delaware court held that absent any evidence that the directors had failed 
to act in good faith, it shall be presumed that they did so and the burden of proving 
otherwise shall be upon the person seeking to establish facts to the contrary. The 
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evidentiary presumption view seems to be the more popular with the American 
courts. As could be gleaned from more recent decisions in the Disney litigation cases 
for example149.  
Given the perception of the Business Judgement Rule as one of judicial non-review, it 
is somewhat surprising the attempts at codification in common law jurisdictions have 
tended to view the rule instead as a standard of review. S.180 (2) of the Australian 
Corporations Law Act, mentions also the requirements for qualification for its 
protections. Requirements which closely resemble the American judicial position, 
adopted in Aronson v Lewis inter alia. The section requires a juridical review of the 
disputed business decision, before deference to the board’s decision may occur, if no 
impropriety was found.  
Similarly, the South African version of the rule, set out in S. 76 (4) of the South African 
Companies Act 71 2008, states the usual requirements that he must have; acted on an 
informed basis, not from self-interest and had a rational basis for making or supporting 
the decision made150. The statute also appears to view the rule as a standard of 
review151. Another example of a codified Business Judgement Rule, which shifted 
ideologically from the original common law position adopted in Harlowe’s Nominees.  
Prior to the enactment of the rule in 2008, the SA courts had generally refused to 
engage in a review of ostensible business decisions. A prime example is the antiquated 
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decision in Levin v Feld and Tweeds Ltd152 where the courts seemed to reason along 
the line of earlier common law judgements, by stating that courts were not obligated 
to substitute their opinion on company affairs for those of qualified business 
managers. This view was adopted in two more recent decisions in Lordon v Dusky 
Dawn investments (In Liquidation)153 and Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim & others154. However, 
the drafters of S.76 (4), chose a different approach, choosing instead to consider the 
rule more as a standard of review, than a doctrine of abstention or judicial restraint. 
There appears to be a lack of consensus on the doctrinal basis of the Business 
Judgment rule as well as the overarching principle of judicial non-interference in 
corporate matters. This also applies to the Business Judgement Rule, to which Telman 
states, “Part of the difficulty that courts face in applying the Rule is that there is no 
agreement as to what it is”155. it appears to be a problem that the formalisation and 
codification of the rule is yet to resolve. 
 
5.10. Recent Developments in Executive Pay legislation and the Judicial 
Response 
As result of the clamour for state intervention in the curbing executive pay and the 
excesses which some believed contributed to the financial meltdown of 2008, the 
response was a legislative attempt at tightening aspects of the pay setting process to 
enhance fairness and transparency.  
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In 2010, American legislators passed the Wall Street Reform and Environmental 
Protection Act (Hereinafter referred to as Dodd-Frank), which amongst other things, 
was intended to improve pay transparency by giving shareholders say on pay powers. 
A similar provision was adopted by the UK parliament via the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which called for a shareholder vote on the director’s 
remuneration report156. 
Naturally, a number of legal challenges arose following the passing of the Dodd-Frank 
law. These challenges, which concluded with limited success, would be examined 




5.10.1 The Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Law 
Amongst the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the breadth of which touched on all 
facets of corporate governance, the most relevant to this discussion are the say on pay 
provisions, and more recent amendments which included pay ratio and performance 
sensitivity disclosures.  
S.951 of the Act requires shareholder approval of executive compensation 
arrangements, including exit payments. This say-on-pay vote is required to be held at 
least once every three years, with the rules also leaving to companies to determine 
                                                            





the regularity with which these votes are held. Shareholders can make this 
determination through a non-binding vote.  
S.952 is presumably aimed at reducing CEO influence over the pay setting process, 
calls for greater independence for the compensation committee, as well as the firm’s 
compensation advisers. The section makes it a key requirement for firm’s seeking to 
be listed on the securities exchange and prohibits the listing of firms found to be in 
non-compliance with the statute.  
Subsequent to amendments made to the Act in 2015, pay-ratio disclosure 
requirements were set out in s.953 of the Act. This required mandatory disclosure of 
ratio of CEO compensation, to the median income of the other employees. This in a 
bid to encourage greater transparency in executive pay reporting, by providing all 
interested parties with the information needed to measure the firms pay practices. As 
such, the pay ratio mandate requires firms to disclose; both the median of the firm’s 
annual total compensation and the annual total compensation of the company. 
Furthermore, a 2015 amendment required firms to disclose the sensitivity of 
performance-based pay to company’s financial performance, by disclosing the Total 
Return to Shareholder (TSR) for the previous 5 years. This disclosure, would facilitate 
a measurement of the firm’s total expenditure on executive pay, as well its 
corresponding TSR, allowing for comparison with peer companies. 
Following the passing of the Act, some commentators predicted a wave of 
compensation-based litigation in the states157. Although, this anticipated wave of cases 
                                                            







never materialised at par with expectations, a few however did arise following the 
early proxy seasons, which sprung from shareholder dissent. These cases which were 
mostly unsuccessful attempts by shareholders to challenge what they determined to 
be wasteful expenditure of company resources, with few exceptions.  
 
5.10.2 The Say-On-Pay Derivative Litigation Cases 
Recent decisions in executive compensation-based litigation in America, suggest that 
despite say on pay provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 intended to give 
shareholders an opportunity to have their say on their firm’s compensation policy, the 
trend would show that a negative say on pay vote has done little to change the stance 
of the American judiciary on excessive remuneration. There have only been a handful 
of legal actions instituted following failed say-on-pay votes that have made it to the 
preliminary stages, with contrasting outcomes. 
In Teamsters Local 237 Additional Security Benefit Fund v. McCarthy158, the court held, 
applying Aronson’s test, that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the board’s 
independence had been compromised in the pay setting process and that as a result 
had failed to create reasonable doubt that the director’s decision constituted a valid 
exercise of their business judgement. Similar decisions were reached in more recent 
cases i.e. Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Bogart159 and Gordon v. Goodyear 
and Navigant Consulting160 were the court in granting the defendants motion to 
dismiss in both cases, stated that the respective plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the 
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requirements of the Aronson’s test and by implication the futility of a pre-suit demand 
for remedy.  
Despite the clear majority of the decisions going the way of the defendant directors, 
there are however some encouraging signs for disgruntled shareholders as 
demonstrated by the Cincinnati Bell Case161, a case decided under Ohio law, instituted 
by disgruntled shareholders outraged by what they deemed excessive payments to 
executives because the company had been in steady decline. At the preliminary stages, 
the court dismissed the defendant’s motion to dismiss stating that the negative say on 
pay vote as evidence that the recommended pay package could not be deemed to be 
in the company’s best interest. Asserting its belief in the futility of a demand because 
the directors, in whom remedial powers were vested, had devised and approved the 
disputed pay plan. The fact that this case was decided under Ohio law was the 
difference between it and other less successful efforts. For under the Ohio law, and in 
contrast to Delaware, plaintiffs are not required to prove with particularity of facts the 
evidence to sufficiently rebut the presumption of a valid exercise of business 
judgement. Also, under Ohio law the demand requirement is jettisoned upon evidence 
of a director’s involvement in the pay setting process162. 
Recent years have witnessed some successful shareholder challenges of non-executive 
director pay. In Calma v Templeton163, the court held that the directors had breached 
their fiduciary duty and wasted corporate assets by awarding restricted stock units, 
absent the requisite shareholder approval. Also, that same year, the case of Espinosa 
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v Zuckerberg164, instituted by investors challenging the reasonableness of share awards 
to directors of Facebook, was allowed to proceed by the Delaware court, prior to 
settlement being reached by the parties involved. It should be noted by way of a 
caveat, that these cases involving non-executive director compensation are subject to 
a different standard as the Business Judgement Rule would not normally apply, given 
that the pay decisions involved the director’s own compensation. There the 
requirement for disinterestedness could hardly be met. 
In summary, so far, the outcome of the say on pay derivative cases bears witness to 
how frustratingly difficult litigating executive pay issues are for aggrieved 
shareholders. Even worse, is that the deduction from the bulk of the decided cases, 
would seem to suggest that a negative say on pay vote does not necessarily obviate 
the need to prove the second prong of the Aronson’s test. The advisory nature of the 
say on pay provision as stated in the Dodd-Frank Act, does not seem to have increased 
the fiduciary responsibility of directors to exercise due care in dealing with corporate 
assets, nor has it imposed additional liability for failure to meet their duty of care 
obligations, at least from a judicial stand-point165. 
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5.11. The Post-Crisis Legislative Attempts to Address High Executive 
Pay in the UK: The Passing of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013. 
Following the last financial crisis, a high pay commission was established by the then 
newly-formed coalition government. The commission’s recommendations called for 
greater transparency in the reporting of executive pay and an advisory forward-
looking vote on remuneration reports166. The then Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills, released a discussion paper on executive remuneration reforms, some of 
which subsequently formed the basis for the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013. This Act along with further amendments to the Companies Act 2006, via the 
Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013, granted more extensive say-on-pay powers to 
shareholders. The preceding would examine their respective provisions. 
 
5.11.1 Say on Pay in the United Kingdom 
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, called for member’s approval of the 
Director’s remuneration report and policy. S.79(4) required companies listed on the 
stock exchange to provide notice of an intention to move an ordinary resolution 
approving the director’s remuneration policy. The vote was required to focus on the 
company’s policy with regards to bonuses and other performance-related aspects of 
executive pay, distinct from the pay package as a whole. The policy must contain 
                                                            






information on how each company director’s pay would be determined, the metrics 
for performance-based pay etc. According to the Act, this vote was intended to be held 
every three years and was to be of an advisory nature. This represented a watered-
down version of the initial proposals set out within the discussion paper. 
However, following amendments to the Companies Act 2006 via the Large and 
Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2013, a binding vote was established with regards to pay policies of the 
largest public companies and these are to be held at least once every three years. 
furthermore, an annual advisory vote was to be held on pay awards made pursuant to 
the shareholder approved remuneration policy. 
Furthermore, the amendments required the company to report how it had taken 
employee pay into account while determining executive pay. It required more 
transparency in the reporting of executive pay, by requiring a clear statement of each 
director’s pay award, to show clearly how the latter was linked to firm performance 
and set out clearly what performance measures had been attained167. If the pay policy 
was rejected by a majority of the shareholders-following the vote which required a 
simple majority-the director’s remuneration policy put forward the following year, 
shall then be subject to a binding vote168. These provisions were subsequently adopted 
by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in its listing rules, making them applicable to 
                                                            






all companies listed on the UK stock exchanges, regardless of where they are 
domiciled169. 
It is fair to say that these enacted provisions leaned heavily towards giving 
shareholders a major say in executive pay reforms, requiring active participation to be 
effective.  
5.11.2 How Effective Has Say-on-Pay Been in Making Executive Pay Fairer  
Given that say on pay has been operative in the UK for half a decade, this section would 
seek to examine how effective it has been in bringing executive pay closer to a more 
ideal position of fairness.   
Since the passing of the ERRA, average pay for FTSE 100 CEOs rose by approximately 
10 per cent between 2014-2015, from an average of £4.96m to £5.48m, while the 
median pay increased slightly to £3.98m within the same time frame170.  The following 
year witnessed a sharp decline of 17 per cent from 2015 levels to an average of £4.5m 
for FTSE 100 CEOs. This is in part due, to substantial reductions for some of the highest 
paid CEOs within the index, while some of the lower paid saw pay increases171. The 
CEO-average worker pay ratio also fell to 129:1 in 2016, from 148:1 a year earlier, this 
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could be attributed more to the reduction in average CEO pay, rather than an increase 
in average earnings, which has remained stagnant172. 
With regards to shareholder approval of executive pay levels, the figures seem to 
suggest a level of general support for executive pay packages since the ERRA passed. 
The year 2016 was the first proxy season, where shareholder could pass a binding vote 
against or in favour of the company’s remuneration policy. There were a few high-
profile revolts to pay proposals, most notably in BP and Smith & Nephews, with the 
latter having 59 per cent of the shareholders vote down the CEO’s pay package. These 
aside, statistics show an average of 93 per cent of shareholders voted in favour the 
firm’s remuneration policy and 92 per cent in favour of the remuneration report in the 
year’s 2016 and 2017. This is with an average of 73 per cent of eligible shareholders 
participating in the vote173. 
The decline in average CEO pay for 2016 could perhaps be in response to the hostility 
which greeted some pay proposals, and some may suggest, companies may have 
begun to consider more seriously shareholder concerns about rising pay and calls for 
greater performance sensitivity174. That regardless, one could argue credibly that 
executive pay levels are still unconscionably high and far removed from the realities 
of average worker’s experience. That a pay gap of 129:1, remains unsustainable, 
irrespective of the decline from previous years. 
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Considering the ERRA, it would perhaps be too early to forge a definitive opinion on 
its effectiveness. It would require an evaluation over a significant period of time to 
make such a determination. There is evidence that say on pay has provided an outlet 
for the public’s hostility towards executive excess to be channelled and this febrile 
environment is causing companies to rethink their remuneration policies175. What 
progress has been made since the passing of the Act, does not dampen the suspicion 
that more needs to be done to make executive pay fairer. To the latter point, in the 
absence of substantive judicial interference on the subject, more drastic and radical 
legislation would present the only viable option. 
The ERRA alongside the current corporate governance regime provides a good 
framework on which to build future efforts on. There are areas which could perhaps 
be strengthened to heighten its efficacy. 
 
5.12. Making Executive Pay Fairer: Possible Enhancements to the 
Current Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework 
The current corporate governance regulatory framework provides a reasonable 
foundation upon which legislative efforts intended to make pay fairer could sit. This 
concluding portion of the chapter would discuss some of the adjustments which could 
be made to the ERRA, as well as the corporate governance rules, to increase their 
effectiveness. Most of the following recommendations are geared towards the pay 
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setting process, due to its importance to the justice of the outcome. As highlighted in 
Chapter Three, that for the process of executive pay setting to accord with Nozick’s 
postulation of a legitimate process, the pay setting process must meet the 
requirements of voluntarism, acquiescence and transparency. Hence, the following 
recommendations are intended to ensure these key requirements factor within the 
pay setting process. 
5.12.1 An Annual Binding Vote for Company Shareholders 
Firstly, the current regime of an annual advisory vote on the director’s remuneration 
report and a tri-annual binding one on the remuneration policy, could be modified 
slightly to increase the level of scrutiny on corporate remuneration policies. A binding 
vote every year would allow shareholders scrutinise and question pay decisions and 
policies they do not deem justifiable, in the light of company performance. The recent 
dip in average executive remuneration in the UK is unlikely to be unconnected to the 
disaffection and vitriol which greeted some remuneration proposals in the 2016 proxy 
season-which was the first-year shareholders could exercise a binding vote following 
the passing of the ERRA176. It could be argued that an annual vote with binding effect, 
would apply the needed downward pressure on executive pay levels, which could 
force remuneration committees to carefully metric pay so it accords to performance 
levels. When investors bear witness to tangible performance gains, the likelihood of a 
negative response to a generous executive pay package would diminish. 
                                                            






The possibility was proposed by the Conservative Government in 2016, as part of a 
bouquet of reforms to UK corporate governance. This portion however, was jettisoned 
in the subsequently released Green paper in November 2016. The reason(s) for this is 
unclear, however, this proposed measure was subject to a fair amount of pushback 
from within the business community177. Those opposed to the measure cited amongst 
their concerns the possibility that shareholders may be less likely to vote against pay 
proposals they disagree with, due to the consequences of a negative vote. That the 
uncertainty an annual binding vote would create, might cause nervous companies to 
consult investors incessantly. Furthermore, a binding vote may hamper the company’s 
ability to pay the CEO while negatively impacting the ability of UK firms to attract and 
retain global talent178. 
Possible variations to a mandated binding vote, could include limiting the vote to 
certain performance-related elements of executive pay, rather than the entire 
package. Also, an escalation approach could be adopted, whereby a negative advisory 
vote, could then lead to a binding vote to be called on the affected remuneration 
policy179. 
Irrespective of the approach adopted, it is the opinion here, that a binding vote would 
present a formidable means to create the levels of shareholder engagement in the pay 
setting process, the ERRA was intended to create. Adopting a less nuanced approach 
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would create the potency required to achieve the latter aim, as well as the end-point 
of fairer executive compensation. 
5.12.2 Requiring Companies to Publish CEO-Employee Pay Ratios 
Furthermore, mandating firms to publish the pay ratios could help make pay fairer. 
Mandatory pay ratios have been put in place in the United States and were first 
proposed in the UK in August 2017. The UK government introduced secondary 
legislation in 2018, which would compel company boards to publish the ratio between 
CEO’s pay and the median within the firm180.   
Pay ratios have long been a controversial measure, with its advocates citing the 
potential for the outrage they elicit, to force pay downwards, while its opponents 
argue against its tendency to mislead. Pay ratios were implemented in the U.S via an 
amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, with 2018 being the first year the affected firms 
were required to publish.  It would perhaps be too early to judge the success of the 
measure, however, there is already evidence of its potential to mislead181.  
That said, the possible positive impact cannot be overstated, the effectiveness of pay 
ratios lies in the outrage factor. Disclosures in 2017 suggested a 129:1 ratio between 
CEO pay and that of the average UK employee182.  The government’s response to the 
November 2016 consultation was released in August 2017, there it outlined eight 
reforms, cut across three areas: executive pay, employees and stakeholder 
engagement and corporate governance within large private firms in the UK183.  
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Concerning the issue of pay, amongst the three reforms dedicated to the latter, was 
the introduction of a mandatory requirement for companies over a certain size limit 
to publish pay ratios. This provision was passed into law in July 2018 via the Companies 
(Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulation 2018, it required quoted companies with more 
than 250 UK employees to publish annually the ratio of their CEO’s pay to the median, 
25th and 75th percentile of their UK workforce. The regulation also requires firms to 
include as part of their reporting, a narrative showing how the ratio had changed from 
year to year, with an explanation for the reason behind these changes184.  
The stated intent behind this requirement, is the need “to give shareholders a new 
tool to assess whether, and how, pay at the top of quoted companies is consistent with 
pay and incentives throughout the company, rather than to compare pay ratios 
between different companies or prescribe ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ratios”185. Furthermore, 
quoted companies would be required to report on how share price growth impacts 
executive pay. The reason for this, is to allow shareholders consider the way share 
price movements over given performance cycles affect the quantum of executive pay. 
As well as to encourage the exercise of discretion by those in charge of pay setting, to 
avoid “mechanistic pay outcomes”186. 
The initial government proposal to enact a pay ratio mandate, was released following 
collaborative research by the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development and the 
High Pay centre, showing the breadth of the CEO-worker pay disparity. What impact 
the above revelation had on the government’s decision is unclear, but it would not be 
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taking liberties, to suggest some correlation. This perhaps best demonstrates the 
outrage factor pay ratio disclosures and the potential to make executive pay fairer. 
When properly implemented, pay ratios could have one of two effects: it could either 
force companies to reduce executive pay levels to limit the disparity or cause a wage 
increase for lower level employees. The latter was the approach adopted by a global 
financial services institution187. 
The reason for the reforms to executive pay-as part of the wider slew of governance 
reforms-was the “concerns about social justice as much as (if not more than) from 
concerns about the effective management of companies”188. It is believed in some 
quarters, that high pay differentials between CEOs and non-executive employees 
could affect productivity both in the long and short term189. The costliness of high pay 
differentials is manifested, when employees become convinced of the inequitable pay 
distribution. Which could cause them to shirk or tail off, lead to high turnover-due to 
employees seeking employment in firms they believe have a more equitable 
distribution of resources or may lead to costly industrial action190.  
In contrast, some research suggests high differentials have no significant impact on 
employee productivity levels191. Faleye et al reduce this non-significance to the fact 
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that most lower level employees are uninformed of the true level of disparity. That in 
the instances where there are informed, particularly in larger firms, they often feel the 
level of executive compensation is commensurate with the responsibilities they have 
within the firm192. Accordingly, pay differentials bear a greater significance in smaller 
firms with higher levels of skilled employees. The differential, in these cases, is said to 
have an incentivizing effect193. 
With the proposed legislation mandating pay ratios said to come into effect in 2018, 
time would tell what sort of impact it would have on pay at either end of the 
distribution scale. The somewhat moderate success of the changes introduced by the 
ERRA 2013 in terms of the way it galvanised shareholder activism, gives cause for some 
optimism. We would undoubtedly be able to judge more accurately in the years 
following the implementation of the measure. 
 
5.12.3 Employee Engagement on Pay Decisions: Having Employees Represented on 
the Remuneration Committees 
Although, Regulation 13 of the Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 
2018, calls for greater stakeholder engagement, with an emphasis on employee, the 
law however stops short of prescribing a direct means by which this could be attained. 
The government had initially discussed the inclusion of workers on company boards, 
this requirement was however jettisoned from the published proposals in November 
2016194. While the government’s initial remarks were welcomed by employee and 
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trade unions, the business community had rejected the implementation of employee 
representation as a compulsory measure. To this end, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) called for the maintenance of the unitary board system195.  
The government’s proposals to improve employee engagement in corporate 
governance, were applied via revisions to the Corporate Governance Code. The 2018 
iteration of the Code set out the means by which this could be attained, which could 
be through one or more of the following: 
 a non-executive director designated to represent employee views; 
 a formal employee advisory council; or 
 a director from the workforce196 
These, as with all the Code’s provisions are voluntary and only implemented on a 
comply or explain basis. As such companies are not required to adhere, provided they 
have valid reasons for not doing so. Furthermore, a company’s adherence to the 
provisions is unlikely to dramatically alter the status quo, due to the advisory nature 
of the proposed measures. 
This Chapter proposes a mandatory requirement to have employees not only 
represented on company boards, but also within the process of executive pay setting. 
It is the argument here; that employee engagement would represent a further step 
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towards the goal of executive pay reform and enhance the fairness of the same. This 
argument is supported by empirical evidence from jurisdictions which mandate board 
level employee representation197. 
The foremost example of this is the German system of co-determination. This 
governance model requires companies with 2,000 or more employees to operate a 
dual-board system: have a management board consisting of executive directors and 
chaired by the CEO, and a supervisory board, made of employee and shareholder 
representatives. The system is intended to improve worker participation in the 
governance process, by encouraging the “equal participation of shareholders and 
employees in a firm’s decision making and shall complement the economic legitimacy 
of a firm’s management with a social one”198.  
The supervisory board is charged with the nomination and appointment of the 
management board, has oversight over the latter’s activities and helps determine 
executive pay199. Employee influence in these co-determined boards varies with the 
company size. The quasi-parity system applies to large firms-with a minimum of 2,000 
employees and requires that employees make up 50 per cent of the supervisory board. 
The system requires that the chairman-usually a shareholder representative-is given 
                                                            
197 Research shows that board level employee representation often leads to higher wage levels for 
ordinary works ans overall lower levels of income disparity between managers and the ordinary 
employees. See Felix Horisch ‘The Macro-Economic Effect of Co-determination on Income Equality’. 
Working Paper No. 147, 2012, available at < https://www.mzes.uni-
mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-147.pdf>. Also see, Bennet Berger and Elena Vaccarino 
‘Codetermination in Germany – a role model for the UK and the US?’ Bruegel Blog Post, October 13, 
2016. Available at < http://bruegel.org/2016/10/codetermination-in-germany-a-role-model-for-the-
uk-and-the-us/> (accessed on 06/08/2018). 
198 Ibid. 
199 Katharina Dyballa and Kornelius Kraft ‘Does Codetermination Affect the Composition of Variable 
Versus Fixed Parts of Executive Compensation? - An Empirical Analysis for Listed Companies in 






an extra vote in in the event of a tie. For companies with less than 2,000 employees, 
one-third co-determination applies, where employees form a 33 per cent of the 
supervisory board. 
The benefits of this system of governance range from increased productivity, greater 
long-term investment and better monitoring of the executive200. Studies show 
employees share an interest in the long-term sustainability of firm growth, just like 
shareholders. However, most relevant to this discussion is its impact on executive pay 
levels and one study shows a direct correlation between board level employee 
representation and lower executive compensation201. Vitols found a negative 
relationship between stock option use and dual-board system, with this limited 
utilisation of equity-based compensation leading to lower levels of CEO pay. Also, 
Dyballa and Kraft found a greater performance-sensitivity of executive pay, in firms 
with co-determined boards202.  
Although CEO pay has grown substantially over the last two decades, the pace appears 
sluggish when compared with the growth rate in places like the U.S203. The reason for 
this could be attributed to the high degree of employee representation in the pay 
setting process, where have a major say in the approval of pay proposals.  Hence, 
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Berger and Vaccarino, state that countries with a co-determined board system, have 
a higher degree of income equality204. 
Attempts at enhancing the fairness of executive pay must focus on improving the 
transparency and accountability of the pay setting process. Increasing the 
representation of employees as board level, represents a means by which, the latter 
could be attained. It also goes the beyond the voluntarism and advisory nature of that 
prescribed by the Corporate Governance Code. It is the argument here, that the 
failures within the Anglo-American corporate governance framework, allow managers 
substantially influence the board as well as the pay setting process. That greater board 
level employee engagement and participation in pay setting, would present a 
substantial check on these powers and stop the CEO-worker pay gap from getting any 
larger. As workers would generally have an interest in keeping the disparity between 
theirs and managerial pay as moderate as possible205. 
Evidence from Germany suggests a co-determinative board system as having a 
sobering impact on executive pay levels. It is not conclusive however, that lower levels 
of executive pay in dual board systems like Germany, are a direct consequence of the 
governance system. As Vitols notes, it is almost impossible to draw a conclusive causal 
link between employee representation on boards, given the difficulty in controlling for 
“country-specific effects”206. Factors such as a low tolerance for excessive levels of 
inequality, which may prevent executive pay from getting to levels which are 
normative in the UK, amongst other places. 
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5.12.4. Executive Pay Caps: An Unthinkable Proposition? 
There are valid arguments that could be made for the implementation of pay caps. 
Aside from its apparent restrictive nature, which goes against the free market ideology 
upon which Anglo-American corporate governance rests, properly implemented 
mandated pay caps could help make executive pay fairer. The composition of 
executive pay, shows a substantial portion of total pay is performance-based207. This 
latter fact, basically lifts the ceiling on how much executives could earn, provided it 
could be justified by a corresponding rise in performance.  
There is however, precedent for this, as provided by the Israeli legislature’s institution 
of pay limits of 44:1 for the highest earners within the nation’s financial sector. The 
law also set limits on total pay-both variable and fixed-with a punitive tax rate for sums 
exceeding the set limits. The law also took the unprecedented step of placing an 
absolute limit on salaries, benchmarked to the growth of the lowest wages208. In the 
Israeli version however, these mandated limits on pay were restricted to the financial 
sector. 
The successful implementation of pay caps, would depend largely on the socio-
economic climate within the affected jurisdiction. Switzerland for instance-a country 
which proposed but failed to implement mandated caps to executive pay-has an 
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economy which thrives on foreign investment. Th country is one of world’s foremost 
financial centres and having one of the lowest corporate and income tax rates in the 
developed world209. It ranks in the top 5 for equality in income distribution and citizen 
happiness indices210. The measure failed there, due largely to fears it might lead to 
flight of foreign capital investment and a talent drain211. The statistics suggest a 
citizenry not quite as bothered by high executive pay, given the relative prosperity in 
within which it largely subsists. 
The conditions preceding the implementation of caps in Israel, where remarkably 
different. Recent OECD figures show Israel as having some of the highest income 
inequality rates, alongside the U.S212, where banker’s wages prior to the mandated cap 
stood at around 70 times the average wage213. As such in 2016, the parliament (the 
Knesset) proposed and subsequently passed a law setting wage limits above which 
would be subject to a tax penalty and a salary cap at just over £460,000 or 44 times 
the lowest salary. The pay cap followed previous attempts at curbing high executive 
wages which included corporate governance reforms by way of an amendment to the 
Companies Act, requiring pay be more clearly linked to performance. The results were 
modest, prompting the government to adopt the more controversial pay caps, via a 
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unanimous parliamentary vote of 56-0214. Unfortunately, the law was not so 
unanimously well received, with some commentators decrying the potential effects 
on the business and financial sector in its wake215. Whether the impacts would be 
negative, time would tell, but the existence of pay caps in a democratic and reasonably 
free market economy, raises legitimate questions regarding its applicability in Anglo-
America.  
Such an intrusive measure could be justified by the consideration of executive pay as 
an issue of public policy. As highlighted in earlier portions of the thesis, the 
externalities of high executive pay, strengthen the arguments for a public policy 
interventionist approach216. While previous attempts at reform have largely left action 
to the markets, the latter consideration would lay the groundwork for the sort of direct 
intervention that mandated pay limits represent. 
  Arguments that the solutions to unjustifiably high executive pay should be left to the 
market and investors to resolve, start to bear very little weight. Instances like the 
Carillion Plc example, where dividends are paid out to shareholders, by companies in 
the throes of insolvency could be resolved by the implementation of pay caps217. The 
institution of pay caps may encourage executives to pursue the enhancement of long 
term value, as against irrational and unsustainable governance measures. 
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As noted by the Parliamentary Committee investigating the Carillion collapse, the 
anomalous pay practices that preceded the firm’s failure, were a symptom of a 
dysfunctional corporate culture and were by no means isolated to Carillion218.  The 
reports cited the government as having a role to play in the reordering of corporate 
culture, and in the tightening of regulations to ensure directors take seriously their 
s.172 duties. It is the strongly held opinion that the implementation of pay caps, 
provides a viable option and one to be seriously considered.  
Over a century ago, JP Morgan stated his bank would refrain from investing in 
companies whose CEO earned more than 20 times the lowest wage, as that was 
evidence of the CEOs self-interestedness219. Considering the current CEO of the bank 
he built earned roughly 364 times the median wage within the bank, one would be 
curious to know what his thoughts were on that220. His comments suggest however, 
that businesses are not incapable of pursuing an egalitarian ethos, it might require the 
intervention of the state to help rediscover that. 
 
5.13. Conclusion 
The non-interventionist approach adopted by the Anglo-American courts, which 
manifests itself as a codified Business Judgement Rule in the U.S and a general 
deference to managerial expertise in the UK, has important implications to the 
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executive pay debate. In a system wherein there appears to be little clarity on what 
fair compensation for the highest paid executives in the largest public companies, 
should constitute, has not been helped by the failure of the judiciary to lend its opinion 
to the debate. 
In a situation where there are no clear determinants of what could be determined to 
be excessive compensation or if it is just for CEO pay to exceed the organisational 
average by 129:1. Existing case law on the issue would in theory provide a frame of 
reference for those charged with trying to make pay fairer. In the absence of the latter-
despite several opportunities to do so-it falls on the legislature to take the needed 
steps. 
Required to so this would be corporate governance rules that state clearly what the 
metrics of fair executive compensation should be. Which could take the form of a pay 
ratio mandate or the more drastic pay caps. The legislative climate and the almost 
intersectional relationship between political institutions and business community, 
leaves little optimism on whether the political will exists to adopt these measures.  
It is undeniable however, the political relevance of the issue, given its impact to on 
income distribution in Anglo-America. The wide gap between CEO pay and average 
earnings both within and without the corporation raises legitimate concerns, with 
regards to the extent to which corporate greed impacts the fabric of society. With the 
courts thus far failing to take leadership on the issue and the political will to take 
meaningful action lacking, one of the more outrage-worthy issues of the modern era, 







 The Justice of High Executive Pay:  A Summary  
6.1. Conclusion 
The objective of the thesis, is to determine whether current levels of executive 
compensation are justifiable and fair. To highlight this, the thesis examined executive 
pay using Nozick’s theory of entitlement, whereby he posits that outcomes would be 
considered just when they arise through “justice preserving means”1.  Applying this 
thought process, to the executive compensation issue, the thesis adopted a two-part 
approach, which required an evaluation of high pay by examining the purity of the pay 
setting process on the first part, followed by a context-based evaluation, which leaned 
heavily on the social impact of executive pay i.e. its effect or potential effect on income 
distribution.   
Therefore, the thesis sought to answer two basic research questions;  
Did possible compromises in the pay setting process render high executive pay unjust? 
Even if executive pay passes the first test, is it rendered unjust, via its sheer size, and 
disparate impact on income distribution? 
To create a platform for some of the arguments made within, the thesis began in 
Chapter Two, by considering whether executive pay could be treated as a public policy 
                                                            
1 Which according to Nozick, are distributions which originate from a just situation and whose 
“repeated transitions”, either through acquisition or transfer, adhere to the demands of justice. 





issue, allowing for a statist intervention of some sort. To answer this question, it was 
prudent to first determine what sort of institution the firm could be regarded as i.e. is 
it to be regarded as a private (one which is solely profit-oriented in its outlook and 
exists for the benefit of its members) or wholly public institution (one with a more 
generalised approach to its governance, which countenances the interests of the 
community it inhabits).  A firm which is wholly private would have its affairs 
determined strictly within market structures, being excluded from the purview of 
public policy, this would apply as well, to its compensatory tendencies. on the other 
hand, the contemplation of the firm as a public institution, would allow for its affairs 
to be subject to public policy dictates and create the ideological platform for 
intervention in the public’s interest.  These arguments are particularly relevant to the 
research questions because, the consideration of the firm as a wholly private 
institution, would render a debate about the justice of executive pay irrelevant. If we 
argue that the implications of high CEO pay are the company’s concern only, it then 
becomes irrelevant discussing issue with the pay setting process or the distributive 
consequences of high pay. The Chapter is also relevant to the discussions regarding 
reform highlighted in Chapter Five, as it would be unnecessary and for the state to 
intervene in issues which are of a wholly private nature2.  
In Chapter Two, the thesis highlighted arguments which favour a single minded, 
shareholder-centric view to corporate governance, in contrast to the more pluralistic 
approach. While the former originates from a view of the corporation as simply a 
profit-oriented entity devoid of any social responsibility, the latter sees the 
                                                            





corporation as inter-woven within the social fabric, with its activities touching almost 
every facet of society by way of externalities. Hence, the latter fact ensures that the 
firm bears a responsibility to those whose well-being it impacts. This becomes relevant 
when we consider the externalities of high executive pay, considered in Chapter Four, 
including rising income inequality3. The conclusions in Chapter Two, favoured the 
argument for the firm as a public institution and by implication, executive pay as 
subject to the dictates of public policy. 
The thesis proceeded in Chapter Three, to answer the first research question, by an 
examination of the pay setting process, using Nozick’s theory of entitlement as a 
measure of its fitness in ensuring a just outcome. The thesis examined three of the 
common arguments and theories regarding the setting of executive pay, which were 
classed into two defined categories. Agency Theory and the Arm’s length Bargaining 
argument, which fall within the mainstream view on compensation setting and the 
managerial interference/ board capture theory on executive pay setting, categorised 
under the alternative view of pay setting4.  
A recognition of the interest conflict managers faced, necessitated a rethink of 
managerial compensation methods. Therefore, a compensation strategy which sought 
to incentivise shareholder value and simultaneously recognised the inherently flawed 
humanity of the corporate manager became requisite. Pay for performance, the need 
to closely align managerial wealth to firm performance emerged as the most viable 
way to counter-balance the managerial conflict of interest5. Closely linked to agency 
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theory, is the arm’s length or optimal contracting view of compensation, premised on 
the ideal that managerial incentives are negotiated and structured to optimise output. 
By a management board, whose only interest is increasing shareholder value. 
Therefore, as the optimal contracting view argues, CEO pay results from negotiations 
at arm’s length, which largely base pay on performance. As such, high executive pay is 
fair because it results from efficient processes6. 
6.1.1. Research Question One: Analysing the Pay Setting Process 
As was mentioned in Chapter Three, where both arguments diverge is in the notion 
that high executive pay is; (a) the result of intensive negotiations between managers 
and a disinterested board and (b) and the notion of negotiations carried out at arm’s 
length.  Managerial influence/Board Capture theorists, like Bebchuk, hoist a counter-
argument to the mainstream view of pay negotiations being an adversarial affair or of 
shareholder value enhancement being the main thrust of these negotiations. 
Accordingly, pay negotiations are sullied by compromise, owed largely to the vestiges 
of prior relationships or the need to forge mutually beneficial alliances between 
individual board members and the CEO7. Furthered by implicit cognitive biases, 
whereby directors, most of whom are highly paid themselves, are non-cognizant of 
the concerns high pay packets would normally provoke. This is not unrelated to the 
fact that directors are mostly men of means themselves and beneficiaries of similar 
largesse8.  
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The alternative view rejects the mainstream argument that high executive pay is pay 
for performance and argues that its fairness is limited by failings within the pay setting 
process 9. The argument therein therefore, was whether the pay-setting process meets 
the standards of a legitimate process set out by Nozick as a precondition for a just 
outcome. The issues with the process highlighted above, as discussed within the 
Chapter, seem to suggest that the answer to the stated question would be in the 
negative. These failures, which are inherent and arise from the governance framework 
in place within Anglo-American firms, create conditions which are less than ideal, if 
the standard were a process unsullied by compromise.  
Further arguments against the pay for performance premise, is the quite common 
practice of artificially ratcheting CEO pay to accord with comparator averages, known 
as benchmarking. This argument is backed by figures which show this as a widely 
utilised approach adopted by remuneration committees in CEO pay setting amongst 
the larger firms10. As noted by Shin, upward ratcheting of pay is more likely in firms 
with significant corporate governance shortcomings, such as firms having a captured 
board, or with entrenched CEOs who might also chair the board11. In Chapter Three, it 
was argued, admitting that although instances where CEOs influence pay decisions 
might be in the minority, a handful of pay decisions that result from compromised 
processes exacerbates the effect this might have. There this thesis highlighted figures 
which showed the most referenced companies in compensation making. With the 
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most referenced 62 times in 201312. Assuming this referenced pay award had it self 
been due to managerial influence and hence unfair and unjust, it follows therefore 
that the other pay awards, which were determined while referencing this flawed 
award, would have been determined based on flawed standards.  
Nozick’s process-oriented thesis requires the acquisition and transfer of income to be 
by means where the justice of the outcome is without question. Nozick therefore, is 
unconcerned by inequalities, provided the process which produced such, are just. it 
goes without saying therefore, that even the potential for compromise would be 
unacceptable in absolute terms. To suggest that basing the income of one executive 
on the earnings of another regardless of desert, is indeed a just way of determining 
executive pay, would be to negate the very essence of Nozick’s entitlement theory. 
 
6.1.2. Research Question Two: Putting High Executive Pay into Context 
Chapter Four was intended to answer the second research question and required a 
context-based analysis of high pay, which focused on its impact within a wider social 
context13. As argued by Nozick, everything obtained through justice preserving means 
is inherently just, regardless of the size of the outcome. Therefore, a positive answer 
to the first research question would normally obviate the need for the second. The 
thesis however disagreed with that assumption and argued in Chapter Four-utilising 
Rawls’ theory-the the justice of the outcome could not be conclusive, until its impact 
was determined. Believing that outcomes could only be regarded as just, when they 
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functioned to the benefit of all in society, coming to the inevitable conclusion that 
outcomes that produce inequalities, were in themselves unjust, unless those 
inequalities bettered the lot of the least in society14. Thereby rendering the justice of 
the process irrelevant. 
Utilising the Rawlsian principle, the thesis proceeded to show the negative 
externalities of high executive compensation. Externalities like, the increasing 
adoption of advanced technologies by companies in production and service provision, 
increasing globalisation as well as devices to consolidate corporate power. Admittedly 
technological advancement and globalisation may have been naturally occurring 
phenomena, not necessarily devised by corporations for financial gain. That said, these 
have been fully utilised by corporations in a bid to optimize productivity. Approaching 
this with a focus on profitability is important, because firm performance, at least in 
principle, is the most significant determinant of executive pay, in the light of the 
increasing use of equity-based incentives for CEOs15. Such that, CEO and shareholder 
value are as intricately aligned now, as they have ever been. Making shareholder value 
maximisation a pursuit for CEOs, having more than mere reputational or legacy related 
consequences, but consequential to her personal fortune. Therefore, with wages 
normally constituting a significant portion of a firms operating expense, keeping the 
latter at a minimum becomes essential to maximise profits and pay. Wage suppression 
appears to be the intent underlying normative practices such as offshoring and 
production outsourcing to low wage locations.   
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As was argued in Chapter Four, the adoption and utilisation of advanced technologies 
in production and service provision, have been effective tools in constricting the 
bargaining powers of the Anglo-American worker16. With almost no leverage to 
bargain with, workers are forced to accept low paying jobs, demands for better pay 
and conditions are often met with veiled threats of relocating sites to low wage 
countries17.  
The foundations for the current regime of suppressed wages were laid in the 1980s, 
where, a wave of neoliberalism began to swell in the U.S and UK, preceding a shift to 
shareholder wealth maximization. Making shareholder value the stated goal of 
economic success, made it needful to eliminate all obstacles, to its realisation. Leading 
to the systematic stifling-and eventual neutering of employee unions- aggressive 
rollback of government regulation, particularly for the financial sector, privatisation 
and denationalisation of hitherto state-owned or controlled infrastructure, as well as 
the wholesale adoption of a market mentality18. Under the new neoliberal regime, 
wages were to be determined by market forces, with little or no government 
intervention. As discussed in Chapter One, the pay for performance ideology for 
executives began to proliferate about the same time. Spurred on by government 
policies intended to foster an entrepreneurial spirit amongst corporate executives, as 
a catalyst for economic growth. It is ironic, that whilst leaving wages to the mercy of 
the markets made it subject to downward pressure, executive compensation however, 
began to enjoy an unprecedented rise19. It is almost impossible to ignore the 
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correlation between wage increases for executives and corresponding stagnation for 
ordinary workers or to ignore theories that suggest a cause-effect relationship there.  
 To determine its justice, the thesis then analysed executive pay, using the second 
Rawls’s two principles of justice. Wherein, Rawls asserts that unequal outcomes are 
only just, when they are “attached to offices open to all - equality of opportunity - and 
work to the “benefit of the least in society”20. Relating the first part to high executive 
pay, renders the latter justifiable, only when “citizens with the same talents and 
willingness to use them have the same educational and economic opportunities 
regardless of whether they were born rich or poor”21.  
In Chapter Four, the thesis discussed the potential for elitism and cronyism in CEO and 
NED appointments. Citing government statistics that show a disproportionate number 
of CEO and company directors in the UK as alumni of elite educational institutions 
when measured on a per capita basis22. Figures like these, suggest that executive 
positions are not necessarily accessible to all with the skills, qualifications or 
willingness to function within those roles. Suggesting a potential for exclusivity, which 
in conclusion renders the undue rewards and resulting inequalities unjust, according 
Rawls’s theory.  
Regarding the second part of the Rawlsian principle, that the inequalities must work 
to the benefit of the least in society to be fair, otherwise known as the difference 
principle. The difference principle requires social institutions to be ordered in a 
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manner whereby those who inhabit the lower strata of the income distribution 
framework, benefit from the uneven distributions of wealth and income23. Here, the 
spirit of the principle argues against the justice of current pay levels. As there is simply 
no evidence that high executive pay works for the benefit of the poorest in our 
societies and much evidence to the contrary in fact.  
Furthermore, the absence of redistributive policies-like tax regimes that retain a 
substantial portion of the highest incomes, which help reduce the disparities in wealth 
and well-being-are inadequate and severely compromised. Such that the wealthiest 
can circumvent the legislative requirements with relative ease, as recent revelations 
suggest24. The difference principle also forbids the wealthiest to increase their 
earnings at the expense of the least well-off. Given, the stagnation of wages of 
ordinary working people has had a bolstering effect on executive-due in part to the its 
correlation to firm performance-provides another indication that high executive pay 
fails to meet the justice requirement. 
Finally, in Chapter Four the thesis highlighted one of the main arguments in support of 
current pay levels, that high pay was necessary to attract and retain the best talent. 
Suggesting that high pay was not due to rent-seeking, but rather pay for talent. The 
thesis also mentioned that there was a similar justification for the premiums paid to 
other similarly compensated individuals, falling within a broadly defined category of 
Entertainers, Athletes and other Superstars (EAOS). This evidences the fetishization of 
talent as worthy of very high premiums. But this undue worship is in discord with the 
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difference principle, which generally treats talent or “natural endowments” as 
undeserved, and as such talented individuals are not entitled to a larger share of the 
income distribution as compensation, regardless of the demand on their talent. 
Given the contextual nature of the second question, executive pay would only be just 
if when placed against an analysis of its social impact, it could be concluded to be 
better rather than worse for society. The pay setting process begins when 
performance metrics are set by the remuneration committee, the onus then is upon 
the benefitting executive to meet the criteria set, to earn the consequential rewards. 
The strategies employed by the said executive-CEO in this case-to meet these criteria 
is just as important as the size of the reward itself.  
Therefore, evaluating corporate strategy becomes key in determining the justice of 
CEO rewards. As such, where CEOs oversee strategic decisions where a company opts 
for automation and production outsourcing, where these culminate in rewards which 
are multiple times the average, the justice of the latter would be rightly called into 
question. The pervasive practices adopted by companies to maximise profits, while 
leading to higher wages for the CEOs, have had the opposite effect on ordinary wages. 
Wages began to stagnate, about the time executive compensation began to explode. 
There is a strong argument for a correlation between high executive pay and wage 
stagnation for ordinary workers and income inequality. Evidenced by figures which 
show CEOs wage growth constituting a significant two-thirds of the income captured 
by the highest earners in both the UK and U.S25. After all, the Lockean proviso 
maintains that an appropriation of a common resource could only be justified provided 
                                                            





there is “enough and as good, left in common for others”26. Given that CEO pay 
constitutes not only a larger portion of company profits, but of national income, 
creating a situation whereby a small subset of earners captures a larger share of the 
income distribution, with majority having to make do with a lot less than they should. 
To conclude, regardless of the justice of the pay setting process-and the evidence 
suggests it is compromised-the fact that pay has risen at the expense of overall 
prosperity, makes it unjust. 
 
 
6.2 How CEO Pay Could Be Made Fairer? 
In Chapter Five, the thesis attempted to discuss the ways in which executive pay could 
be made fairer. The Chapter discussed the judiciary as well as the role stricter 
legislation could play in attaining the said goal. There, the thesis discussed the 
historical reluctance of the Anglo-American courts to interfere in corporate 
governance in general, with a focus on executive pay issues. This reluctance is founded 
on a principle of non-intervention, with has its origin in the common law27. This 
principle of non-interference is codified in the U.S - amongst other jurisdictions -as the 
Business Judgment Rule. The absence of a codified version of the rule in the UK, has 
not precluded the courts from adopting an attitude of deference to director’s business 
judgement. 
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There are however certain exceptions to this principle in executive compensation 
cases; in instances where compensation has been challenged as a waste of corporate 
assets and where high pay is challenged for being unfairly prejudicial. These exceptions 
apply in the U.S and UK respectively. In these cases, the courts would be required to 
examine the rationale behind the compensation decisions to determine the 
justiciability of the latter. With corporate waste cases, this responsibility would be 
triggered once the applicant meets the threshold known as the demand 
requirement28.  
In the UK, the courts would be required to examine compensation decisions when a 
minority member alleges that the decision to compensate to the stated quantum 
would be detrimental to her interests as a member. As discussed, particularly with 
corporate waste cases, the threshold for judicial intervention i.e. the onerous nature 
of the demand requirement, often prejudices the success of these cases. Acting almost 
as a further shield for directors from the glare of judicial review, this is supported by 
the dismal returns in terms of the success of these legal challenges against 
compensation deemed to be excessive29. The Chapter argued, that given the failure of 
the judiciay to make a meaningful contribution to the executive pay debate, that the 
courts could not be relied upon in the efforts to make pay fairer. The Chapter 
proceeded therefore to consider other measures by which the stated goal could be 
attained, highlighting legislative reform as potentially the most effective tool. 
Given the failure of the courts to meaningfully intervene in the executive pay debate, 
the Chapter proceeded to discuss ways legislation could fill the void. The Chapter also 
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considered the recent say on pay enactments in the U.S and the UK and discussed ways 
these could be tightened to heighten their effectiveness. 
 
6.2.1. Say-on-pay in Anglo-America: Having the Desired Impact? 
Furthermore, in Chapter Five, the thesis considered the effectiveness of the existing 
say-on-pay legislation. Looking at provisions within the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013 and its American equivalent, the Dodd-Frank Act 2010. With the 
former, the say-on-pay provisions are contained in S.79, which- an amendment to the 
Companies Act 2006 per s.439-in summary mandates an annual vote on the director’s 
remuneration report and a vote on the company’s remuneration policy for directors 
every three years. 
The provision is intended to make remuneration fairer, by increasing the 
accountability of directors to shareholders, encouraging greater engagement by giving 
shareholders a say on remuneration. The provision is also intended to improve the 
transparency of compensation, by improving reporting to shareholders, to aid their 
voting decision, all in a bid “to promote best practice on pay-setting”30. The advantages 
of s.79 were highlighted in a recent article31.  
However, the success of the Act would be determined by its effect on executive pay 
levels in the UK. As discussed in Chapter Five, some of the signs have been 
encouraging. Since its enactment in 2013, UK corporate governance has witnessed a 
continuation of the wave of shareholder activism, which greeted the passing of the 
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Directors Remuneration Report Regulation 2002, which required an advisory vote by 
shareholders. Since 2012 there has been a sustained effort by shareholder disgruntled 
by executive excess, at expressing their displeasure. Marked by an increasing number 
of dissenting votes against remuneration reports and policies, peaking in 2017 when a 
reported 3 percent of remuneration proposals were voted down-by more than 50 
percent of the voting shareholders32. Figures have also shown a reduction in average 
executive pay in the FTSE 100, by a reported 17 per cent in 2016, although the median 
remained constant. The decline was due largely to sizeable reductions in pay for some 
of the highest earners within the index, which could be attributed to severe 
shareholder opposition33. 
These obvious signs of improvement do not obviate the need for more stringent action 
to be taken, to on the one hand make pay fairer, but also to bridge the CEO-worker 
wealth gap. As noted in Chapter Five, although the dip in 2016 pay levels saw the gap 
shrink from 148:1 to 129:1, the latter still represents a substantial earnings disparity.  
The modest returns perhaps call into question the wisdom of centring reform on 
increased shareholder engagement. Despite improvements in shareholder activism, 
figures still show a startling amount of abstentions from compensation-related votes, 
which suggest that the Act may have failed to catalyse the higher levels of engagement 
it was intended to34. There is a myriad of reasons, for this apparent disengagement 
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with regards to remuneration proposals, which could include the relative costs of 
engagement, as well as the complexity of remuneration reports-which could be 
complex and not easily understandable35. 
It may suggest that the shareholding body in its current form is ill-equipped to carry 
the burden of making executive pay fairer, due to its composition and largely dispersed 
nature. To this point, it is telling that similar say on pay provisions in the U.S have 
produced comparably lukewarm returns36.  
In exploring ways to make the current regime better, the Chapter discussed the 
possibility of an annual binding vote on the firm’s remuneration policy as against the 
current requirement for a tri-annual vote. This measure was briefly explored by the UK 
government’s pay reform initiative, contained amongst proposals released by the 
Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in its Green Paper on 
Corporate Governance Reform in November 2016. The paper proposed the idea of a 
binding annual vote “on all or some elements of executive pay”, because shareholders 
might be better engaged with the issues, if they believed their votes were more likely 
to effect a change37.   
The proposal was not widely well received; some of the challenges centred on the 
likelihood for annual binding votes to cause uncertainty amongst directors in the UK, 
as well as negatively impact the ability of UK companies to attract the best global 
talent. There, the thesis explored possible variations to the proposal, which could 
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include limiting the vote to just the performance-related aspects of pay. Giving 
shareholders an annual say on the firm’s remuneration policy, may constitute an 
effective means of ensuring that pay is made commensurate to performance in the 
short term and have longer term consequences on its fairness. Furthermore, the 
modest strides taken in closing the CEO-worker pay gap, could be reduced further, as 
directors whose pay policies were rejected by shareholders may be forced to carefully 
consider pay proposals in a bid to avoid the negative publicity and embarrassment of 
subsequent no votes. It is the position of this thesis, that despite the protestations of 
some, an annual binding vote would ultimately do more good than harm to efforts 
intended to make executive pay more equitable. 
Furthermore, in Chapter Five, the thesis discussed the institution of pay ratios as a 
mandatory requirement for companies. while highlighting the controversial nature of 
the proposed measure, it was mentioned therein that pay ratios had already become 
mandatory for large firms in the U.S38. A similar undertaken was proposed in the UK in 
2017, with the government placing before parliament draft legislation to that effect in 
June 2018. The measure which was passed within The Companies (Miscellaneous 
Reporting) Regulations 2018, called for the setting out of the ratio of CEO pay to that 
of the companies average UK employees39. This measure is intended to apply only to 
companies with a minimum of 250 employees within the UK. Where the company in 
question is a parent company, the bill called for the ratio of the CEO to average group 
pay to be published.   
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Given the measure is yet to be implemented, it is difficult to say what its impact would 
be on CEO pay levels. While some interested parties might view the institution of pay 
ratios as a means to apply downward pressure to CEO pay, causing them to either 
oppose or laud the efforts, it is the position of the thesis, that those who view this 
measure in either of those respects miss the point. Although pay ratios may yet have 
the effect of curbing the growth or reducing current pay levels, however, for the 
measure to be successful that should not be the intent. The appropriate intent should 
be to highlight the fairness of current executive pay levels in the UK, and where this is 
found to be wanting, encourage the taking of remedial steps. Making executive pay 
fairer exceeds a mere consideration of CEO pay, but rather the latter in comparison to 
average earnings in the CEOs immediate habitation. While publishing pay ratios may 
force directors to reconsider how much CEOs earn, it may also have the more positive 
effect of catalysing a wage rise across the board. The measure would be credited as 
successful if it eventually leads to the slimming of the CEO-worker wealth gap. This 
would be true, regardless of a reduction from the current level of CEO pay. 
Similar consideration was given to the inclusion of employees to company boards and 
their involvement in the setting of executive pay40. The Chapter considered the system 
of co-determination which is a staple within German corporate governance as well as 
other parts of the globe. The argument was made that board level employee 
representation, could be a means to increase the efficiency of the pay setting process 
and the fairness of the outcome. This view is supported by figures which show higher 
                                                            





levels of income equality in jurisdictions which mandate employee board-level 
representation41. 
 
6.2.2. Executive Pay Caps: An Unthinkable Proposition? 
Closely linked to the pay ratio debate, is the issue of mandatory pay caps. Would the 
imposition of pay caps be in the interest of fairness? The answer to the above question 
would be determined by one’s attitude towards wealth disparities.  
The Greek philosopher Plato once remarked that the wealthiest should never earn 
better than five times the value of the lowest incomes42. It may be contended that 
Plato’s assertion, stems from a recognition of the need to value labour, with pay, which 
is a key indicator of how an organisation values said individual. Studies show pay 
disparities influence how workers rate the importance of their role within the 
company, with regards to their superiors43. With morale further dampened, when 
disparities in pay suggest inequity in the way pay is determined44.  
In Chapter Five the thesis discussed the implementation of pay caps in Anglo-America, 
citing the recent passing of a similar measure in Israel as a template. While the 
discussion in the erstwhile Chapter focused on implementation in a theoretical sense, 
here the thesis would seek to expand on this discussion and explore the functionality 
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of pay caps, as well as some of the arguments which would usually be made against its 
implementation. 
 
6.2.4. The Implementation of CEO Pay Caps: Hard or Soft Ceilings? 
One of the strongest arguments against the implementation of CEO pay caps is the 
way it inhibits the variability of CEO pay. In an economic system where prices are 
thought to be market-driven, artificial restrictions on the quantum of CEO pay would 
run in stark contrast to this central tenet. However, pay caps are not an entirely foreign 
concept to the Anglo-American system. In the U.S for instance, the S.162 of the IRC set 
the limits for tax deductibility for executive compensation at $1m45. More recently the 
federal government placed a hard cap of $500,000 for executives, of firms receiving 
government assistance, with very limited success however46. Although these prior 
attempts had a limited scope, they could in fact provide a framework for future 
attempts at a more expansive approach to limiting pay.  
The issue of hard pay caps was addressed as part of the Hutton Review of Fair Pay in 
the Public Sector, where in contemplating the feasibility of a hard cap within the UK 
public sector of 20:1, it was concluded “that a hard cap would be inoperable across a 
diverse public-sector workforce”, because they do not accord with the principles of 
fairness and just desert47.  Although the review failed to see the merit in instituting 
caps for public sector executives-or even private sector for that matter-it may not 
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however be conclusive of what the general attitude is within the country. A survey 
from 1999, showed the public believed the highest earner should be paid no more 
than 6.25 times the lowest paid48. It is unlikely that this would be any different today, 
given current attitudes towards the wealthy elite. 
State mandated pay caps have been in place for executives in parts of the developed 
world. The French for instance have capped pay for executives within state-owned 
corporations at 20:149. While the German government capped the salaries of 
executives of firms receiving state assistance at 500,000 Euros50. More recently the 
European Union passed The Capital Requirement Directives IV, to which it appended a 
cap on variable remuneration for executives at continents largest banks51. Accordingly, 
bonuses paid are not to surpass a 100 per cent of the executive’s fixed annual 
remuneration. With the directive being of jurisdictional consequence in the UK, by its 
EU membership at the time, the UK government reluctantly adopted these changes, 
following an unsuccessful challenge at the European Court of Justice52. Sceptics have 
declared the law might have the opposite effect, as bankers may find clever ways to 
circumvent its provisions, like ratcheting up fixed annual salaries, to maximise variable 
pay53. 
                                                            
48 John Hills ‘Inequality and State’ (Oxford: OUP, 2004) at 34. 
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50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Alex Barker ‘Osborne gives up on challenge to bank bonus cap’ Ft.com (Nov. 2014). 
53 Evidenced by promises made by Barclays Bank hierarchy to top-up fixed compensation. The 
proposed payments were reportedly to take the form of an allowance in addition to bonus and salary 
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Adopting state mandated caps on executive pay, presents a major issue with regards 
to the form these should take. Do you opt for hard caps, which may not be surpassed, 
or do you set a soft ceiling on pay, that legislates penalties if violated? 
Pay caps were discussed in the recently released Green paper. The paper discussed the 
possibility of “an upper threshold for total annual pay”, to be set out as part of the 
remuneration policy. These limits were not to be externally imposed but would give 
shareholders the option of a binding vote at the company’s general meeting where 
total pay exceeds the predetermined limits54. Pay caps have been well used in the 
sports world for years. they are usually in two forms, hard caps set by the professional 
body, which may not be exceeded and have stiff penalties as a deterrent to violation 
and soft caps, which are not absolute, but may only be exceeded under certain 
circumstances55. 
The U.S legislature had flirted with a soft ceiling on executive pay, when it passed 
S.162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, with well-known results56. It would only make 
sense therefore to adopt a different approach, one perhaps which could involve a hard 
ceiling on executive pay. 
The use is anathema in economies soldered to a free market ideology, where it could 
be argued that hard caps could have motivational consequences on executives, 
leading to a drop, in efficiency and hence shareholder value. Also, like in a lot of 
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instances where restrictive financial measures are proposed, opponents could argue a 
potential exodus of valuable human capital, as a likely fall-out of mandatory pay limits. 
 
 
6.2.4.1 Hard Caps Would Inhibit Firm Efficiency 
It could be argued that limiting how much executives could earn could have serious 
motivational consequences and could affect executive willingness to maximise firm 
performance. Re-introducing the agency problem, pay for performance was meant to 
correct. This argument is however not fool-proof. 
First, it is possible the agency model overestimates the value of performance-based 
compensation. Osterloh and Frey posit that by focusing on monetary incentives to 
maximize CEO performance, agency theory underestimates the value of intrinsic 
motivation-motivation not determined by external circumstances-and in so doing 
could inadvertently suppress intrinsic motivation57. Their theory is predicated on a 
belief that the individual’s motivation is more broadly based, as such certain 
individuals derive utility from the activity in question, or “because they wish to comply 
to given normative standards for their own sake”58. They emphasize the relevance of 
prosocial intrinsic motivation for CEOs, which is a desire to work for the common good, 
and these prosocial behaviours may be maximised if the appropriate institutional 
structures are in place.  
                                                            
57 Bruno S. Frey and Margit Osterloh, ‘Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats’ Journal of 
Management Inquiry, [2005] Vol.14 No.1, 96-111. 





They argue further, that when the institutional structures a geared towards external 
incentives, this could effectively “crowd-out” prior non-external motivation and the 
individuals innate desire to optimise performance for the sake of it. As such they argue 
for fixed salaries, as against variable performance related pay59. 
There are two points that could be derived from Osterloh and Frey’s theory in order 
to strengthen an argument for hard caps. First, if institutional and governance 
structures were rearranged to instead focus on incentivising performance via non-
monetary means, it would harness the intrinsic desire to simply do a proper job and 
to meet set standards for the sake of it. Also, if the mind-set of performance 
optimisation is viewed as one’s duty and thus encultured within the corporate 
zeitgeist, then instituting hard limits on executive should not impact performance as 
much as proponent estimate. 
Further on this point, hard caps which peg executive pay to the lowest incomes within 
the firm, could in fact improve firm efficiency. Given that executives are self-interested 
and rent seeking by nature, means they would naturally find ways to maximise pay 
regardless, as such every increase in CEO pay would trigger a contemporaneous rise in 
average wages. The effect on companywide morale due to pay rises, could trigger 
efficiency gains, as well as the acquisition and retention of talented individuals at mid 
to lower levels of the business60. 
 
                                                            
59 Ibid, 98. 
60 George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen ‘The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment’ The 





6.2.4.2 Pay Caps May lead to Talent Flight 
In Chapter Four, the thesis addressed the issue of talent as a carefully constructed 
narrative to justify outsized executive rewards. Talent retention-particularly rare CEO 
talent- could be touted as an argument against implementing pay limits.  The 
seemingly unfounded concern that setting limits on pay, might on the one hand cause 
talented CEOs to relocate to less regulated environments and on the other hand 
discourage the best and brightest from considering positions, when they otherwise 
might have61. These objections appear to be hasty for the following reasons, 
Firstly, it assumes that CEO decision making is primarily motivated by pay. Although it 
would only seem normal that remuneration would be factored into career decisions, 
it would be remiss to assume it as the overarching factor in those decisions. As shown 
previously, CEOs are motivated by reasons other than-or at least alongside-
remuneration, such as an innate desire to succeed within the chosen field, and the 
reputational consequences that accompany a positive legacy built over many years. 
Secondly, these arguments undermine the logistical difficulties of geographical 
relocation, as well as overestimating CEO mobility. Executives well established within 
a geographical location or environment, might be hard-pressed to relocate to a 
different environment, having built a reputation and a sphere of influence. 
Furthermore, the ability to relocate, is entirely dependent on the availability of similar 
positions in other less regulated environments. Given also, that Anglo-American 
executives rank amongst the highest paid globally, the adoption of pay caps may not 
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inhibit the competitiveness of the total pay, as they currently out-earn most of their 
peers on the continent62.  
Similar objections were raised against the implementation of hard caps in Israel. 
However, it is not proven fact, that Israel is an attractive destination for international 
CEOs, nor is it trite that there currently exists a growing market for Israeli CEO talent, 




6.3. In the Alternative, How About Redistribution? 
Nozick stipulates, that redistribution represents one way of correcting the flaws within 
the distributive process. This results from an acknowledgement of historical injustices 
which may exist within the process of distribution63. Given the thesis’ conclusion that 
high executive pay cannot be justified due to its flawed process of determination, a 
redistributive framework could represent a viable restorative measure. 
one way to do this, would be to institute pay caps via a soft ceiling, i.e. a set limit with 
stated penalties for violation. This would mimic the Israeli model where pay for the 
country’s top bankers was capped at about $652,000 or 44 times the least paid 
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employee at the firm64. Anything beyond this would be subject to a punitive tax 
penalty. 
This approach would be most recommendable for two reasons; it could have the 
unintended consequences of pulling the lowest wages up beyond their current levels, 
as it may force the hand of self-interested executives to work towards paying fairer 
wages at the bottom in a bid to keep theirs high, while remaining within the statutory 
confines. This is however unlikely given the effect it could have on the short-term 
profits of the firm, even if it may be beneficial in the long-term due to the morale boost 
and talent retention that would result. Secondly, a punitive tax penalty for exceeding 
set limits could have a redistributive effect, whereby high earners would then be 
required to pay more in taxes, which inevitably would benefit society. An example of 
this, was the so called “super-tax” of 75 per cent imposed by the French government 
on incomes above £780, 000 in 2012. Although the tax was reversed in 2015 due to 
disappointing returns, it did have some success as one commentator noted, it caused 
companies to agree with high earners “to limit salaries for the two years and come to 
an agreement afterwards”65.  
Although the French experiment proved unsuccessful, it may be that with 
adjustments, learning from the errors of the French system might make a similar 
application in the UK more successful. For one, the scope of application would need to 
be streamlined. Whereas the French attempt applied to all high earners, an Anglo-
American version could be limited to top earners in quoted companies. With regards 
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to this, the UK Labour Party in May 2017, in its published manifesto, laid out plans to 
institute an “excessive pay levy”. The levy would impose a 2.5 per cent charge on 
personal earnings above £330,000 and a 5 per cent charge for earnings above 
£500,00066. If these proposals were to come to fruition, companies would have to pay 
an additional £4,250 for every worker earning above the lower threshold of £500,000 
and £29,250 for any earning above a £1m67.  
Mandatory clawback provisions might also be a viable medium to ensure the fairness 
of executive pay. Provisions which allow firms recover all or parts of performance-
related compensation, if the circumstances that precipitated the pay-out are later 
shown to be non-existent or resulted from manipulation by members of the executive. 
The U.S Securities and Exchange Commission is empowered by s.304 of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 2002 to recover bonuses and other performance-related compensation paid 
out to the CEO and chief financial officer, if the firm had to issue a financial 
restatement due to misconduct or any other form of legal non-compliance. the 
provision targets payments made within a 12 month. The SEC have a proposed 
clawback rule to be included as an amendment to s.954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, that would require companies to 
recover incentive compensation mistakenly paid to executives following accounting 
errors. 
The Bank of England passed a provision regarding clawbacks in January 2015, which 
makes bonuses subject to a malus and clawback for a period of seven years from the 
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date of the award68. In 2016, the Bank highlighted plans to expand the rule to allow 
bonuses to be recovered even after the employees leave the firm69. These mandatory 
clawbacks only apply to banks and their employees, they could however be expanded 
further to include all publicly listed firms in the UK, following the American model. As 
they present an opportunity to enhance the fairness of executive pay. 
As noted by Nozick, it would be up to the particular society to determine what principle 
of rectification should be applied to correct past injustices. Stating that, “one cannot 
use the analysis and theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of 
transfer payments, unless it was clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice 
could apply to justify it”70. It might not be possible to reverse some of the injustices 
which result from an avaricious culture of executive excess, however, the reforms 
discussed in the thesis might represent a viable starting point. 
 
 
6.4.   Compassionate Capitalism: Abandoning self-interest in 
Reaching for an Egalitarian Society 
In a society guided by egalitarian principles, state-mandated pay caps would be wholly 
unnecessary. As the income distribution framework, would be informed by a need to 
maintain a balanced, fair and equitable distribution of wealth. As antithetic as it may 
seem, given the Darwinist nature of Anglo-American capitalism, examples exist of 
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corporations, that have egalitarian principles embedded within its core value systems. 
A modern example of this would be department store John Lewis, accompany which 
caps its total CEO wage to 75 times the lowest salary, treats its members as owners in 
common, allowing them to have a direct financial stake in the company’s success71. 
Other examples exist of companies rejecting the traditionalist ‘winner takes all’ 
mentality towards remuneration, which has fostered inequity and inequality, adhering 
instead to notions of equity, that allow for narrower wealth gaps within the 
organisations. One successful example, is the Mondragon Model, which is derived 
from the organisational structuring of Mondragon Cooperative, one of the largest 
corporations in Spain. The Basque based cooperative, in eschewing the standard 
corporate model, bridged the gap between efficiency and equity, constructing a niche 
corporate model that has equitable principles at its core, while managing to stay 
efficient72. Other examples abound of corporations choosing rectitude over efficiency 
in grafting remuneration policies73.  
Whatever the immediate outcome, examples like these provide the basis for an 
‘alternative form of capitalism’, not driven by an indefatigable lust for power and 
wealth, but rather one in which the pursuit of efficiency and growth is tempered by 
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notions of egalitarianism, equity and fairness. Ideally, in such a system, corporate 
governance systems would be structured to foster the pursuit of growth and value 
enhancement in the long-term, as such remuneration policies would naturally follow 
suit. Much unlike the present version, which is largely short-termist both in its 
approach to business and in the construct of its reward systems. 
Perhaps the greatest indictment on short-term capitalism and its extraneous 
remunerative culture, is its unsustainability. Not only for the fact that for our finite 
resources to keep pace with the growth of wealth at the top, would require a 
simultaneous diminishing of wealth at the other levels of the income distribution scale. 
But that the income and wealth gap that would result both within and without the 
corporation, could have potentially devastating consequences, both for the 
corporation and wider society.  Changing this would require a recalibration of the way 
corporations think, with regards to the corporate strategy and the way they do 
business, but also the way CEOs are compensated. 
Undoubtedly, the position of the chief executive is one deserving of the recognition 
that the title entails, as such CEOs need to be set apart from the rest of the employee 
pool, particularly with the regards to the way these positions are incentivised. 
However, over the past four decades, companies seem to have moved beyond the 
erstwhile traditional perks, to outlandish sign-on and severance packages, bonus 
payments and share awards. Such that as at 2015, FTSE 100 CEO pay bests the median 
full-time wage by 183 times, and 129:1 the total pay of their average employees. These 





revelations, leading to suspicion that current CEO pay in Anglo-America is 
unsustainable. 
Besides its unsustainability, it is also unfair and unjust. That CEO wages have grown 
despite a general stagnation in wage growth, suggests a cause and effect relationship 
between the two i.e. CEO wage growth has been catalysed by wage stagnation and 
wage stagnation could be attributed majorly to corporate greed. 
Which then brings us to the challenging issue, of how to make executive pay fairer.  
Recent discourse has shown a preference for legislative intervention rather than the 
current regime of market self-regulation. The scepticism with regards to the latter is 
understandable, as it is akin to giving turkeys a vote on Christmas. However, it is 
apparent, that any true solution would require a combination of the two. Not only 
should governments regulate corporate activity and legislate on pay, but corporations 
need to adopt a more egalitarian stance as well. Eschewing the current view of a 
primary responsibility to investors, with others falling in line, in favour of a more 
realistic approach which recognises the importance of the other constituencies. 
Companies cannot function without employees, nor can they do business without 
society’s custom, investors may be the residual owners, but are in no way responsible 
for the company’s success, hence should not be the major beneficiaries thereof. The 
wealth should be allocated amongst all stakeholders, to employees in form of higher 
wages in good times and better working conditions and to consumers in cheaper goods 
and overall value for money. 
As such, companies need to embrace initiatives that foster greater social responsibility 





they inhabit, and this should not be limited to minimising the negative externalities 
their operations could cause, but rather taking deliberate steps to better the 
communities, by providing or helping improve public infrastructure, protecting the 
environment and ensure well-paying jobs are created.  
Arguments could be made for corporate social responsibility to be made hard law, 
following the template laid in places like India. Where in 2014, a law was passed 
requiring companies with revenues over £150m to allocate a minimum of 2 per cent 
of its total revenue towards a philanthropic cause. Though arguments remain with 
regards to whether the law is effective or useful, but the indisputable fact is, that 
following the law’s enactment, philanthropic spending by India’s largest corporations 
has increased by almost 600 percent, from £357m before the law was passed, to its 
current level £2.63bn74. Most of these donations have been put towards investments 
in social infrastructure, making a difference in areas where a government handicapped 
by inadequate resources, rampant corruption and a swelling urban population, would 
inevitably fall short. 
Although an equivalent piece of legislation in Anglo-America may not be feasible-at 
least not in the short-term-efforts could be made to encourage corporations to take 
an active role in Anglo-American society providing infrastructure in disadvantaged 
communities and as well as opportunities for those left behind by austerity programs, 
put in place by governments struggling to meet its obligations, with ever diminishing 
resources. 
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While we could hope for a corporate sector with CSR at its core, the reality is steps 
need to be taken to ensure corporations meet these obligations75. Such as paying their 
fair share of taxes, focus on job creation within host communities and limit outsourcing 
to save costs and amplify profits, above all and most importantly make wages a fair 
reflection of the firm’s success and standing. The latter applies to CEOs and ordinary 
workers alike. The argument is not just that executive pay is unfair, but that the gains 
of growth seem to go to those at the helm only. Perhaps a more equitable distribution 
of performance gains would allow wages at the bottom to keep pace, and perhaps 
executive pay may attain a semblance of fairness. 
 
 
                                                            
75 As part of a bouquet of corporate governance reforms, the UK government via the Companies 
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